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PREFACE 
 
In the 1950s, three European Communities were created by a series of international legal 
instruments: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) by the Treaty of Paris, 1952; the 
European Economic Community (EEC, now EC), and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EAEC - usually referred to as ‘Euratom’), both in Rome in 1957. 
 
The ECSC Treaty expires in 2002. The other two are of limitless duration. The EEC (now EC) 
Treaty has been much amended, by, inter alia, the Single European Act (1987), and the 
Maastricht Treaty  (1993), which created the European Union, comprising the existing European 
Communities, plus two other ‘pillars’ concerning co-operation in justice and home affairs, and a 
common foreign and security policy. The most recent amendments have been introduced by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force in 1999. The Treaty of Nice, which makes further 
amendments, has not yet come into force. The Euratom Treaty has never been amended as 
to substance. 
 
The provisions of the Euratom Treaty 
 
Believing that civil nuclear power was the key energy technology of the future, the founding 
fathers of the European Communities shared a functionalist belief that by obliging collaboration 
over the development of this technology between the Member States, via the Euratom Treaty, 
then political integration would more likely follow. The Treaty aimed to give considerable 
centralised powers to the Commission responsible for its implementation. Thus, the Euratom 
Supplies Agency would own and control the supply of all fissile materials in the Community, 
and the Commission would control the distribution of patent rights and production licences for a 
series of reactor designs and fuel cycle technologies to be developed by the Joint Nuclear 
Research Centre (JNRC). Provisions for research (Article 7) and international agreements 
(Article 101) were important features of the Treaty: research was required to establish nuclear 
capability, and international agreements were required to gain access to fissile materials and 
technologies. (The USA, for example, was and is the major supplier of enriched uranium, and 
had a virtual monopoly of the supply of the highly enriched uranium required for research 
reactors). 
 
The basic purpose and structure of the Euratom Treaty are set out in its first two articles: 
 
‘The tasks of the Community 
 
Article 1 
 
By this Treaty the HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES establish among themselves a  
EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY (EURATOM).  
 
It shall be the task of the Community to contribute to the raising of the standard of living in the Member 
States and to the development of relations with the other countries by creating the conditions necessary 
for the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear industries.  
 
Article 2 
 
In order to perform its task, the Community shall, as provided in this Treaty:  
 
The EP and the Euratom Treaty: past, present and future 
ii 
PE 313.072 
a. promote research and ensure the dissemination of technical information; 
b. establish uniform safety standards to protect the health of workers and of the general public and 
ensure that they are applied; 
c. facilitate investment and ensure, particularly by encouraging ventures on the part of undertakings, 
the establishment of the basic installations necessary for the development of nuclear energy in the 
Community; 
d. ensure that all users in the Community receive a regular and equitable supply of ores and nuclear 
fuels; 
e. make certain, by appropriate supervision, that nuclear materials are not diverted to purposes other 
than those for which they are intended; 
f. exercise the right of ownership conferred upon it with respect to special fissile materials; 
g. ensure wide commercial outlets and access to the best technical facilities by the creation of a 
common market in specialised materials and equipment, by the free movement of capital for 
investment in the field of nuclear energy and by freedom of employment for specialists within the 
Community; 
h. establish with other countries and international organizations such relations as will foster progress in 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy’.  
 
Control by democratically elected Parliaments was not exactly a significant feature of the 
nuclear sector in the 1950s. All the nuclear weapon States developed their military technology 
in secret, free from scrutiny by their national Parliaments. Moreover the link between the 
development of civil nuclear technology and the military technology was so close that the same 
culture of secrecy also pervaded the civil nuclear sector (and to a certain extent still does). 
Parliaments were not involved in the key decisions relating to development of either the military 
or the civil technologies, or in the international agreements which lubricated them. Thus it 
comes as no surprise that monitoring and control by the European "Assembly" (now officially 
"Parliament" since the adoption of the European Single Act) was not a strong feature of the 
Euratom Treaty, although, ironically, it can be plausibly argued that it is precisely in these areas 
that the public most feels the need for rigorous democratic scrutiny, control and accountability. 
 
The current role of the European Parliament in the Euratom Treaty 
 
The most obvious problem concerns the lack of any requirement for the Council to formally 
consult the European Parliament on a whole range of issues relating to different articles of the 
Euratom Treaty, even though the Parliament is the co-budgetary authority for all expenditure 
based on this Treaty. In contrast, consultation of the unelected Economic and Social Committee 
(ESC) and the unelected (advisory) Scientific and Technical Committee (which is nominated by 
the Member States) is usually required.   
 
Since 1957, as mentioned above, there have been substantial changes and modifications to the 
EEC (now EC) Treaty, via the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty, and now the Treaty 
of Amsterdam. These changes have, inter alia, steadily increased the role, power, and influence 
of the European Parliament, by the introduction of co-decision, and the assent procedure for 
international agreements. But no such changes have been made to the Euratom Treaty: apart 
from minor adjustments, it remains essentially unamended. The Member States, sometimes 
aided and abetted by the Commission, appear to use only parts of the Treaty, and they only use 
those when it suits them. 
 
Parliamentary efforts to reform or revise the Euratom Treaty 
 
Dissatisfaction with the institutional ‘imbalance’ enshrined in the Euratom Treaty compared to 
the provisions laid down in the TEC is one of the major reasons why the European Parliament 
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has repeatedly called for revision of the Euratom Treaty. In contrast to the Euratom Treaty, the 
Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) provides for substantial parliamentary 
involvement in the legislative process (with the co-decision procedure endowing Parliament 
with the right to co-legislate in an ever growing number of areas), or in the conclusion of 
international agreements (assent procedure). None of these procedural rights apply to Parliament 
in the realm of nuclear energy or related issues covered by the Euratom Treaty. 
 
The European Parliament, and in particular its Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research 
and Energy (and previously its Committee on Research, Technological Development and 
Energy) has continuously demanded that the Member States should revise certain provisions of 
the Euratom Treaty. The Treaty’s ‘democratic deficit’, i.e. the lack of parliamentary 
involvement in the decision-making process, has been a subject of particular concern. This 
concern is considered particularly relevant with regard to Chapters I (‘Promotion of Research’) 
and Chapter 10 (‘External Relations’) of the Euratom Treaty, the latter having also been 
vigorously pursued by Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee. Furthermore, the European 
Parliament has repeatedly drawn attention to those Treaty provisions which it regards as 
seriously out-dated, either because they were never implemented, or because their material 
content no longer corresponds to present realities. Did any activity on behalf of the Council or 
the Commission follow Parliament’s repeated calls for more parliamentary involvement? The 
various proposals and opinions have not been translated into action by the Member States. Not 
only did Euratom never assume a prominent position on the Parliament’s agenda for the IGCs, 
the Member States equally successfully excluded Euratom from the negotiating package. It has 
to be admitted frankly that the call for selective Treaty revision has not produced results. This 
‘outcome’ is not too surprising given the interest-constellations in the Council (and in particular 
the position of the French government which sturdily resists any attempt for Treaty reform), and 
the unanimity requirement for any Treaty revision. 
 
Thus we see the general context which explains why this study was requested by Parliament’s 
Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research, and Energy (ITRE). The terms of reference 
were that DG 4 should undertake: ‘a study which summarises the developing relationship over 
time between the EP and the Euratom Treaty, and which offers guidelines as to possible future 
developments and possible EP initiatives in this domain’. Given this ambitious and wide-
ranging brief a decision was taken to carry out the study on an internal/external basis. External 
expertise was sought concerning both the history of the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom), and concerning Parliamentary strategies for Treaty reform/revision/re-interpretation. 
Other chapters, on research, Euratom loans, nuclear safety, supplies, nuclear safeguards, and 
international agreements have been written in-house. 
 
The structure of the study 
 
Thus the structure of this study is as follows: Part One of the study is a history of the Euratom 
Treaty, which covers the period from the early 1950s to the late 1960s. History informs the 
present, not least because the Euratom Treaty has never been significantly amended, yet this 
particular history is not at all well known. It is hoped that this part of the study will result in a 
much wider understanding of the forces which shaped the Euratom Treaty, and which still affect 
its current implementation.  
 
Part Two of the study considers and analyses the most important provisions of the Euratom 
Treaty, chapter by chapter, and then Part Three offers some thoughts on possible strategies 
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which the Parliament might use so as to reduce the ‘democratic deficit’ which is generally 
thought to characterise the Euratom Treaty.  
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Executive Summary 
 
S.1. Summary of Part One: the History of the Euratom Treaty 
 
The Euratom Treaty is often overlooked in the history and operation of the European Union. 
This neglect is unwarranted. Its tactical pairing with the EEC was a crucial factor in initially 
persuading and eventually convincing a sceptical French Government to engage with European 
integration after the embittering experience of the aborted European Defence Community. Jean 
Monnet’s nuclear energy community proposal, and the negotiations that it generated during 
1955, played a crucial role in initiating the relance. In due course, Euratom was to be 
overshadowed by its sister proposal for the creation of a ‘common market’. At the time in 1955 
and early 1956, however, it was widely believed in many quarters that the Euratom proposal 
held the greatest promise of success, while the EEC negotiations faltered. 
  
The negotiation and creation of Euratom reflected a wider contemporary international 
phenomenon: universal optimism about the commercial and scientific applications of nuclear 
energy. The shift away from coal as the primary source of energy in the Western European 
economy exacerbated European anxieties about the dangers of dependence on Middle East oil. 
The political goal of furthering European integration through the device of a nuclear energy 
community thus proved attractive. 
 
The first objective of this history is to determine how the momentum for European nuclear 
energy cooperation first developed. It examines, inter alia, the doubly mistaken belief of Monnet 
and the ‘Europeanists’ in 1955 and 1956, that since nuclear energy was ‘virgin territory’ there 
were no national interests, and so European integration could proceed smoothly in this sector. 
This subsequently led to the emasculation of the original Euratom proposals. France, in 
particular, had strong pre-existing stakes in nuclear energy before the Euratom proposal, and the 
FRG and Belgium also had strong preferences. Therefore, to understand how the negotiations 
proceeded once Euratom was proposed, an appreciation of the wide variations between the 
ECSC member states on the matter of nuclear energy is necessary. The varying experiences, 
institutions, interests and values of individual member states affected the course of the Euratom 
negotiations.  
 
Three major issues were at stake during the negotiations to establish Euratom: 
 
1) whether Euratom should construct a gaseous diffusion plant to produce enriched uranium; 
2) whether member states should be prohibited from the development of the military 
applications of nuclear energy; and 
3) whether Euratom should have a monopoly of ownership and use with respect to nuclear 
materials.  
 
By their very nature these questions revolved around the issue of whether Euratom should 
become a totally self-sufficient Western European organisation, that would allow Europe to 
become a ‘third power’ economically and militarily independent of the USA. France, in 
particular, supported this ‘third power’ approach, but her more Atlanticist neighbours, in 
particular the FRG, disliked this notion. A basic difference in economic approaches between 
France’s statist and interventionist approach, and the more laissez-faire or liberal economic 
policies of the FRG also complicated the negotiations, which unfortunately failed to reconcile 
the divergent interests and values of the member states. This led to a weak treaty and the 
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subsequent failure of the nuclear Community to achieve its substantive goal of an integrated 
European nuclear industry. 
 
Sectoral integration of nuclear energy was chosen by Spaak and Monnet because it was viewed 
as less ambitious than a general common market or customs union, and therefore less likely to 
fail. Nuclear energy was an appealing prestige technology, especially after the liberalisation of 
US nuclear policy. The primary assumption of the integrationists was that the demands of a ‘big 
science’, such as nuclear energy, were probably beyond the capabilities of the individual 
medium and small states of Western Europe, but that together in an integrated collective 
programme they could build an industrial scale nuclear sector producing competitively priced 
electricity in a matter of years. 
 
The determination and ingenuity of Monnet and Spaak ultimately led to the breakthrough that 
placed nuclear integration on the agenda of the ‘Six’ in mid-1955, by linking it with Beyen’s 
idea of a customs union or common market, as a means to reconcile the divergent interests of 
France and the FRG in a package deal. However, the neoliberal priorities of Germany’s 
Economic Ministry and powerful sections of German industry militated against agreement on a 
strong supranational Euratom structure with a total monopoly on ownership of all fissile 
materials and control on their use. It was the presumed strongest supporters of Euratom who 
weakened the organisation irretrievably at the outset: the extremely tenuous assumptions upon 
which Euratom was conceived began to disentangle in the face of intransigent sectional interest 
groups within both the FRG and France.  
 
In sum, the Euratom concept initiated the relance and was considered the most likely vehicle for 
further European integration by Monnet, Spaak, France, the USA and the Action Committee. 
But in the light of this substantial progress in the EEC negotiations, Franco-German 
fundamental difficulties over the Euratom Treaty appeared less salient and they effectively 
agreed to differ. A centralised Euratom Supplies Agency was instituted but denied a de facto 
monopoly. France eventually went ahead with its own isotope separation programme. Domestic 
politics ensured that France had no room for manoeuvre as regards the military option. 
Euratom’s control stopped at the gates of military installations.  
 
In the final analysis, the Euratom Treaty was effectively ‘gutted’. The treaty was inadequate, 
civil nuclear energy was still in its commercial infancy, and the economic predictions for 
nuclear energy were wildly unrealistic. The primary underlying difficulty was that too much 
political importance was vested in an untested economic sector. The ‘myth’ of an energy 
shortage that had propelled Monnet’s efforts during 1955, 1956 and early 1957, dissipated 
thereafter when an abundance of cheap oil flooded Europe. This denied Euratom a major 
centripetal force that could have checked the fissiparous influences of national interest and 
motivated a common energy and nuclear policy. Ultimately, it was the absence of a Franco-
German Axis in nuclear matters that was the undoing of the Treaty during its negotiation and 
implementation stages. A workable and mutually beneficial Franco-German compromise was 
central to the success of the EEC Treaty, but nothing similar existed in Euratom.  
 
The final objective of this history is to assess the establishment, development and performance 
of Euratom in the first decade of its existence. 1967 is chosen as the end date for two main 
reasons. Firstly, the treaty to merge the institutions of the three communities (ECSC, Euratom, 
and the EEC) took effect in that year. Secondly, the unanimous consensus of commentators is 
that 1967 signals the end of Euratom as an effective force. Many explanations for ‘l’échec 
d’Euratom’ are considered including inter alia shortcomings of the Euratom Treaty, nuclear 
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nationalism, a lack of leadership, overinflated initial expectations, and inauspicious 
circumstances. At the centre of the entire saga is the Franco-German relationship in the nuclear 
energy sector.  
 
The Commission argued that Europe’s comparative lack of progress in comparison with the 
USA (in the development of nuclear power) was a product of the ‘fragmentation of the 
[European] effort, the bulk of which has been pursued at the national level with national 
objectives in view’. The damning conclusion was that: ‘Member countries have reserved 
appropriations and public contracts for their own domestic industries, and orders placed by the 
electricity utilities have been awarded solely to domestic contractors. The weakness of industrial 
structures within the Community is in fact the result as much as the cause of this lack of co-
ordination of officially sponsored projects’ (Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement, 
Sept/Oct 1968). The EC Commission, in effect, admitted that Euratom had failed to meet even 
the whittled down objectives that survived the negotiation process to be included in the Treaty. 
Competing national interests made Euratom more of a broker than a prime mover in the 
commercial use of energy in Europe. 
 
S.2. Summary of Part Two: The main provisions of the Euratom 
Treaty 
 
Introduction 
 
In the 1950s, three European Communities were created by a series of international legal 
instruments: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) by the Treaty of Paris, 1952; the 
European Economic Community (EEC, now EC), and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EAEC - usually referred to as ‘Euratom’), both in Rome in 1957. 
 
The ECSC Treaty expires in 2002. The other two are of limitless duration. The EEC (now EC) 
Treaty has been much amended, by, inter alia, the Single European Act (1987), and the 
Maastricht Treaty (1993), which created the European Union, comprising the existing European 
Communities, plus two other ‘pillars’ concerning co-operation in justice and home affairs, and a 
common foreign and security policy. The most recent amendments have been introduced by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force in 1999, and the Treaty of Nice, which has not yet 
come into force. The Euratom Treaty has never been amended as to substance. 
 
The provisions of the Euratom Treaty 
 
Believing that civil nuclear power was the key energy technology of the future, the founding 
fathers of the European Communities shared a functionalist belief that by obliging collaboration 
over the development of this technology between the Member States, via the Euratom Treaty, 
then political integration would more likely follow. The Treaty aimed to give considerable 
centralised powers to the Commission responsible for its implementation. Thus, the Euratom 
Supplies Agency would own and control the supply of all fissile materials in the Community, 
and the Commission would control the distribution of patent rights and production licences for a 
series of reactor designs and fuel cycle technologies to be developed by the Joint Nuclear 
Research Centre (JNRC). Provisions for research (Article 7) and international agreements 
(Article 101) were important features of the Treaty: research was required to establish nuclear 
capability, and international agreements were required to gain access to fissile materials and 
technologies. 
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The basic intent of the Euratom Treaty is set out in its first article: 
 
‘The tasks of the Community 
 
Article 1 
 
By this Treaty the HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES establish among themselves a  
EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY (EURATOM).  
 
It shall be the task of the Community to contribute to the raising of the standard of living in the Member 
States and to the development of relations with the other countries by creating the conditions necessary 
for the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear industries’. 
 
The current role of the European Parliament in the Euratom Treaty 
 
Since 1957, as mentioned above, there have been substantial changes and modifications to the 
EEC (now EC) Treaty, via the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, and, if ratified, the Treaty of Nice. These changes have, inter alia, steadily 
increased the role, power, and influence of the European Parliament, by the introduction of co-
decision, and the assent procedure for international agreements. But no such changes have been 
made to the Euratom Treaty: apart from minor adjustments, it remains essentially unamended. 
 
The most obvious problem concerns the lack of any requirement for the Council to formally 
consult the European Parliament on a whole range of issues relating to different articles of the 
Euratom Treaty, even though the Parliament is the co-budgetary authority for all expenditure 
based on this Treaty. In contrast, consultation of the unelected Economic and Social Committee 
(ESC) and the unelected (advisory) Scientific and Technical Committee (which is nominated by 
the Member States), is usually required. 
 
Support for research activities by the European Communities 
 
Between 1998 and 2002 the European Union will spend BEURO 14.96 in its Fifth Framework 
Programmes for Research, Technological Development, and Demonstration (Programmes 
because there is an EC Programme, and a Euratom Programme.) This contrasts sharply with the 
situation even as late as in the 1970’s, when European Economic Community R & D was a very 
modest affair indeed: the idea that science and technology policy have a general legitimacy at 
the European level is a relatively novel one. The 1957 EEC Treaty of Rome contained no 
provision for Community research. Indeed, the only significant coverage of research was 
provided by the Euratom Treaty, the most relevant provisions of which include the following: 
 
Treaty Chapter 1. Promotion of Research 
 
‘Article 4 
 
1. The Commission shall be responsible for promoting and facilitating nuclear research in the Member 
States and for complementing it by carrying out a Community research and training programme.  
 
[…] 
Article 7 
 
Community research and training programmes shall be determined by the Council, acting unanimously 
on a proposal from the Commission, which shall consult the Scientific and Technical Committee.  
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These programmes shall be drawn up for a period of not more than five years.  
 
The funds required for carrying out these programmes shall be included each year in the research and 
investment budget of the Community.  
 
The Commission shall ensure that these programmes are carried out and shall submit an annual report 
thereon to the Council.  
 
The Commission shall keep the Economic and Social Committee informed of the broad outlines of 
Community research and training programmes’. 
 
The Euratom Treaty thus effectively defined research as nuclear research, and contained specific 
provision for an initial 5-year research and training programme to be carried out at the Joint 
Nuclear Research Centre (established by the Commission pursuant to provisions in Article 8 of 
the Euratom Treaty). 
 
Since the early 1980s the European Economic Community (now European Community) has 
become more and more involved in the support of activities in the area of research and 
technological development (R&TD). There was no explicit provision for this in the EEC Treaty, 
and so the first so-called R&TD Framework Programmes were based on the then Article 235 
EEC. A chapter on R&TD was added to the Treaty by the Single European Act. The Framework 
Programmes for EC RTD&D are now based on Article 166(1) of the EC Treaty, which involves 
co-decision by Parliament and Council, pursuant to Article 251 of this Treaty. The so-called 
‘Euratom Framework Programmes’ are still based on Article 7 of the Euratom Treaty, which 
does not formally oblige any consultation of the EP, though in practice the Council does now 
request Parliament’s opinion in a single-reading ‘consultation facultative’. 
 
Treaty Chapter 3. Health and Safety 
 
Article 2 of the Euratom Treaty provides, inter alia, for the Community to ‘establish uniform 
safety standards to protect the health of workers and of the general public and ensure that they 
are applied’. Chapter 3 of the Treaty, ‘Health and Safety’, shows how this is to be done. 
 
‘Article 30: 
Basic standards shall be laid down within the Community for the protection of the health of workers and 
the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiations’. 
 
It is important to realise what this provision means and includes, and what it does not. It 
essentially provides for the Community to establish a series of dose limits for exposure of 
human beings to radiation. (This has been done, usually following the line established by the 
International Commission for Radiological Protection (ICRP)). But it does not provide any 
competence to Euratom either with respect to possible damage to the natural environment 
caused by radiation, and perhaps even more remarkably, it provides no Euratom Community 
competence with respect to the safety of nuclear reactors.  
 
Thus while there is extensive talk of ‘international safety standards’ and ‘Western standards’ in 
many EU documents dealing with nuclear safety issues, there is no Euratom Directive 
establishing the basic safety standards for the design, construction and operation of nuclear 
reactors in the EU. Thus it is up to each Member State to define its own nuclear reactor safety 
regulations, and regulatory structure, with some possible co-ordination via the IAEA. Given the 
The EP and the Euratom Treaty: past, present and future 
xii 
PE 313.072 
more-or-less inevitably cross-border nature of any major nuclear accident, and given the aim of 
the Euratom Treaty of creating a Common Market for nuclear energy, the omission of any 
harmonisation provisions for nuclear reactor safety does seem surprising, even more so in the 
light of the enlargement negotiations. The Member States, especially the ‘nuclear’ states, appear 
to have a fear of even considering a possible Euratom Directive on the safety of nuclear 
installations, including the establishment of basic safety criteria for the design, construction and 
operation of nuclear reactors in the Community. Why is this? Perhaps because they appear to 
assume, arguably erroneously, that this would inevitably lead to the creation of a European 
Nuclear Installations Safety Inspectorate, which would involve teams of staff from other 
Member States being allowed to inspect sensitive national nuclear installations. This fear seems 
to arise from the model provided by Euratom Safeguards provisions (see below), and the 
existence of Euratom Safeguards inspectors who do have such powers. But this model would 
not of course apply in the case of a Community Directive. A nuclear installations/reactor safety 
Directive would be implemented via the existing national nuclear regulatory provisions and 
organisations, and would thus not require the creation of any European Inspectorate at all. In the 
absence of such Community legislation, the ‘acquis’ on nuclear reactor safety is being 
elaborated in an essentially inter- governmental/ inter-regulatory authority process. 
 
Euratom Loans 
 
The Euratom Treaty makes no mention of the provision of Euratom Loans. Nevertheless, they 
have in recent years become a particularly visible feature in the Euratom political landscape, 
because of their (potential and actual) use to modernise and upgrade the safety systems and 
other technical features of nuclear reactors in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
Euratom Loans was first established by ‘Council Decision 77/270/EURATOM of 29 March 
19771 empowering the Commission to issue Euratom Loans for the purpose of contributing to 
the financing of nuclear power stations’. 
 
The 1977 decision only concerns projects within the Member States of Euratom, and in fact, 
few such loans were ever made. The consequence was that the Euratom loans unit was 
subsequently mothballed, only to be re-established following the Council Decision 
94/179/Euratom of 21 March 1994, ‘amending Decision 77/279/Euratom, to authorize the 
Commission to contract Euratom borrowings in order to contribute to the financing required for 
improving the degree of safety and efficiency of nuclear power stations in certain non-member 
countries’. (Actually the countries of central and eastern Europe, including the CIS countries). 
 
Once again the Commission is empowered to issue these loans: there is no apparent role for the 
Council, and certainly, as with the original 1977 decision, no requirement to consult the 
European Parliament. Appearances, can, however, be deceptive: annexed to the minutes of the 
Council meeting of 21 March 1994 is a set of ‘guidelines’. Their official title is ‘Guidelines 
relating to the financing required for improving the safety and efficiency of nuclear power 
stations in certain non-member countries’. These guidelines are not mentioned in the Council 
Decision. Accordingly we must assume that they are somewhat akin to a Council Declaration 
in the minutes of Council meetings, and the Court of Justice has clearly stated that such 
declarations have no legal force. Nonetheless, it is quite clear that the Commission treats these 
particular ‘guidelines’ as a clear set of instructions from the Council, which determine what 
                                                 
1OJ L88 of 6 April 1977. 
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kind of projects, undertaken by what kind of organisation, can be financed. The guidelines are 
reproduced in this chapter of the study. 
 
Treaty Chapter 6 -Supplies, and Chapter 8 - Property Ownership 
 
Chapter 6 of the Euratom Treaty has a special mythology in the history of the European 
Communities. It created the Euratom Supplies Agency, with its own capital, which was 
designed to control the civil market for fissile materials in the Community. The Community, 
according to the Treaty, owns all such fissile materials, and the Supplies Agency has a right of 
option to purchase all such materials, and has the exclusive right to conclude contracts for the 
supply of such materials. Unfortunately Chapter 6 is, it would seem, not all that it appears to be: 
many articles have apparently either not been implemented at all, or only partially implemented 
or applied. The key provisions of Chapter 8 have never been implemented. The Supplies 
Agency exists, but is a mere shadow of what was intended. It does not appear to have ever 
exercised its purchase option: indeed it does not seem to have ever, in 35 or so years, used any 
of its capital. The Court of Auditors has regularly asked what the Supplies Agency actually 
does. France appears in the past to have sometimes largely ignored the very existence of the 
Agency, considering that France is exempt from most of the provisions of Chapter 6 (which it 
has also challenged the legitimacy of in the European Court of Justice - so far unsuccessfully). 
There is some evidence that France has recently adopted a more co-operative approach with the 
Agency, since it sympathises with its aim of reducing reliance on imports from the CIS, and in 
particular Russia. 
 
The Treaty further specifies that seven years after the coming into force of the Treaty the 
Council should either confirm the provisions of Chapter 6, or modify them by qualified 
majority. The Council has done neither. No Failure to Act case has been brought by the 
Commission against the Council in this or any other matter relating to the non-implementation 
of key provisions of the Euratom Treaty. In recent years the Supplies Agency has enjoyed a 
modest re-vitalisation, as it has attempted to limit imports of nuclear materials from Russia (so 
as to prevent a distortion of the market), and has been supported by the Court of Justice in a 
number of cases relating to this policy. 
 
Treaty Chapter 7 - Safeguards 
 
Euratom Safeguards are designed to prevent the diversion of civil fissile materials to ‘uses not 
declared by their owners’. This peculiar phrase is universally interpreted to mean ‘the 
production of nuclear weapons’. At least this is unambiguously the interpretation that the 
Euratom Safeguards staff put upon it. Chapter 7 is thus a prototype European Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. Indeed its real purposes were presumably (a) to offer a guarantee to the USA that fissile 
material of US origin would always be ‘tracked’ to ensure that it was only used for ‘declared’ 
(i.e. civil) uses, and (b) to prevent Germany from secretly developing a nuclear weapons 
programme - the requirement for declared use would have obliged an explicit decision by 
Germany to follow this path, (as France subsequently did) and Safeguards inspections would 
detect any covert attempt so to do. 
 
The UN Non-Proliferation Treaty gives a Safeguards role to an Inspectorate created within the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, based in Vienna. Crucially, however, such Inspectors do 
not carry out a significant level of inspection within the five States which officially possess 
nuclear weapons - in particular they do not carry out detailed inspections of reprocessing plants 
in these States, even though these produce most of the fissile materials. The IAEA does not do 
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so because such States have dedicated military facilities which are immune to inspection, and 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty recognised that there was little point in inspecting civil facilities in 
these countries, since if the State concerned chose to break the Treaty provisions, it could divert 
fissile material to whoever it liked whenever it liked under the cloak of military secrecy.  
 
Euratom Safeguards - or rather the Euratom Treaty - does not accept this logic, since it now 
devotes over 70% of its resources to inspecting the two major sources of fissile materials in the 
Community - the reprocessing plants at Sellafield in the UK, and at Cap la Hague in France. 
Since both States are nuclear weapon States, both have military production facilities, and stocks 
of Pu 239 and U 235, which are wholly outside Euratom’s control, - since the third paragraph of 
Article 84 of the Euratom Treaty provides that: 
 
‘The safeguards may not extend to materials intended to meet defence requirements’. 
 
One question that must be addressed therefore, is what is the point in inspecting just the civil 
side of fissile materials production in the weapon States, at considerable cost to the European 
taxpayer? Should inspection be extended to all fissile materials (a highly unlikely scenario), 
should European inspection of State owned facilities in nuclear weapons States simply cease, or 
is the current situation acceptable? 
 
International Agreements 
 
International agreements in the areas covered by the Euratom Treaty are covered by Article 101 
of the Euratom Treaty, which reads as follows: 
 
‘The Community may, within the limits of its powers and jurisdiction, enter into obligations by 
concluding agreements or contracts with a third State, an international organisation or a national of a 
third State. 
 
Such agreements or contracts shall be negotiated by the Commission in accordance with the directives of 
the Council: they shall be concluded by the Commission with the approval of the Council, which shall 
act by a qualified majority. 
 
Agreements or contracts whose implementation does not require action by the Council and can be 
effected within the limits of the relevant budget shall, however, be negotiated and concluded solely by 
the Commission; the Commission shall keep the Council informed’. 
 
There is no mention of the European Parliament in this article. For once, there is no mention of 
the Economic and Social Committee either. This therefore effectively guarantees that any such 
international agreements can be negotiated in secret, away from public scrutiny by European 
taxpayers, or by their elected representatives in the European Parliament, although the other 
countries with whom such agreements are signed may well have extensive provisions for 
Parliamentary accountability. Parliament’s Rules of Procedure do provide for Parliamentary 
monitoring of international agreements - but such rules have no legal force, and the Council and 
the Commission have in the past somewhat neglected them with respect to Article 101. 
 
In 1998, Parliament refused to cast a favourable vote on budgetary appropriations destined for 
Community participation in the financing of the modernisation of nuclear power plants in North 
Korea under the guidance of KEDO (Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization) 
which had been founded in 1997 on an initiative by the United States. Negotiations of a 
Euratom-KEDO agreement were covered by Article 101 of the Euratom Treaty and thus did not 
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formally require the Commission to consult Parliament. Yet Parliament strongly criticised the 
Commission for not asking for its opinion. Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee requested 
that Parliament be consulted by the Commission on a voluntary basis ‘in the light of the 
extremely important foreign policy implications of the Agreement’2. However, the agreement 
between Euratom represented by the Commission and KEDO had already been concluded 
without the Parliament having delivered an opinion thereon. Nevertheless, Parliament sought to 
improve its position with regard to future international agreement based on Article 101 of the 
Euratom Treaty by making use of its budgetary powers over what then were non-compulsory 
expenditures. 
 
In a meeting between the Commission, (represented by Sir Leon Brittan) and the Parliament 
representatives in Strasbourg on 09/03/1999, Brittan promised that the Commission would 
provide a list annually of all agreements being negotiated or planned under Article 101. 
Furthermore, it was promised that any draft agreement would be forwarded automatically to 
Parliament at the same time as to the Council and it was also proposed that deadlines should not 
be fixed as there should be ample time for Parliament to express its views. It thus seemed that, 
finally, Parliament having expressed its dissatisfaction with the exchange of letters and having 
re-iterated its ‘threat’ to make use of the budgetary weapon, has succeeded in making a small 
step towards reducing the ‘democratic deficit’ on one important aspect of the Treaty. 
 
S.3. (A) Summary of strategy paper one 
 
In those areas where the European Parliament can make use of its budgetary, procedural and 
oversight instruments, there is a very real opportunity to overcome the subordinate position it is 
endowed with in the Euratom Treaty, vis-à-vis the Commission and the Council. However, the 
use of these instruments will only be successful if it is supplemented by strategic considerations 
by Parliament. The main elements that might be included and questions that might be asked so 
as to devise a strategy are as follows: 
 
- What is the aim of Parliament’s activity? 
Parliament should specify a hierarchy of aims. This hierarchy could, for example, be as 
follows: full revision of the Euratom Treaty; selective Treaty revision; ‘small-steps’ without 
a formal revision of the Treaty etc. 
 
- What are the probabilities that can be attached to each of the previously defined 
aims? 
In order to assess the likelihood of achieving the different aims, the following steps have to 
be taken: 
 Assessment of the interests of all the actors involved in the (formal or informal) 
revision ‘game’; their likely strategies, and the payoffs they attach to the different 
outcomes. 
 Specification of the procedural constraints: seeking discretion on the basis of the 
existing Treaty. 
 Assessment of the degree to which a large majority of MEPs and party groups can 
commit themselves to the means employed to achieve particular aims. 
 Assessing the instruments and the ‘instrument mix’ that can be deployed by 
Parliament. 
                                                 
2 Letter by the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy, Tom Spencer, to the 
President of the European Parliament, José Maria Gil-Robles, 10/03/1998. 
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The first strategy chapter highlights the areas where the small steps approach is most likely to 
produce immediate and tangible results for the European Parliament. It must be vigilant, and 
seek out ‘windows of opportunity’ which may open up possibilities for Treaty revision. Here are 
some examples: 
 
 One tactical device Parliament could employ is to commit Member States to strive for 
Treaty revision. Parliament could seek a commitment from the Council Presidency and other 
‘revision-positive’ Member States to place the item on the agenda for an IGC. 
 
 In this context, Parliament could continue to communicate the absurdity and partly farcical 
nature of some of the Treaty provisions to a wider audience. One ingredient for successful 
agenda placement is the creation of an interested public (awareness raising), which includes 
a critical mass of interested Member States, but also a large majority of parliamentary 
members. 
 
 Parliament could also focus its major criticisms on the institutional shortcomings of the 
Treaty. This would allow Parliament to act more coherently and make it more difficult for 
the Council to reject Parliament’s claims for ‘more democracy’. 
 
 Although Parliament will not have much influence on the number and kind of issues 
discussed at an IGC, the likelihood of Euratom revision will be greatly enhanced if issue 
linkages are made possible during an IGC. 
 
Parliament also needs to pay much closer attention to the activities of the Council’s ‘Atomic 
Questions Group’ (AQG), which is the Council Working Group, comprised of national officials, 
which prepares for Council all matters concerning the Euratom Treaty. The Commission is 
present at the meetings of the AQG, but Parliament, of course, is not. This does not prevent 
Parliamentarians, or Parliamentary officials, making informal contact with the members of the 
AQG, in order to ensure that Parliament is fully aware of the issues which are of current concern 
to the AQG. 
 
S.3. (B) Summary of strategy paper two 
 
The leitmotifs of enlargement and inter-institutional debate are democracy, openness, 
accountability, effectiveness, and efficiency. Enlargement requires institutional change. This 
presents the EP with an opportunity to seek to insert itself more effectively into constitutional 
processes: in short, enlargement, the next IGC and the future of Euratom present the EP with the 
opportunity to insist on a parliamentary voice being heard and heeded as a general matter of 
principle and practice. 
 
The EP’s over-arching goal must be to show that it is relevant, and has something worthwhile to 
contribute in the sensitive areas covered by Euratom. MEPs’ legislative clout might be expanded 
either juridically via treaty change and entrenched expansion of their authority (universalisation 
of co-decision); or de facto via intervention as permitted by existing treaties (questions, budget, 
investigations, public hearings, legislative tactics to delay implementation pending modification 
of specific clauses, etc). 
 
It is no longer acceptable to assume that Euratom’s concerns are fundamentally so technical as 
to dispense with the need for effective political oversight and public scrutiny. Technical 
desiderata are vital but in a democracy they cannot be allowed to be seen to be implemented 
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without open scrutiny. Moreover, public concern about many of the matters covered by Euratom 
and nuclear energy, means that ideally appropriate mechanisms of accountability should be in 
place to which the public can relate.  
 
Enlargement alone requires EU level public scrutiny of the range of issues associated with the 
matters falling under Euratom. As in the past, one of the most useful political weapons available 
to the EP remains the one which is not a legally entrenched right but a tool of political operators: 
the instrument of embarrassment.  
 
Normative issues 
 
It behoves each EU institution to uphold the Transparency, Openness, Democracy, and 
Accountability norms. The European Parliament is not the custodian of these norms. It may, 
however, become their de facto guardian. This has the merit of being non-provocative, non-
expansionary, non-threatening vis-à-vis the unique competences of the Commission and the 
Council, and therefore unlikely to provoke downright opposition on the part of the member 
governments. Especially at a point of enlargement (to nascent democracies), it would be very 
difficult for governments in practice to object to MEPs seeking to sustain democratic values, 
norms and behaviour themselves by virtue of their position as the elected representatives of the 
people. 
 
Constitutional 
 
The constitutional expression of these values has been developed by (a) successive revisions of 
the treaties establishing the EU; (b) reform of inter-institutional relations whether through inter-
institutional declarations, trilogue agreements, Codes of Conduct or through formal amendment 
to specific articles of the relevant treaties. An unspoken but guiding principle for the European 
Parliament, has been to assume that anything that is not expressly prohibited by the treaties is 
implicitly permitted, until the governments decide otherwise. Many of the legislative powers 
now exercised by the EP were seen as radical and unacceptable not so long ago. There is no 
good reason why the EP should desist from seeking to exercise an appropriate, even radical, role 
for itself in respect of the Euratom Treaty, and many of the issues that fall both under its remit 
and that of the EU treaty pillars. In particular, the EP should issue own-initiative opinions, even 
if it has not been formally consulted by the Council. And MEPs must seek out every opportunity 
to make known the EP’s voice and views whether expressly provided for in the treaties or not.  
 
It is entirely appropriate and proper that MEPs should question any issue on which they feel 
inadequately informed; inadequately primed; inadequately prepared by not receiving timely 
information; and inadequately inserted into the legislative process governing the decision on the 
proposal on the table. The EP could combine attempts to set precedents under pillars II and III in 
respect of securing greater acknowledgement of its existence and ‘voice’ by the other 
institutions, with efforts to use the same tactics in respect of Euratom treaty provisions. To this 
end, it would be appropriate for MEPs to use all channels open to them – including the right to 
veto a proposal having budgetary implications, or international repercussions – to assert their 
legitimate right to have a say, and ultimately, of course, to be an equal partner in the process of 
approving or refusing approval for a proposal or course of action proposed by the Commission 
and/or member governments. 
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Threats and negotiations 
 
The EP needs a strategy having several components. This means prioritising and combining 
several negotiating tactics to secure a clearly defined end goal: for example: 
 a gradualist small steps approach (securing informal inter-institutional arrangements to 
exchange information, allow MEPs access to letters, briefing, documents etc. on an informal 
but systematic basis, for example),  
 combined with a tactic to codify small changes in practice (derived, possibly from the 
former) and entrench them in formal inter-institutional agreements,  
 medium level negotiations to incorporate these in treaty articles, worded as generally as 
possible, to  
 full-blown treaty revision designed to universalise co-decision. 
 
The first three would be amenable to persuasion and bargaining, possibly coupled with carefully 
targeted use of threats deploying EP existing power to maximum advantage. 
 
The EP might persuade the Commission to share information, even where this is not explicitly 
required under the Euratom treaty. For example, it could systematically ask the Commission and 
Council for copies of information and develop with them a practice of information sharing. 
 
The most obvious threat open to the EP is to withhold assent on spending, especially non-
compulsory expenditure, and to query and withhold assent for spending relating to international 
agreements, enlargement, or research programmes, where this is legally possible. 
 
Constraints in the EP 
 
None of these tactics is realisable unless there is a good probability of maintaining a winning 
majority behind them in the EP. Great care needs to be taken in assessing ‘opponents’ (from 
member governments to vested interests) and in building and sustaining an environment inside 
the EP and outside receptive to EP wishes in respect of the broad strategy relating to remedying 
the democratic deficit, lack of transparency and accountability in the policy sectors covered by 
Euratom. A strategy of mixing and deploying these tactics strategically and selectively is 
essential. It needs to be coupled with a strategy of deliberation with national parliaments, 
because of their role in Treaty ratification.  
 
If the EP can demonstrate to other institutions and to member governments the usefulness of its 
inputs, it might be possible for MEPs to persuade member governments with an interest in treaty 
reform (especially regarding Euratom and the issue of nuclear reactor safety on the eve of 
enlargement) to include it as an agenda item for the upcoming IGC. The high profile and 
sensitive nature of nuclear issues means that the EP should be able to make political capital out 
of the incomprehensible differences between the treaties over the type and extent of role the EP 
is permitted. 
 
Whilst acknowledging that wholesale revision of Euratom is highly unlikely, the EP cannot 
afford to be seen by the public to be silent about nuclear issues. The EP already has a de facto 
position post-Kedo in being consulted on agreements with third countries, but needs to refine 
and accelerate its own internal procedures to be sure of having an impact. In short, it needs to 
act as a full legislative partner regardless of the formal limitations on its role.  
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I. The origins and early history of Euratom, 1955-1968 
 
‘…contrary to traditional interpretations, the Atomic Community was neither an irrelevant 
peripheral affair in the shadow of the Common Market negotiations, nor was it merely a 
vehicle for the realization of the EEC. On the contrary, the concept of, and the negotiations 
toward, Euratom seem to have been indispensable stepping stones to the development of the 
Common Market’. (Deubner, 1979: 206). 
 
Introduction 
 
The Euratom Treaty is often overlooked in the history and operation of the European Union. 
This neglect is unwarranted. Its tactical pairing with the EEC was a crucial factor in initially 
persuading and eventually convincing a sceptical French Government to engage with 
European integration after the embittering experience of the aborted ‘European Army’. 
Thus, Euratom’s underlying motive was political. It originated as the vehicle for relaunching 
European integration after the stillbirth of the European Defence Community (EDC). As 
such its origins are closely intertwined with that of the ECSC (European Coal and Steel 
Community), EDC and EEC (European Economic Community). Jean Monnet’s nuclear 
energy community proposal, and the negotiations that it generated during 1955, played a 
crucial role in initiating the relance. In due course, Euratom was to be overshadowed by its 
sister proposal for the creation of a ‘common market’. At the time in 1955 and early 1956, 
however, it was widely believed in many quarters that the Euratom proposal held the 
greatest promise of success, while the EEC negotiations faltered. In this sense it performed a 
substantial service to the ‘European idea’. 
 
The negotiation and creation of Euratom reflected a wider contemporary international 
phenomenon: universal optimism about the commercial and scientific applications of 
nuclear energy. Alluring speculations that electricity produced by nuclear power stations 
would become so cheap and could be produced in such vast quantities that the general public 
would not even have to pay for it were commonplace during 1954 and 1955. Such 
excessively optimistic predictions caught the imagination of scientific and political 
audiences in ‘Little Europe’. After all, ‘the Six’ were only just recovering from the energy 
shortages that that had threatened their economic reconstruction after World War II. Their 
economies were growing strongly and, though the formation of the ECSC had overcome the 
coal and steel bottlenecks of the late 1940s and early 1950s, strong economic growth 
projections fuelled expectations of future shortages. The shift away from coal as the primary 
source of energy in the Western European economy exacerbated European anxieties about 
the dangers of dependence on Middle East oil. The political goal of furthering European 
integration through the device of a nuclear energy community thus proved attractive. 
 
Thus the first grand objective of this chapter is to determine how the momentum for 
European nuclear energy cooperation first developed. This is necessary for a number of 
reasons: 
 
 First, the European interest in nuclear energy integration began earlier than is normally 
presumed, 
 
 Second, specific discussions of European co-operation in the nuclear energy field 
predated Monnet’s eventual successful attempt to place the subject on the integrationist 
agenda.  
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Two common misconceptions surrounding the origins of Euratom also require particular 
attention.  
 
 The first is that Jean Monnet single-handedly inspired European interest in nuclear 
energy in late 1954 and 1955. Certainly, he recognised the zeitgeist and saw an 
opportunity to link the widespread nuclear optimism to his overriding political objective 
of European unity, but his idea of European nuclear integration was not new.  
 
 The second fallacy was the doubly mistaken belief of Monnet and the ‘Europeanists’ in 
1955 and 1956, that since nuclear energy was ‘virgin territory’ there were no national 
interests, and so European integration could proceed smoothly in this sector.  
 
These cardinal errors subsequently led to the emasculation of the original Euratom 
proposals. France, in particular, had strong pre-existing stakes in nuclear energy before the 
Euratom proposal. The FRG and Belgium also had strong preferences. Therefore, to 
understand how the negotiations proceeded once Euratom was proposed, an appreciation of 
the wide variations between the ECSC member states on the matter of nuclear energy is 
necessary. The varying experiences, institutions, interests and values of individual member 
states affected the course of the Euratom negotiations.  
 
The second grand objective is to trace the negotiations from the intergovernmental 
conference at Messina (June 1955) to the signing of the Euratom Treaty in Rome on 25 
March 1957. Three major issues were at the stake during the negotiations to establish 
Euratom: 
 1) whether Euratom should construct a gaseous diffusion plant to produce enriched 
uranium; 
 2) whether member states should be prohibited from the development of the military 
applications of nuclear energy; and 
 3) whether Euratom should have a monopoly of ownership and use over the use of 
nuclear materials.  
 
By their very nature these questions revolved around the issue of whether Euratom should 
become a totally self-sufficient Western European organisation, that would allow Europe to 
become a ‘third power’ economically and militarily independent of the USA (Polach, 1964: 
61; Donnelly, 1972: 77). France, in particular, supported this ‘third power’ approach, but her 
more Atlanticist neighbours, in particular the FRG, disliked this notion. A basic difference 
in economic approaches between France’s statist and interventionist approach, and the more 
laissez-faire or liberal economic policies of the FRG (which were credited for the 
Wirtschaftswunder or economic miracle), also complicated the negotiations. Unfortunately 
the negotiations failed to reconcile the divergent interests and values of its member states. 
This led to a weak treaty and the subsequent failure of the nuclear Community to achieve its 
substantive goal of an integrated European nuclear industry. 
 
The third, and final, objective, therefore, is to assess the establishment, development and 
performance of Euratom in the first decade of its existence. 1967 is chosen as the end date 
for two main reasons. Firstly, the treaty to merge the institutions of the three communities 
(ECSC, Euratom, and the EEC) took effect in that year. Secondly, the unanimous consensus 
of commentators is that 1967 signals the end of Euratom as an effective force. Many 
explanations for ‘l’échec d’Euratom’ are considered including inter alia shortcomings of the 
Euratom Treaty, nuclear nationalism, a lack of leadership, over-inflated initial expectations, 
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and inauspicious circumstances. At the centre of the entire saga is the Franco-German 
relationship in the nuclear energy sector.  
 
I.1. CERN: An ‘Experimental’ Precursor? 
 
During the post-war decade, most Western European states’ interest in nuclear energy was 
muted. General economic reconstruction was prioritised. The US dual policy of 
monopolisation (of known reserves and sources of strategic nuclear raw materials) and 
denial (of all information relating to nuclear science) condemned other powers to construct a 
nuclear programme in isolation. West European countries were forced to pursue the costly 
approach of developing the necessary nuclear infrastructure, research and expertise 
independently if they were determined to enter the ‘atomic business’. A ‘catch-up’ 
syndrome ensued in Britain and France, because of their pre-war and wartime experiences in 
the field. In ‘Little Europe’ on a whole, however, the prerogative of rapid rebuilding 
necessitated the exploitation and maximisation of proven conventional energy sources rather 
than the diversion of scarce state resources to the risky, experimental and largely untried 
field of civil nuclear energy. This pragmatism contributed to the foundation of the European 
Coal and Steel Community.  
 
Some interest in nuclear co-operative ventures existed nevertheless. After the European 
Unity Movements’ Hague Congress of May 1948, the possible establishment of a European 
nuclear institute for physics was debated. ‘Towards the very end of 1949, in the aftermath of 
President Truman’s announcement of the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb, several 
personalities associated with nuclear matters in Europe began to think seriously about the 
possibilities of multinational co-operation in this area’ (Krige and Pestre, 1987: 524). Denis 
de Rougemont, a Swiss writer, was active in promoting such ideas. Other interested parties 
included three key senior scientific administrators in Italy, Belgium and France. Their 
motivation was not only to co-operate on fundamental nuclear research but on industrial 
production as well. 
 
Thus, Raoul Dautry, the Administrator-General of the French CEA, argued that ‘the 
factories manufacturing the components for nuclear equipment cannot be used to full 
capacity by one country alone. … A single group of installations could thus meet the need of 
several countries’. This rationale foreshadowed the central economic and technical reasons 
put forward for the creation of Euratom between 1955 and 1957. Simultaneously, at the end 
of 1949, nuclear physicists from the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Denmark, Switzerland 
and Sweden, led by another key member of France’s pre-war nuclear research programme, 
Lew Kowarski, began discussing co-operation in the field of experimental nuclear physics 
(Pestre, 1987: 68-70). Such pressures led the Lausanne Conference (December 1949) to pass 
a resolution calling for studies to be undertaken into the feasibility of creating a European 
institute for nuclear science ‘directed towards applications in everyday life’ (Krige & Pestre, 
1987: 524 ). Dautry argued that ‘what each European nation is unable to do alone, a united 
Europe can do and, I have no doubt, would do brilliantly’ (Pestre, 1987: 74).  
 
The eventual product of the negotiations was CERN – an intergovernmental organisation 
devoted to fundamental research in high-energy physics. By the time the CERN Convention 
was signed on 1 July 1953, therefore, the whole objective of the organisation had become 
much narrower than originally conceived by Dautry. It was the first genuinely European 
science organisation, but why was the ‘minimalist’ nuclear route chosen by CERN?  
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Firstly, contrary to the high ‘humanitarian’ hopes placed in it, the entire nuclear field was 
umbilically connected to military nuclear energy. Allied countries, France in particular, 
would not countenance the risk of former Axis states, especially the FRG, gaining the 
technical expertise of this dual-use technology. Mutual trust was still lacking so soon after 
World War II, and the USA tried to block the development of any nuclear energy 
applications. Thus geopolitics barred co-operation in practical atomic energy matters. 
Fundamental research necessitating the building of a European laboratory and particle 
accelerator was a different matter. High-energy physics research offered a safe and relatively 
low cost way to demonstrate European unity. The field was prestigious, and since it required 
relatively large-scale equipment, international co-operation in Western Europe could 
accelerate its advancement. More importantly, although it was firmly within the ‘mythical’ 
nuclear area, any possible applications that developed from it were only likely far into the 
future, so national rivalry and the ‘military’ question did not present insurmountable 
obstacles.  
 
Secondly, most European governments before 1953 took little interest in science policy. The 
United Kingdom, and France to an extent, was the notable exception. Consequently, 
individuals, in particular scientists, had considerable freedom to frame CERN to meet their 
scientific interests without the imposition of national agendas (see Krige and Pestre, 1987: 
526-28). Conversely, Euratom, since it was conceived later and was driven by the 
expectation of extensive benefits from civil nuclear applications, encountered strong 
national and industrial interests. But even before such a ‘maximalist’ nuclear integrative 
project could emerge as a viable concept one major impediment had to be removed.  
 
I.2. US Nuclear Policy 
 
Europe, in general, lacked access to not only the raw materials, but also to much of the 
information and technology, to build a nuclear industry. The US imposed a policy of nuclear 
denial designed to prevent other states from constructing nuclear weapons (Gillon, 1994: 21-
24). US non-proliferation policy, in concert with the UK and Canada, sought to monopolise 
and restrict access to the uranium and thorium resources of the post-war world for the US 
(Skogmar, 1993: 297-320). The USA policy was enshrined in the McMahon Atomic Energy 
Act, 1946. It prohibited any civil nuclear co-operation with other states unless US Congress 
was satisfied with the international safeguards in place (Scheinman, 1987: 17).  
 
A volte-face in US nuclear policy during 1953 and 1954 single-handedly induced an 
international ‘euphoria’ about the presumed potential of civil nuclear energy. President 
Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech on December 8, 1953 signalled this turnaround. The 
‘Atoms for Peace’ programme aimed at diverting military fissile material to civil uses in 
order to slow Soviet efforts in the arms race. It was also designed to develop US private 
enterprises to compete more effectively for the potential market for atomic energy in high 
cost energy countries such as in Western Europe (Hewlett & Holl, 1989: 209-37). The USA 
recognised that a `nuclear export race’ was in danger of commencing between France and 
the UK (Goldschmidt, 1977: 73). If the USA was to benefit, a change of US legislation was 
required. Consequently, the USA rethought its legislation for a number of reasons including 
competitive commercial concerns, the questionable success of its non-proliferation policies, 
and the realisation of the potential civil applications. 
 
Consequently, the 1954 US Atomic Energy Act permitted the transfer of American civil 
nuclear information to her allies (Botti, 1987: 133-41). However, this major amendment to 
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the 1946 Act still proscribed the communication of any military nuclear information to allies 
(Weiss, 1985: 133-35). The ‘military risks of exporting civilian nuclear technology’ were 
realised (Sokolski, 1985: 42). Though Allies would be provided with the necessary raw 
materials and technological know-how for civilian nuclear energy production, the USA 
would also establish an International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA), to inspect civilian 
nuclear programmes created under its auspices to verify that they were not abused for 
military purposes. The US specifically sought to prevent the transfer of two key 
technologies related to uranium enrichment technology and chemical reprocessing of 
depleted reactor fuel to produce plutonium (Ehrlich, 1985: 326-7). 
 
Even so, ‘Atoms for Peace’ was the ‘catalyst’ (Stirk, 1996: 137) for the idea of European 
integration of nuclear energy and for determining some of the main contours of the intra-
European discussions during the Euratom negotiations. 
 
Though nuclear power stations were still at a very early stage of development, in February 
1955 Britain’s announced that it was inaugurating the world’s first industrial nuclear 
electricity production programme reinforced widely held hopes about the potential of 
nuclear energy. The British predicted that the cost of nuclear-generated electricity would be 
competitive with that of conventionally produced electricity by 1963. This led to the ‘crazy 
years’ of nuclear energy enthusiasm (Goldschmidt, 1982: 260-61). The euphoria generated 
several international and national nuclear energy institutions between 1955 and 1958. In the 
space of a few months the IAEA (29 June 1957), Euratom (1 January 1958), and the 
OEEC’s European Nuclear Energy Agency (1 February 1958) were created.  
 
I.3. The OEEC 
 
The OEEC was the first organisation to examine the possibilities for regional nuclear energy 
co-operation. The rising imports of energy (especially oil) were perceived as a threat to the 
continued economic recovery of Western Europe. The Council of the OEEC began to 
consider the implications of the rising imports and the rising costs of energy in late 1953 
(Guillen, 1994: 112).  
 
In early 1954, the OEEC commissioned a study of the region’s energy needs led by M. 
Louis Armand (Nelsen, 1958: 43), the Chairman of the French National Railway (Société 
Nationale des Chemins de Fer) (Milward, 2000: 205). He was a strong advocate of nuclear 
energy and European integration and ‘had a natural tendency toward international co-
operation and wanted the whole world’ to benefit from his work (Hecht, 1998: 34-38). In 
1951 he had refused to take over the leadership of the French Commissariat à l’Energie 
Atomique (CEA), because he was ‘convinced of the need for a nuclear Europe’ rather than 
nuclear nations (Goldschmidt, 1982: 290). In 1954 the OEEC gave him the opportunity to 
put his nuclear vision of Europe into practice. 
 
Armand’s OEEC Report (‘Quelques Aspects du Problème Européen de l’Energie’) was 
published in June 1955. It highlighted that Europe’s energy needs were increasing and that 
Europe needed an indigenous source of energy, especially electrical energy. Armand 
predicted that peaceful nuclear energy was an ideal energy source and would become 
economically competitive in a few years (Gaudet, 1959: 147; Arbuthnott, 1979: 124). 
Because of the extraordinarily large scientific, technical, industrial and financial demands 
involved in the development of civil nuclear energy, the Report believed extensive European 
co-operation was vital (Nelsen, 1958, p. 43). Co-operation would accelerate and maximise 
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the commercialisation of nuclear-generated electricity by facilitating the pooling of research 
results and by financing joint installations that were beyond the resources of individual 
states, in particular nuclear enrichment facilities. The OEEC Council took note of this 
positive analysis, established an OEEC Commission for Energy and commissioned a three-
man expert Nicolaides Working Group to investigate co-operation in peaceful nuclear 
energy.  
 
Meanwhile, the ECSC ‘Six’ (who were also members of the OEEC) began to consider 
forming a nuclear organisation. Therefore, two regional nuclear plans were discussed in 
tandem for much of the period between 1955 and 1957. This complicated both sets of 
negotiations. A tug-of-war developed for the devotion of France, the FRG, Italy, and 
Benelux. Armand dissociated from the OEEC option which he had pioneered, because he 
disliked the minimal intergovernmentalist approach of the OEEC. He preferred the more 
ambitious supranationalist approach contemplated by the advocates of Euratom (Vaïsse, 
1994: 108). But where did the Euratom proposal spring from? 
 
I.4. L’Inspirateur? 
 
Three individuals, Jean Monnet, Paul-Henri Spaak and Johan Willem Beyen, were central in 
proposing further integration within ‘Little Europe’ after the ignominious collapse of the 
EDC. The French Assemblée Nationale’s rejection of the EDC Treaty appeared to end the 
prospect of further integration on the ECSC model (Duchêne, 1994: 258). The Mendès-
France proto-Gaullist government was inherently hostile to European integration. De Gaulle 
publicly maligned Monnet as the promoter of a ‘stateless’ European ‘monstrosity’, i.e., the 
EDC (quoted in Duchêne, 1994: 254).  
 
Within months, however, Monnet, Spaak and Beyen formulated and linked the proposals for 
the creation of Euratom and the ‘Common Market’. They also ensured that the proposals 
received a hearing from the Six governments, despite pronounced caution in Paris and Bonn. 
Monnet was the senior member of this triumvirate, but an able team of supporters backed 
him: Pierre Uri, Max Kohnstamm, Richard Mayne, and François Duchêne. The Common 
Assembly of the ECSC may also have played a role. In its 1954 session, the Common 
Assembly adopted a report urging the High Authority of the ECSC ‘to explore possibilities 
of expanding the scope of the Coal and Steel Community and its institutions…’ (Polach, 
1964: 20; see also Kramer, 1976: 31-64 & Meyer-Cording, 1957). Though the Common 
Assembly’s call expressed the sentiments of all convinced ‘Europeans’, it lacked any power 
to act on the impulse.  
 
The decisive action was Spaak’s encouragement of Monnet to act within twenty-four hours 
of the French Assemblée Nationale’s veto of the EDC (Moravscik, 1999: 139). Spaak and 
Monnet began to draft a declaration that would amount to a manifesto for renewed 
integration. They busied themselves with formulating a feasible but attractive proposal, and 
they had several from which to choose. Various ‘political entrepreneurs’ proposed over a 
dozen integrationist plans in the eighteen months after the EDC’s collapse (Moravscik, 
1999: 139). Why did Monnet and Spaak decide to pursue atomics as the route to integration? 
What ensured that a nuclear energy scheme would rise above the other proposals and 
become enshrined in the Euratom Treaty?  
 
Until January 1955, neither Spaak nor Monnet had discovered a core practical proposal for 
Monnet’s planned declaration. The expansion of the ECSC to new forms of energy and 
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transport was a persistent theme, but only one of many, throughout the numerous drafts. It 
was not until Monnet met Max Isenbergh in January 1955 that civil nuclear energy co-
operation was suggested. Isenbergh, the deputy legal counsel of the US Atomic Energy 
Commission (USAEC), gave Monnet the idea for Euratom (Duchêne, 1994: 263-4). Monnet 
favoured this as a continuation of the integrative approach that the ECSC had inaugurated, 
also known as sectoral or vertical or functional integration. This involved the pooling of 
particular economic sectors, such as coal and steel, for the ‘common good’. Monnet believed 
that once the benefits of integrating one economic sector was realised, there would be less 
resistance to integrating other sectors of the member states’ economies. Thus functional 
integration would ‘spillover’. Integration would occur gradually or incrementally. Monnet 
believed that the nationalism in France would prevent more ambitious ‘horizontal’ 
integrationist projects, such as a ‘common market’. 
 
In light of the nuclear optimism that prevailed at the time, Monnet began to view nuclear 
energy as ‘God’s gift to integrators’. Europe was falling behind the USA and Britain in a 
new technology that held enormous potential. Therefore, a common European interest 
existed. A pooling of resources and energies in a great ‘collective effort’ was the best 
solution in Monnet’s perspective, in light of the great outlays of resources and finance 
required to enter the nuclear sphere. Additionally, the nuclear situation necessitated 
regulation, to ensure the impartial allocation of scarce raw materials and finance, as well as 
to ensure no diversification of materials to military applications (Duchêne, 1994: 264-5).  
 
Hence, Monnet believed that an atomic energy community could easily be established since 
it ‘only’ required the member states to ‘persuade their Parliaments to extend the range of the 
High Authority’s mandate and to set up a new Authority for atomic power’ (Monnet, 1978: 
401). In light of his previous role in the French economic modernisation programme, the 
formulation of the Schuman Plan, and his role as President of the ECSC’s High Authority, 
Monnet was predisposed to seeking integration in sectors which required the existence of a 
strong centralised economic planning authority. Monnet believed that nuclear energy ‘was 
the right star to hitch [the] European wagon to’(cit. in Scheinman, 1965: 133). Certainly, 
circumstances were good. 
 
The anti-integrationist Mendès-France government collapsed on 6 February 1955 to be 
replaced by a centre-right government led by Edgar Faure (Milward, 2000: 192). Though 
Faure’s cabinet was riven by disputes, the fall of the slayer of the EDC was viewed as a 
positive development by pro-integrationists (Stirk, 1996: 136). Additionally, the ‘vexed 
issue’ of West German rearmament and sovereignty was close to solution. In December 
1954 the main obstacle to German rearmament, the French National Assembly, ratified the 
Paris Treaty and thus the setting up of the Western European Union (WEU) (Dedman, 1996: 
89-90). Following successful ratification by all the states party to the Treaty, the FRG joined 
NATO on 5 May 1955.  
 
Finally, Monnet’s programme for an atomic community was framed with French nuclear 
energy interests in mind. Even the Eurosceptical Gaullists were prepared to countenance 
integration in the field (Milward, 2000: 206). Thus, Monnet calculated that French interest 
in European integration was most likely to return if the proposed integration occurred in a 
sector, in which it had strong interests and thought that it could gain from a pooling of 
resources.  
 
France was well on her way to becoming an independent producer of fissile materials as a 
result of the £40 million First French Five Year Plan for Atomic Energy, which was 
The EP and the Euratom Treaty: past, present and future 
PE 313.072 
 
 
8 
approved in 1952 (Goldschmidt, 1982: 58-59). Meanwhile, the French civil nuclear energy 
project grew rapidly throughout 1955. The budget of the Commissariat à l’Énergie 
Atomique (CEA) almost doubled under Mendès France’s Government. Then on 20 May 
1955 this was almost doubled again, bringing appropriations to the CEA to just under 1% of 
the national budget (O’Driscoll, 1996: 50). The French nuclear programme dwarfed the 
cumulative nuclear efforts of all its ECSC partners by the mid-1950s (Scheinman, 1967: 30).  
 
Despite France’s progress, she still required substantial external scientific expertise and 
industrial might. The French needed large amounts of enriched uranium for ostensibly 
civilian purposes but the gaseous/isotopic diffusion process was still denied to them by US 
national security policy. The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) was 
unable to meet the CEA’s rapidly increasing demands for enriched uranium from its existing 
‘modest’ enrichment plant at Capenhurst. France’s suggestion that Britain should build a 
separation diffusion plant in France for French needs was rejected on 5 February 1955 as 
‘politically difficult’. This was a veiled reference to the British priority of maintaining the 
Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’. The UKAEA counterproposal that a plant could be 
built in Britain to meet French demands, if France signed a long-term contract agreeing to 
buy enriched uranium, failed to satisfy the CEA. France wanted its own diffusion plant 
independent of external influence and control (see O’Driscoll, 1996: 56).  
 
Following her failure to acquire either sufficient quantities of enriched uranium or the 
necessary gaseous diffusion technology to do so from Britain, France began to see some 
advantages in co-operation with the FRG. Though Germany was only just initiating a 
nuclear industry, she had a world-renowned chemical industry and world-class scientists 
which would ensure rapid progress. Siemens and Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft 
(AEG) were world class electrochemical firms (Walker & Lönnroth, 1983: 20). French 
political initiative led to negotiation of a Franco-German nuclear agreement which was 
signed on 30 April 1955. The underlying rationale was that the two countries should 
coordinate their activities for the development of the nuclear energy. The notion of a 
‘common approach’ was central to the agreement. According to Polach this ‘common 
approach’ was considered by both countries as ‘the best instrument for strengthening 
European solidarity’ (Polach, 1964: 21).  
 
Earlier, and independently, on 4 April, Spaak had written to the Foreign Ministers of 
Germany, Italy and France (Adenauer, Pinay, and Gaetano Martino). He ‘proposed that a 
conference be convened to negotiate treaties to extend the ECSC to all of energy and 
transport (including airlines) and to create a new Community for civil nuclear power’ 
(Duchêne, 1994: 268). However, the replies were discouraging. As Monnet admits, 
‘Pinay…was afraid to reopen the European debate which had so recently closed. The 
Germans, contrary to my first expectations, were not enthusiastic about the idea of an atomic 
Community on the model of the ECSC’ (Monnet, 1978: 403). Adenauer recalls in his 
memoirs that he ‘reacted coolly’ to Monnet’s proposal. Though Spaak believed him to be 
‘passionately pro-European’ (Schwarz, 1997: 230), Adenauer was ‘haunted by the thought 
that it would be disastrous for a new attempt to fail’ (Monnet, 1978: 403). 
 
On 6 April 1955, the German Foreign Office’s Political Department confirmed that the 
German Government could not support Euratom, but that it might support a ‘general 
common market’ (Duchêne, 1994: 269). Ludwig Erhard, the Minister for Economic Affairs, 
and his Under-Secretaries Ludger Westrick and Alfred Müller-Armack, were hostile to 
dirigiste sectoral integration on the model of the ECSC and favoured international free-trade 
system as the basis of the FRG economy (Schwarz, 1997: 230). The ‘future producers’ of 
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West German nuclear technology, viz, the chemical, electrical engineering, machine-
building and non-ferrous metals industries, were expanding into international markets and 
sought to be internationally competitive (Deubner, 1979: 211-215). These advanced 
industries resented any interference with their commercial freedoms, and considered that 
nuclear co-operation with the advanced nuclear powers, Britain and particularly the USA 
held out the greatest prospects (Moravcsik, 1999: 140).  
 
The French for their part were cautious. Pinay, the French Foreign Minister, feared that the 
proposals ‘to supranationalise energy and transport might produce another EDC in France’. 
Faure, was hostile to Monnet personally, and feared an ECSC High Authority with a new 
role in nuclear energy. The Italian Foreign Minister Gaetano Martino was reportedly 
‘opaque’ (Duchêne, 1994: 271). These discouraging replies to the Monnet-Spaak initiative 
surprised Monnet.  
I.5. Junktim 
 
Johan Willem Beyen, the Dutch Foreign Minister, was the only Foreign Minister to react in 
a constructive manner to the Monnet-Spaak proposals for Euratom. He suggested the very 
idea of a customs union that Spaak and Monnet had downplayed or rejected as too 
ambitious. A Western European customs union had been under serious consideration in 
Dutch government circles since 1952 (Milward, 2000: 173-193). Independently of Monnet 
and Spaak, Beyen had gained confidence that progress in integration matters was again 
possible with the fall of Mendès-France, and he revived his customs union proposal in 
March 1955 (Milward, 2000: 193). Thus, Beyen replied to Spaak’s Euratom solicitation with 
the argument that ‘partial integration’ on a sector-by-sector basis did not go far enough. In 
order to increase productivity and European ‘solidarity’ he asserted that: ‘it is vital that a 
feeling of joint responsibility of the European states for the common welfare should be 
embodied in an organisation which follows the general interest, with an executive which is 
answerable not to the national government but before a supranational parliament’ (Duchêne, 
1994: 273). Though Spaak was initially ‘scared’ by the ‘daring’ of the Beyen Plan, 
reflection convinced him of the rightness of Beyen’s approach (Duchêne, 1994: 274).  
 
Monnet was also in the process of reaching the same conclusions. His discussions with 
Ophüls of the German Foreign Office revealed that at ‘no time were the Germans willing to 
swallow Euratom without a general common market’ (Duchêne, 1994: 269, 274). The strong 
liberal internationalist objections of German industry and the Economic Affairs Minister 
presented a major stumbling block. Monnet was convinced by this potentially powerful 
opposition that a Common Market should also be considered in tandem with Euratom 
(Monnet, 1978: 403; see also Schwarz, 1997: 230).  
 
As a result, the Beyen Plan was linked with the Monnet-Spaak one creating a ‘joint 
approach’. The linkage or ‘junktim’ between the vertical (nuclear sector) and horizontal 
(common market) modes of integration was a creative compromise. It would always be a 
balancing act to find a single integrative project that would satisfy the two key actors, the 
French and the Germans, as well as the other member states of the ECSC, but it appeared to 
Beyen, Spaak and Monnet that a ‘package deal’ could be achieved from the ‘junktim’. Both 
France and Germany potentially had something to gain.  
 
Though Beyen convinced Spaak that the French could be persuaded to join a common 
market, Spaak still retained deep-seated fears that it was too ambitious and according to one 
commentator, ‘The sectoral approach was put into it because, Spaak said, if we fail in the 
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overall approach, we have to have a fall-back position’ (Duchêne, 1994: 274). Beyen and 
Spaak arrived at this compromise on 23 April. They then composed the now famous 
Benelux Memorandum and circulated it on 20 May as part of the agenda for the next 
meeting of ECSC foreign Ministers on 1-2 June 1955 (Moravscik, 1999: 141), which had 
been convened to select a successor to Jean Monnet as President of the ECSC High 
Authority. But in order to fully understand the positions take by the national governments at 
Messina and in the subsequent negotiations it is first essential to appreciate the state of the 
nuclear industries among the Six. 
 
Wide differences existed in the nuclear sectors of the ECSC ‘Six’. France was the most 
advanced, with an extensive nuclear infrastructure, and since 1952 it was moving from the 
experimental into the industrial stage. Its programme was dual-purpose in character, and 
harboured military intent. Meanwhile, the Netherlands and Italy were still in the initial 
experimental stages. Belgium showed considerable promise owing to a close relationship 
with the USA and its uranium deposits in the Belgium Congo. The FRG, though a late 
starter, also held considerable potential. In terms of economic philosophies and 
administrative bodies the situation in each state was extremely disparate. Administratively, 
France had a powerful centralised public body, the CEA, directly accountable to the Prime 
Minister. There was little or no private involvement in the nuclear sphere. Belgium and 
Germany favoured a more liberal, business-friendly approach to nuclear development. Italy 
wavered between a liberal and more interventionist policy. ‘[E]ach country faced different 
internal circumstances and preoccupations which shaped its perceptions of international 
priorities’ (Nau, 1974: 95)3. These variations help to explain the considerable difficulties 
that were about to arise in discussions of regional cooperation on nuclear matters that began 
at Messina. 
I.6. Messina  
 
Messina’s historical importance derives from the fact that it kept the prospect of further 
integration alive. It did not ensure the success of the relance. Instead, Messina simply kept 
the option open, so that in the next twenty months, a gradual convergence of interests could 
occur. Monnet was not present because he had become such a controversial figure in France. 
Faure had vetoed his attendance. It was an intergovernmental conference and the ECSC 
High Authority was ignored. Although there was a widespread view among the ‘Six’ that 
integration was worthwhile pursuing, there was still no consensus about the ‘method’ of 
integration to be adopted.  
 
The mixed responses between the ECSC ‘Six’ to the Benelux Memorandum resulted in an 
awkward atmosphere at the Messina Conference (1-2 June 1955). Though Adenauer 
recognised the potential significance of Messina, he refused to attend ‘for fear of failure’ 
(Duchêne, 1994: 281). At a crucial meeting of representatives of the German Economic 
Affairs Ministry on 22 May it was decided that the Beyen proposals served German interests 
better than Euratom. However, Adenauer and the German Foreign Office indicated that 
political, rather than economic, imperatives were crucial, and European integration was 
desirable for normalising Germany’s relationship with its Western neighbours (Milward, 
2000: 198-201). Initial indications were that Italy held a similar position. She backed further 
European integration, but strong domestic actors favoured ‘horizontal’ integration over 
atomic energy integration (Polach, 1964: 21; Duchêne, 1994: 277-8).  
 
                                                 
3 This entire section relies heavily on the comprehensive assessment provided by H.R. Nau (1974: pp. 66-95). 
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The key problem encountered at Messina was that of how to bridge the gap between 
France’s position and the other five states. France was concerned not to agree to an 
ambitious initiative that would meet the same disastrous end as the EDC Treaty (see 
Milward, 2000: 210). French politicians were beginning to view European cooperation in 
the nuclear sector as a multi-functional tool. At a diplomatic level it would help to control or 
monitor the military implications of Germany’s nuclear industry without discriminating 
against her. French support for nuclear co-operation would also act as a valuable French 
gesture towards European unification, and aid her rehabilitation following her ignominious 
role in destroying the EDC. Finally, the French nuclear programme would benefit (DDF, 
1955, Vol. I, doc. 239). France’s difficulty in obtaining either enriched uranium or the 
technology necessary to achieve uranium enrichment, led its policymakers to consider the 
possibility of developing a European joint facility. This would permit subsidisation of the 
French nuclear programme. 
 
Thus, Pinay’s position was ‘yes to Euratom and no to the Common Market’ which was 
unacceptable to the other member states. Even Pinay’s support for Euratom during the 
conference was heavily qualified: ‘It was to have decision-making powers, but none to take 
over bilateral national agreements with the USA, none to pool information and none to 
replace or coordinate national policies’ (Duchêne, 1994: 281). This was a reflection of the 
CEA’s initial hostility to Monnet’s Euratom idea. It feared that since France had the by far 
the largest nuclear energy industry among the ECSC countries, she would have to bear the 
substantial costs of setting up a European nuclear energy community. The CEA also disliked 
the intrusive supranational features of the proposed Euratom, preferring the 
intergovernmental option being proposed by the OEEC instead (DDF, 1955, Vol. I, docs. 
288 & 301). Thus, Pinay proposed a minimal Euratom that would not drain resources from 
France’s national programme, but which would complement it. 
 
Only an all-night tête-à-tête between Spaak and Pinay produced the Messina communiqué, 
which sanctioned the continuation of ‘exploratory’ talks to examine the feasibility of 
implementing the Benelux Memorandum. The Director of Economic Relations at the Quai 
d’Orsay, ‘emphasised the French had only agreed not to oppose a continuation of talks, and 
that this was very different from assent’ (Duchêne, 1994: 282).  
I.7. The Spaak Committee 
 
Spaak was appointed as head of the Intergovernmental Committee of experts mandated to 
investigate the feasibility of the various proposals for integration and produce a report for 
consideration by the governments. The Spaak Committee instituted four commissions of 
national experts, one of which was devoted to atomic energy (Polach, 1964: 22). Louis 
Armand was appointed chairman of the Commission on Atomic Energy. The final Armand 
Report urged the governments to adopt measures to ensure the development of the industry, 
non-discriminatory access to resources and a common price-level. Armand coined the term 
Euratom.  
 
Thus, the report proposed a strong supranational Euratom. Governments should delegate the 
right to purchase and own all fissile resources to a Community agency. This agency would 
also control their supply. This agency was to possess a community monopoly over supplies 
and be the legal owner of the material. The Report, therefore, saw the necessity for what 
became the Euratom Supplies Agency (ESA). It also recommended the creation of 
authoritative health and safety measures, active coordination of scientific and technological 
knowledge and the establishment of joint installations (e.g., an isotope separation plant). The 
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‘core’ Euratom should be a trade monopoly (the term ‘monopoly’ was excluded in the final 
report) over fissile materials (Weilemann, 1983: 42-47). Two ‘possibilities for common 
action’ were presented as possibilities for co-operation: the construction of an isotopic 
separation and a plutonium extraction plant. 
 
Though the majority of the Armand commission supported the report, the German delegates 
were dissatisfied. The federal Ministry of Economic Affairs led by Ludwig Erhard, and the 
newly created Ministry of Atomic Affairs led by Franz Josef Strauss were strongly opposed 
to the idea of a supply monopoly which was to be exercised by an independent Community 
organ. Erhard feared a new supranational, dirigiste project modelled on the ECSC. German 
businessmen believed that cooperation with the USA would be more beneficial (Helmreich, 
1991: 394). Strauss viewed Euratom as ‘a transparent attempt to capture the burgeoning 
German nuclear industry’ (Schwarz, 1997: 230). The German members of the Armand 
Commission were aware of these concerns.  
 
The second major cleavage that emerged, and subsequently threatened the negotiation of 
Euratom, was the military question. Spaak had originally recognised that the question of the 
military atom was a serious problem because of the French military predilections 
(Scheinman, 1965: 141). Spaak admitted that he did not know whether French had a military 
nuclear programme, but he knew that the military and peaceful uses of atomic energy were 
inseparable. He believed that the French could have their own nuclear weapons programme 
outside the nuclear energy pool and rely on their domestic sources of natural uranium to 
maintain it, while using the proposed community’s sources for its peaceful atomic energy 
programme (NARA, RG59, 840.1901/9-155, 1 Sept. 1955). The French feared that if they 
were forced to reject their right to manufacture nuclear weapons, they would ‘not only place 
themselves outside the circle of great powers but resign themselves to total impotence’ 
(NARA, OEAO, ROS, Subject Files, 1956-7, Box 67). Meanwhile, other Europeans, the 
USA and Britain feared that German nationalists would demand atomic armaments as a 
symbol of equality, if all the members of Euratom did not renounce nuclear military 
ambitions (NARA, RG59, Central Files, 840.1901, 9 Feb 1956).  
 
And this seemed possible. Adenauer’s unilateral renunciation of the FRG’s right to 
manufacture weapons of ‘mass destruction’ ‘on its own soil’ as part of the WEU package 
was implicitly conditional and ambiguous. The conditionality of the pledge was underlined 
by Dulles at the time Adenauer made this famous declaration at the London Conference of 
October 1954. According to Adenauer’s memoirs: ‘When I had given this declaration, 
Dulles rose from his seat. He came to me and said in a loud voice, so that everyone in the 
room could hear it: “Herr Chancellor, you have just declared that the Federal Republic will 
renounce the production of NBC weapons on its own soil. You have meant with this that it, 
like all declarations and obligations under international law, is valid only rebus sic 
stantibus!” I replied in an equally loud voice: “You have interpreted my declaration 
correctly”. The others present remained silent’ (quoted in Schwarz, 1997: 123). This 
exchange implied ‘that as the general situation changed, the pledge would no longer be 
binding’ (Trachtenberg, 1999: 234).  
 
The implication was that the German ‘nuclear question’ could be reopened if the European 
geopolitical environment changed. If the US commitment to Europe faltered or the 
credibility of the US ‘nuclear umbrella’ protecting Western Europe was seriously dented, 
then the German ‘nuclear question’ could become a live issue. Occasionally, Franz-Josef 
Strauss’ ambivalent public and private pronouncements on the issue of German access to 
nuclear weapons fuelled speculation that the FRG might develop a nuclear deterrent 
The EP and the Euratom Treaty: past, present and future 
PE 313.072 
 
 
13 
(Ahonen, 1995: 25-28). However, it was not the ‘military question’ that put the whole 
Euratom project at immediate risk. 
 
I.8. OEEC Proposals 
 
In December 1955, the OEEC Nicolaides Working Party’s Report (Possibilities of Action in 
the Field of Nuclear Energy) was published (Nelsen, 1958: 44). It advocated the 
establishment of an OEEC directorate for atomic energy to coordinate national research 
activities and prepare joint projects. One of the core objectives of the OEEC should be the 
creation of an isotope separation plant in order to ensure European self-sufficiency in the 
provision of fissile materials. This OEEC report stood in stark contrast to the idea (advanced 
in the Messina Declaration) of an independent agency with a supply-monopoly. The OEEC 
plan foresaw a more liberal ‘regime’ with regard to the trading rules for nuclear materials 
between the member states.  
 
This initiative was welcomed by those groups who opposed Euratom either on economic 
grounds or who disliked supranationalism on the model of the ECSC. It produced debates 
inside the German cabinet. At an interministerial meeting in December 1955, there was no 
majority support for the Armand Report. One month later, in early January, even foreign 
minister von Brentano, a convinced pro-European, did not press for a quick solution of the 
plans to create an atomic energy community. In his estimation, it was premature to take a 
final view on the proposals elaborated by the different working commissions following 
Messina. Simultaneously, British policy aggravated the German divisions.  
 
Britain participated in the Spaak Committee, on the invitation of the ‘Six’, but it was very 
‘sceptical’ of the proposals for nuclear energy. The British representative, a relatively low-
level Board of Trade official, was instructed by London to guide the talks towards a limited 
intergovernmental OEEC solution away from the supranational alternative (Young, 1998: 
85-88). The UK made it clear that it did not intend to commit itself to the goals set out in the 
Messina Declaration merely by participating in these meetings. Then in early October 1955, 
the UKAEA proposed Anglo-German civil nuclear cooperation. This would include the 
installation of nuclear power stations in Germany. The French, who felt that the British offer 
reinforced Erhard’s negative attitude towards Euratom, were naturally displeased (DDF, 
1956-I, Doc. 104: 210-11). The British offer threatened the success of the relance, since 
both West Germany’s industrial leaders and Strauss (Fischer, 1992: 391) were encouraged in 
their criticism of the potential ‘socialisation of industry and the discriminatory [against 
Germany] leanings of Euratom’ (Helmreich, 1991: 394-95). 
 
On 7 November 1955, Britain withdrew from the Spaak Committee’s deliberations and 
contended that her interdependent civil and military nuclear programmes prevented her from 
joining Euratom (PRO, FO 371/116054, 17 November 1955). None of the Messina powers 
had a declared military nuclear programme and West Germany had unilaterally renounced 
such a programme. Besides, if Britain joined Euratom, the British nuclear infrastructure 
would not be able to meet the other members’ demands for expertise and materials without 
damaging her own domestic nuclear programme. As a result the British government 
favoured any programme produced by the OEEC Working Party on European Energy (the 
Nicolaides Working Party) whereby Britain would retain `freedom to deal bilaterally with 
individual countries’ and ‘to arrange our own contribution according to our resources’ 
(PRO, FO 371/116054, 14 November 1955). 
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The Euratom negotiations had reached a nadir. The split in the German cabinet, the military 
question, the threat posed by the alternative OEEC plan and Britain’s implicit opposition to 
the Euratom project threatened to derail the whole process. A disillusioned Louis Armand 
resigned from the Nuclear Energy Sub-Commission and began to work closely with Jean 
Monnet and the Action Committee instead to progress the Euratom proposal (Vaïsse, 1994: 
108).  
I.9. Adenauer Intervenes 
 
The pro-integration forces rallied. Jean Monnet launched the Action Committee for the 
United States of Europe on 13 September 1955. Monnet assembled leading representatives 
of non-extremist parties (excluding nationalists and communists) and trade unions to commit 
parliaments and governments to the path of further integration. Monnet’s Action Committee 
was devoted to the idea of Euratom and until 1957 it only paid ‘lip service to the Common 
Market’ (Duchêne, 1994: 292).  
 
In January 1956, the Action Committee unanimously adopted a Declaration that was to be 
put to the vote in each of the six ECSC assemblies. The declaration emphasised the 
‘supranationality’ of the cooperative nuclear proposal. A Euratom Commission was to be 
endowed with extensive competencies in order to ensure the development atomic energy 
solely for civil purposes only. The Action Committee aimed at a renunciation of nuclear 
weaponry by endowing a supranational Commission with the rights to buy, own and 
distribute fissile material to ensure non-military applications. The Committee’s pressure for 
a French renunciation of her right to fabricate nuclear weapons (NARA, RG59, 840.1901). 
This would ensure that the FRG who had renounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons 
would not be discriminated against. As Duchêne notes, ‘Monnet’s Community for strictly 
civil nuclear power was rather attractive to the Socialists [across the ‘Six’] since it implied 
planning, a renunciation of weapons by the French and nuclear controls on the Germans’ 
(Duchêne, 1994: 287). To ensure non-diversion of Euratom’s nuclear materials and the 
misuse of its facilities for illicit purposes it was deemed necessary in the eyes of Monnet, the 
Action Committee, the Armand Report and eventually the Spaak Report, that the ownership 
of fissionable materials and all by-products should be vested in Euratom. Thus strict nuclear 
controls and safeguards were envisioned.  
 
Meanwhile, Adenauer reacted to the OEEC threat. He was strongly in favour of the relance 
even if some of the substantive proposals ran counter to the interests of some of his cabinet 
and parts of the German industry. For him Euratom was ‘un mal nécessaire’ but it was a 
necessary concession to gain France’s agreement for a ‘common market’ (Bitsch, 1999: 
112). The dissension within the FRG cabinet threatened the ‘junktim’, and Adenauer acted 
decisively.  
 
In a directive to his ministers on 19 January 1956, he demanded ‘a clear, positive German 
attitude to European integration’ (Schwarz, 1997: 231). With reference to Article 65 of the 
German ‘Basic Law’ (Grundgesetz), which posits that the chancellor shall determine the 
broad goals of governmental policies (Richtlinienkompetenz), Adenauer stated that the 
Messina agreements had to be implemented rigorously without alteration and delay. 
Furthermore, he advocated that the political character of the entire integration project should 
be more strongly recognised (see Kramer, 1976: 50 and Weilemann, 1983: 68). He rejected 
outright the OEEC proposal, which did not go far enough in terms of political integration in 
his view. The OEEC ‘framework’ failed to guarantee the wider political objectives sought 
by the ‘Six’, according to Adenauer. International distrust of any German drive for ‘a pure 
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national nuclear settlement’ must be taken into account. Outside pressure, especially from 
the U.S. to signal that Germany should not ‘sabotage’ the relance, provided another reason 
to redouble integration efforts. Erhard was ‘particularly incensed’ by Adenauer’s 
‘integration order’. He demanded that Britain should be included in all integration projects 
(Schwarz, 1997: 231). At this point the USA made a timely intervention.  
I.10. US Intervention 
 
Before December 1955 the USA had maintained a ‘reserved’ and ‘cautious’, but ‘friendly’, 
attitude towards Euratom fearing that an overtly active US role in the discussions might 
jeopardise its chances of success (Schwarz, 1992b: 210-11; Helmreich, 1991: 400). 
However, the hostile British attitude, the threat posed by the OEEC and internal German 
division elicited a US initiative to support the Euratom proposal. For Eisenhower, John 
Foster Dulles (US Secretary of State) and many senior officials the ‘six-nations approach’, 
which promised to produce a cohesive nuclear organisation with state-like attributes, was 
preferable to a ‘loose’ organisation under the OEEC umbrella. Euratom could facilitate 
Franco-German reconciliation, bind West Germany to Western Europe, promote a United 
States of Europe, and allow the US Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC) to deal with a 
single organisation rather than six separate states (O’Driscoll, 1998a: 150-52).  
 
To underline the US commitment to Euratom, on 22 February 1956 Eisenhower announced 
that the US would provide 20,000 kg of enriched uranium for peaceful uses to friendly states 
(Hewlett & Holl, 1989: 324). The offer was promised greater privileges to a community 
such as Euratom than to an individual country such as Germany. The offer favoured the 
powerful civil model of Euratom á la Monnet (Winand, 1993: 84). This would have strong 
powers of inspection as well as ‘ownership and monopoly of the purchase and sale’ of all 
fissionable materials in the territories of the Six (Duchêne, 1994: 293).  
 
The US government outlined its position in greater detail in a circular to the ‘Six’ 
governments in May 1956 just prior to their crucial meeting to deliberate on the Spaak 
Report at Venice. In effect, the USA would only enter a direct relationship with a 
multinational nuclear organisation if it ‘had effective communal authority and could 
undertake responsibilities and duties similar to those of national governments’. The 
multinational organisation had to have complete and control ownership of nuclear fuels 
vested in it to implement the necessary safeguards to prevent diversion of nuclear materials 
to illicit purposes. Then the USA would adopt a more liberal attitude to assisting the 
organisation than to individual states (Goldschmidt, 1982: 293-4). The US administration 
and Monnet believed that it would strengthen the case for Euratom (Winand, 1993: 86).  
 
This US policy line was maintained throughout 1956; it was calculated to counter the case 
advocated by Erhard and German industry. This policy was reinforced by the US Atomic 
Energy Commission’s (USAEC). Dulles and Eisenhower impressed upon the USAEC 
Chairman, Lewis L. Strauss, to postpone, suspend or amend bilateral accords and 
negotiations with the individual member states of the ECSC so as not to threaten the 
Euratom negotiations. The US-Belgian nuclear agreement of 1955 was amended in July 
1956 to permit Belgium to make available increasing amounts of Congolese uranium to 
Euratom until 1960. It held out the possibility that all uranium produced in the Belgium 
Congo after 1960 could be purchased by Euratom. In view of the fact that uranium was in 
short supply, US withdrawal of its claims to the Congolese ore was calculated to strengthen 
the arguments in favour of a strong Euratom. Under the amendment, the US permitted 
Belgium to dilute its most-favoured-nation status and communicate nuclear information to 
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other members of Euratom, with appropriate security assurances. In addition, the US 
signalled that it was favourable towards the establishment of Euratom facilities for 
processing nuclear materials (Helmreich, 1991: 401-3). Most importantly, the amendment 
stated that the US ‘would be prepared if so requested by the Government of Belgium to 
arrange for the integrated group to assume the rights and obligations of the Government of 
Belgium under this Agreement, provided the integrated group can, in the judgement of the 
Government of the United States of America, effectively and securely carry out the 
undertakings of this Agreement’ (quoted in Helmreich, 1991: 403). Spaak, as the Belgian 
Foreign Minister, was more than willing to agree to this, if it meant that European 
integration was stimulated.  
 
Cumulatively, this more active US policy overcame the danger that British support for the 
OEEC could destroy Euratom. Britain could not possibly provide similar privileges to an 
OEEC grouping. The US offer made Euratom more attractive to the Germans, though US 
policymakers had to continue to work steadily at convincing sceptical German interest 
groups throughout 1956 (Winand, 1993: 87). The entire US approach was designed ‘to lend 
encouragement to European efforts to restore [the] impetus [of] European integration 
through effective supranational European atomic energy’, according to Dulles (NARA, 
RG59, Central Files, 840.1901, 29.2.1956). This reinforced Adenauer’s support of the 
Euratom against his errant Cabinet colleagues.  
 
Apart from the developments in Germany and the new more overtly supportive US policy, 
the results of the French elections produced new ‘hope’. Guy Mollet, a member of the 
Action Committee and a convinced pro-European, was elected Prime Minister. Furthermore, 
with Pineau in the Quai d’Orsay and Faure as state secretary, Mollet had a number of allies 
in his endeavours to promote integration. Already as leader of the French Socialists (SFIO), 
he committed his party to a pro-European stance. 
I.11. From Brussels to Venice 
 
Nevertheless, these improvements in the general prospect for Euratom were still insufficient 
to produce immediate agreement. The conference of the six foreign ministers that took place 
in Brussels on 11-12 February 1956 was inconclusive.  
 
Pineau stated that France would not renounce its military option. On the question of property 
ownership of fissile materials, the German delegation still stuck to its ‘liberal’ position 
supported by the German industry. As to the relationship between the two communities (i.e. 
atomic energy and common market), France now preferred to unlink the two communities 
and integrate the atomic energy sector more quickly (Stirk, 1996: 142).  
 
Mollet had signalled this French approach in his investiture speech two weeks earlier. On 
that occasion he informed the Assemblée Nationale that establishing ‘a Common Market in 
Europe will be a long haul’ and that it should be postponed until later (Duchêne, 1994: 294; 
see also Milward, 2000: 210-11). The other governments expressed their preference for a 
close connection between the two plans (Kramer, 1976: 53). Spaak feared a dissolution of 
the Junktim might provoke Germany, the Netherlands and Italy to renounce their 
commitment to Euratom (Weilemann, 1983: 79). Euratom and the common market 
proposals were mutually dependent. It appeared that France would not countenance a 
common market without Euratom, while the FRG and Italy in particular, would only 
contemplate Euratom if the common market proposal succeeded. 
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Nonetheless, the Euratom discussions were making greater progress than the common 
market ones. Despite several outstanding issues, the outlines of a workable Euratom solution 
appeared possible, in conjunction with US patronage and Franco-German compromise. The 
Spaak Report, which was completed and finally released on 21 April 1956, recommended 
that the governments should begin to negotiate both a European Economic Community and 
a Euratom. The Report mirrored widespread consensus and compromise in relation to much 
of the Euratom proposal. The Spaak Report served ‘as the “blueprint” for Euratom’ 
(Howlett, 1990: 23). It proposed that Euratom should not create a single integrated 
supranational organisation that would end the need for national nuclear institutions. Instead 
Euratom’s role would be limited to promoting the development of nuclear energy and to 
coordinating national programmes for collective benefit. Its overarching objective should be 
to assist ‘in creating conditions favouring rapid growth of nuclear industry as well as the 
application of nuclear techniques in other industries and economic activities’ (cit. in Polach, 
1964: 29).  
 
Therefore, the Spaak Report revealed substantial agreement on the liberalisation of trade in 
the nuclear sector, the need to harmonise safety rules, and the necessity to implement health 
and environmental protection matters to create a single market in the nuclear industry. 
Euratom should also promote nuclear research and disseminate the results. There was also 
agreement on the question of joint undertakings in areas that were beyond the resources of 
independent member states. A central role was thus envisaged for cooperation in 
establishing joint installations to produce enriched uranium and reprocess plutonium.  
 
The institutional set-up foreseen in the Spaak Report corresponded to the ECSC model: a 
separate Euratom Commission would be responsible to a Common Assembly and a Council 
of Ministers was to exercise ‘governing’ functions alongside the Commission. Such a 
Euratom Commission would undertake to:  
 issue decisions with regard to the control of safety and materials, 
 assume operational responsibility for the joint installations and undertakings, 
 coordinate intra-community research, and  
 develop its own research programmes.  
 
The Commission was also to be endowed with a sufficient budget to cover administrative 
expenses, the costs of community research centres, and the costs of contributions to joint 
installations as well as research grants. 
 
The ‘Six’ Foreign Ministers met in Venice on 29 and 30 May to discuss the Spaak Report. 
Despite continued French objections to the common market, the insistence of the ‘Five’ 
ensured that Pineau agreed that the negotiation of the treaties were interdependent and 
should proceed in parallel. The ‘junktim’ continued as a necessary means to facilitate 
agreement. Thus intergovernmental negotiations on the two treaties were sanctioned to 
commence on the 26 June 1956 (Milward, 2000: 210-11; Stirk, 1996: 142). These 
negotiations occurred at Château Val Duchesse near Brussels and the Spaak Report acted as 
the basis of their discussions. Three committees were established to subdivide the work. 
Hans von der Groeben presided over the Common Market Committee. The Euratom 
Committee was chaired by the administrator-general of the French CEA, Pierre Guillaumat. 
Spaak became the chairman of the committee of the national delegations (Bitsch, 1999: 
113).  
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I.12. Moratorium 
 
One of the main problems at Venice, and at Val Duchesse subsequently, concerned the 
‘military question’, but this was soon solved. Guy Mollet, the French Socialist leader, was 
an active member of Monnet’s Action Committee. When he was invested as French Prime 
Minister, in early February 1956, he stated that he preferred a French renunciation of 
military nuclear research (Soutou, 1989: 3).  
 
Nationalist pressure forced Mollet to reverse his position. Members of his own Cabinet such 
as Christian Pineau (Foreign Minister) and Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury (Defence Minister) 
were unwilling to support a French renunciation. The Gaullists were determined that France 
should not renounce her right to research and manufacture nuclear weapons. Therefore, 
Mollet had to guarantee to protect France’s right to manufacture nuclear weapons in order to 
win the National Assembly’s approval of France’s bargaining position in the Euratom 
negotiations. On 21 June 1956 the French Senators, led by the Gaullist Michel Debré, voted 
to set up a military division within the CEA. Mollet had to retract his earlier statements 
during the Assemblée Nationale debate on Euratom in July 1956. He stated that: ‘Euratom 
… will not stand in the way of a possible French decision to build nuclear weapons’ (cit. in 
Monnet, 1978: 420). In the end, Mollet was mandated to progress with the negotiations on 
the proviso that France’s freedom to pursue the a nuclear weapons programme was not 
prejudiced. The final vote was 332 to 181 in favour of pursuing the negotiations on Euratom.  
 
At the suggestion of Dulles and Spaak (Helmreich, 1991: 401), a compromise was suggested 
whereby Mollet would pledge that France would not manufacture or test atomic bombs 
before January 1961. But she could continue to research and develop nuclear weapons 
during the moratorium. This concession ensured the Council of the Republic approved 
France’s participation in the negotiations for European atomic co-operation, but it angered 
the Germans provoking a new crisis in the Euratom negotiations. A fundamental rationale 
for Euratom was undermined: ‘The primary purpose of Euratom controls, to preclude 
nuclear weapons had lost its point. There was still a secondary one, to stop any diversion of 
fissionable materials earmarked for civil use to the military. But this was binding only on 
horses which had no intention of bolting from the stable. Euratom could now be presented as 
a hypocritical device of the French to control Germany while evading all obligations 
themselves…It was a golden opportunity for the anti-Euratom lobby in Germany’ (Duchêne, 
1994: 296-7).  
 
The German position was thus hostile against the dirigiste character of the envisaged supply 
monopoly on both commercial and equality grounds. Strauss, supported by the Bund der 
Deutschen Industrie (BDI), renounced the supply-monopoly and community ownership of 
fissile materials as ‘socialistic’ (see Kramer, 1976: 60; Moravscik, 1998: 97; Deubner, 
1979). 
 
Another divergence in fundamentals also caused problems. The organisational set-up of 
Euratom was a matter of disagreement. Agreement was reached over the basic structure of 
Community organs which coincided with the set-up chosen for the ECSC: a Council of 
Ministers, a Commission, a parliamentary assembly and a Court of Justice. However, the 
‘Six’ had not yet reached an agreement with regard to the actual distribution of 
competencies that were to be attributed to the different organs (Weilemann, 1983: 116). 
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Overall, the German and French positions seemed overly rigid. According to the French 
conception, all military measures, even if they involved nuclear material, had to be exempt 
from Euratom control. However, in practice it was difficult to draw a clear demarcation 
between the civil and military use of atomic material. As a result, states with a military 
nuclear programme could escape Euratom control by assuming the mantle of ‘military 
secrecy’ as a means to prevent inspections of dual purpose facilities; states without military 
programmes had to disclose their entire knowledge and research. Consequently, the German 
delegation was adamant that both military and civil uses of nuclear material should be dealt 
with under the same control system (see Weilemann, 1983: 126). France disagreed.  
 
The seriousness of these differences emerged in the negotiations at a ministerial meeting in 
Paris on 19 and 20 October. The only positive development that arose from this meeting was 
the decision to commission a report ‘on the quantities of atomic energy which can be 
produced in the near future by the six countries, and on the means to be employed for this 
purpose’ (Gaudet, 1959: 150). This initiative was undertaken on the suggestion of Monnet’s 
Action Committee (Duchêne, 1994: 300; Monnet, 1978: 421-22). In November, three 
distinguished experts, the so-called ‘Three Wise Men’, were appointed to undertake this 
task. The sagacious ones were: Louis Armand, Franz Etzel (then Vice-President of the 
ECSC High Authority) and Francesco Giordani (head of the Italian Atomic Energy 
Commission).  
 
Otherwise, at the Paris meeting it was clear that France wanted to safeguard her high level of 
social welfare provision and demanded welfare harmonisation across the proposed Common 
Market to create a level playing field. Erhard rejected this French proposal (Milward, 2000: 
211-16). In relation to Euratom, Strauss declared that Euratom’s ownership of all fissile 
material to the exclusion of private enterprise, as envisaged by France, was ‘radically 
unacceptable’ (DDF, 1956, II, doc. 192). Monnet believed that ‘Strauss is making Euratom 
impossible’, and was strengthening the hand of the CEA which was sceptical of Euratom 
(cit. in Duchêne, 1994: 297). Erhard was confident that the ‘distasteful common market 
project’ was dying, and preferred Britain’s idea of a free trade area (Schwarz, 1997: 240). 
The relance was extremely vulnerable. 
I.13. Improving Prospects 
 
Several auspicious international factors intervened. The international environment markedly 
deteriorated encouraging the ‘Six’, particularly France and West Germany, to reconcile their 
differences. The Eastern Bloc experienced widespread instability commencing in Poland in 
June 1956 and culminating in Soviet military intervention in Hungary in November. In this 
uncertain atmosphere, Adenauer experienced a crisis of confidence in the US commitment to 
West German and European defence. Firstly, in June, he heard rumours that the Soviet 
leaders would be invited to Washington D.C. by Eisenhower, after the upcoming 
presidential election, which fuelled his fears of a US-Soviet détente and the neutralisation of 
West Germany. Secondly, on 13 July 1956 the New York Times revealed that the US 
Radford Plan. This proposed the reduction of US conventional forces in Europe and its 
replacement by tactical nuclear forces in order to cut US defence expenditure. West 
Germans feared that their troops would become cannon fodder and that Germany would be 
reduced to a nuclear battlefield (Schwarz, 1997: 233-40).  
 
Monnet’s timely suggestion that the Euratom Treaty should be finalised tempted Adenauer. 
The prospect of deeper European integration, Franco-German reconciliation and European 
defence co-operation could act as complements and, if necessary, substitutes for dependence 
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on the USA. The US commitment to the German defence was further undermined in 
December 1956 when the US informed NATO that it wanted to withdraw six divisions. 
Adenauer no longer trusted the US ‘nuclear umbrella’ (Schwarz, 1997: 239). Meanwhile, 
other events inclined the French leadership towards compromise, particularly on their 
demands for harmonization of social costs.  
 
President Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal, in conjunction with increased tensions 
between Israel and her Arab neighbours, provoked Anglo-French military intervention on 
November 6. Eisenhower’s condemnation and undermining of the Anglo-French 
intervention led to its collapse. The crisis accelerated European integration among the Six 
Messina powers (cf. Moravscik, 1998: 119-20). As A. V. Freeman stated: ‘If Suez did not 
give birth to Euratom, it was at least a midwife or, possibly, a lady-in-waiting’ (Freeman, 
1960: 384). It highlighted European, and especially French, dependence on Middle Eastern 
oil. It appeared to confirm the successive calls of the Armand Reports (for the OEEC and the 
Spaak Committee) and the Spaak Report for an alternative source of energy. Mollet, 
abandoned by the Anglo-Americans, perceived the advantage of a strong European regional 
unit as a prop to a weakened French economy and her international profile. Armand jokingly 
suggested that a statue should be erected to Nasser as ‘the federator of Europe’ (Monnet, 
1978: 422).  
 
Again, Adenauer asserted his authority in the German Cabinet. On the 31 October just as the 
Hungarian and Suez crises were approaching their crescendo he persuaded Erhard that it was 
in the FRG’s interest to persist with the Common Market. Earlier on 5 October at a Cabinet 
meeting Adenauer responded to Strauss’s criticisms that Euratom ‘controlled German 
development rather than promoted it’. The Chancellor ambiguously argued that Euratom 
would give the FRG ‘the chance to get at nuclear weapons in the normal way’ (Schwarz, 
1997: 239-40). Whether this was simply an attempt to diffuse the criticisms of Strauss, or 
the communication of intent that the FRG could use Euratom to build either an independent 
national weapons capability or a Euro-deterrent is unclear. However, the episode 
demonstrated that Adenauer was prepared to bridge the differences with France.  
 
The FRG now moved towards accepting the Community’s supply monopoly for fissile 
materials. The US Ambassador to the FRG made a ‘decisive intervention’. He stressed that it 
was essential that Euratom maintained a monopoly over fissile materials and controlled their 
use. He thus rejected Strauss’ claim that Euratom was ‘socialistic’ pointing to the fact that 
the USA maintained such a strict regime (Duchêne, 1994: 297-8).  
 
Meanwhile, the French Premier, Guy Mollet, influenced by international events was also 
looking for ways to ‘repair’ relations (Milward, 2000: 214-15). The bulk of French business, 
though initially sceptical, was also moving steadily in the direction of qualified support of 
the common market proposal. Farmers began to see the EEC plan as an outlet for growing 
agricultural surpluses. Thus, the French Government and key producer groups realised that 
France’s best economic interests lay with the ‘Six’ (Moravscik, 1998: 108-12).  
 
Adenauer’s state visit to France on 6 November 1956 catalysed this convergence in Franco-
German attitudes. The previous day the US presidential election had been held and the 
invasion of the Suez Canal Zone had commenced. Mollet welcomed Adenauer’s willingness 
to show solidarity with France by going through with the state visit. Adenauer’s 
unconditional approval of France’s actions strengthened Franco-German relations (Schwarz, 
1997: 242-44). When the British Prime Minister rang to appraise Mollet that he was 
unilaterally terminating the Suez intervention, Adenauer advised Mollet to ‘make Europe 
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your revenge’ (Moravscik, 1998: 144). Adenauer agreed ‘in principle’ to the harmonisation 
of social welfare provisions in the Common Market which broke the negotiating logjam in 
the junktim (Stirk, 1996: 143). In effect, on 6 November, both Adenauer and Mollet agreed 
to work in earnest to resolve their remaining differences and finalise Euratom and the EEC. 
There were still several points of difference remaining in relation to Euratom, but the 
political will now existed to overcome them by February 1957. 
 
On the military question, the FRG eventually admitted French freedom to pursue a national 
nuclear deterrent. The French envisaged ‘the possibility of two programs carried out 
simultaneously but separately’: an independent dual-purpose French one and a collective 
civil Euratom one (Goldschmidt, 1987: 12). The key decision came on 24 January 1957, 
when the Germans agreed that Euratom’s control over fissile material would not be applied 
to military installations. This was confirmed at a conference of the ‘Six’ foreign ministers 
between 26 and 28 January. In effect, France was given total freedom to conduct a military 
nuclear programme outside of Euratom controls (Guillen, 1994: 122). The Euratom Treaty 
enshrined the compromise in the following way: ‘Safeguards may not extend to materials 
intended to meet defence requirements which are in the course of being specially processed 
for this purpose or which, after being so processed, are, in accordance with an operational 
plan, placed or stored in a military establishment’ (Euratom Treaty, 1957: Article 84). 
 
In relation to the ownership of fissile materials, France had consistently maintained that 
Euratom should have a total monopoly for several reasons. First, it would control the 
development of the FRG’s nuclear industry, and dissuade it from acquiring a military 
capability. Second, it would convince the USA that Euratom’s safeguards against diversion 
of nuclear materials were so strong that US or IAEA inspectors were not required to police it 
permitting an independent European nuclear industry. Finally, France harboured the hope 
that Euratom would ensure the supply of sufficient nuclear materials (uranium, enriched 
uranium etc) to permit the rapid development of France’s nuclear programme. This was a 
period of acute scarcity in nuclear materials and France’s strategem was to convince the 
USA that Euratom was a responsible, self-policing vehicle of European integration, which 
could safely receive large quantities of US fissile materials. France, as the largest nuclear 
power among the ECSC, expected to benefit disproportionately from any US preferential 
treatment of Euratom (Guillen, 1994: 123). 
 
However, the FRG still remained averse to ‘a Euratom (de facto French) monopoly’ as it 
would constrain the freedom of the German nuclear sector. It was only on 19 and 20 
February 1957 that a compromise position was reached at a final conference between the 
heads of government (Stirk, 1996: 144). France’s and Monnet’s demands that all fissionable 
materials should be owned by Euratom were diluted. The new atomic energy community 
would only own ‘special fissile materials which are produced or imported by a Member 
State’ (Euratom Treaty, 1957, Article 86). The ‘special fissile materials’ were listed in 
Annex IV. Ownership and possession of the fissile material was explicitly separated on the 
suggestion of von Brentano to Pineau (see Weilemann, 1983: 128-129 and Kramer, 1976: 
62). Formal ownership of special fissile material was vested in the Community but ‘member 
states, persons or undertakings shall have unlimited right of use and consumption’ in most 
circumstances (Euratom Treaty, 1957, Article 87). The final obstacles to the Treaty had been 
cleared. 
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I.14. Treaty 
 
The ‘Six’ signed the Euratom Treaty on 28 March 1957. The fundamental objective of the 
Treaty was outlined in Article 1: ‘It shall be the task of the Community to contribute to the 
raising of the standard of living in the Member States and to the development of relations 
with other countries by creating the conditions necessary for the speedy establishment and 
growth of nuclear industries’. To achieve this industrial mission, it was tasked to promote 
research (Euratom Treaty, Chapter I) and disseminate research information (Euratom Treaty, 
Chapter II). To ‘stimulate’ entrepreneurial and research activity in the nuclear sector, it was 
to promote investment in the nuclear sector, by coordinating research within the Community 
and by ‘periodically’ publishing ‘illustrative programmes’ (which later became known as 
PINCs) indicating nuclear energy production targets and the investment required to achieve 
these targets (Euratom Treaty, Chapter IV, Article 40). 
 
Euratom was granted powers to establish joint undertakings, with a ‘legal personality’, in 
areas of ‘fundamental importance to the development of the nuclear industry in the 
Community’ (Euratom Treaty, Chapter V, Article 45). To ensure ‘equal’ and 
nondiscriminatory ‘access’ to necessary materials, a common supply policy and a Euratom 
Supplies Agency (ESA) were to be created. The ESA was given the ‘right of option on ores, 
source materials and special fissile materials produced in the territories of the Member 
States and an exclusive right to conclude contracts relating to the supply of ores, source 
materials and special fissile materials coming from inside the Community or from outside’ 
(Euratom Treaty, Chapter 6, Article 52).  
 
Another crucial element of the Euratom Treaty was its international dimension. It was 
deemed essential by the framers of the Treaty that Euratom, in particular its Commission, 
should have exclusive powers to negotiate and conclude agreements with third powers such 
as individual countries like the USA, UK and Canada or international organisations 
(Euratom Treaty, Chapter X). External assistance in the form of research, scientists, 
equipment (research and industrial), uranium ores, and special fissile materials were 
considered invaluable to supplement the embryonic West European industry in a world 
market that was experiencing a scarcity in nuclear resources. By giving the Euratom 
Commission exclusive competence to act on behalf of the Member States in the international 
domain, ‘a united and, therefore, stronger front’ could be presented in negotiation with third 
countries (Gaudet, 1959: 452).  
 
In order to placate potential third parties, in particular the non-proliferationist USA, the 
Treaty instituted the first working international safeguards system (Euratom Treaty, Chapter 
7). The safeguards system sought to assure third parties and Member States that:  
 ores, source materials, and special fissile materials were not diverted to unintended uses 
or destinations; 
 special safeguarding provisions in Euratom’s agreements with third parties were adhered 
to (Euratom Treaty, Article 77). 
 
However, this was not a control system designed to prevent military activities (see Euratom 
Treaty, Article 84). It was a simple ‘conformity-control’ system, i.e., ‘conformity of the use 
with declared destination and with the Treaty provisions regarding supply’ (Mathijsen, 1961: 
448). The Euratom Commission was endowed with substantial powers to enforce 
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compliance with this control system including total withdrawal of assistance (financial etc) 
and supplies from the guilty party (Euratom Treaty, Article 83).  
 
Since nuclear materials are often hazardous, their uses and transport have to be closely 
supervised. The control, supply and external dimensions of the Euratom Treaty, therefore, 
were inseparable from issues of ownership and public safety (Gaudet, 1959: 168). Euratom 
was granted legal ownership of all special fissile materials (Euratom Treaty, Chapter 7, 
Article 86), excepting those of a military character or on loan from suppliers outside the 
Community. Ownership did not normally mean possession. Rightful possessors of special 
fissile materials, i.e., member states, persons or firms engaged in the nuclear industry, were 
conferred with full rights to their use and consumption subject to safeguards against their 
diversion to undeclared uses, Euratom’s ultimate right of option, and the maintenance of 
Euratom’s health and safety regulations (Euratom Treaty, Article 87). Euratom was given 
rights and powers to ensure the establishment and implementation of community-wide 
‘basic standards’ in the Member States to ensure the health protection of the nuclear workers 
and the general public (Euratom Treaty, Chapter III, Articles 30-39).  
 
The creation of a nuclear common market was also a prime brief (Euratom Treaty, Chapter 
9). Euratom was designated responsibility for ensuring unimpeded trade in many nuclear 
ores and materials within the nuclear community, as well as the free movement of properly 
qualified labour, capital and services necessary for the nuclear industry. All quantitative 
hindrances on free movement of goods, services and persons necessary for a nuclear 
industry, such as taxes and tariffs between the member states, were to be removed.  
 
It can be seen, therefore, that Euratom’s primary mission was ‘promotional’, i.e., the 
promotion of the nuclear industry. However, it was vested with secondary functions, those 
of regulating the nuclear industry and maintaining safeguards against the diversion of fissile 
material from the stated aims of the users, which proved more durable in the long-term 
(Mathijsen, 1965-66: 330; Lyons, 1994: chapter 8). At the time of Euratom’s conception and 
initialisation, however, these secondary functions were viewed as incidentals necessary to 
achieve the primary goal of the commercial development of nuclear energy for the ‘Six’.  
 
Unfortunately, as a result of national and sectional interests, the Treaty was vested with 
limited exclusive competencies to achieve its maximalist industrial objective. Nau concludes 
that: ‘The Euratom Treaty, in fact, contained weaker provisions than the EEC Treaty, despite 
the fact that Euratom was charged with an explicitly industrial task’ (Nau, 1974: 102-3). 
Many commentators are of a similar opinion (see for example, Polach, 1964: 71; Mathijsen, 
1965-66; Scheinman, 1967). For instance, the Treaty did not contain any guidelines like 
those of the EEC Treaty (Articles 85 and 100) regulating industrial competition and 
harmonising relevant laws across the community. In only one domain was Euratom granted 
exclusive competence, that of health protection. In almost all the other fields, such as 
research and development, joint enterprises, and investment, Euratom had to share 
competencies with the member states. The Treaty was weak. According to Scheinman: 
‘Unlike the tasks of the ECSC…Euratom’s functions with regard to nuclear integration are 
less imposing; the scope of its juridical authority is more tightly circumscribed; the means at 
its disposal are more limited; and its functions are supplemental rather than exclusive’ 
(Scheinman, 1967: 11). 
 
While Euratom’s primary aim was the promotion of commercial nuclear power in Europe, it 
is an unavoidable conclusion that the original conception of a Euratom à la Monnet was 
emasculated by national and industrial interests, leaving it with strong powers only in certain 
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regulatory areas (Mathijsen, 1965-66: 227-30; Nau, 1974). Consequently, ‘it is essentially 
advisory and directed at stimulating and coordinating investments in the field of nuclear 
energy’ (Mathijsen, 1965-66: 336). Whether Euratom had the institutional strength to deliver 
on the grand objective of a European nuclear industry was thus doubtful from the beginning. 
Euratom’s role was that of ‘a middleman, a broker…’. (Donnelly, 1972: 81). The 
Commission’s powers under the Treaty were severely constrained by comparison to the 
ECSC High Authority’s, because of objections, primarily German, that the latter had been 
too interventionist. From the outset the Euratom Commission felt that it had to avoid 
‘systematic intervention’ or ‘any semblance of authoritarianism’ (Donnelly, 1972: 81). As 
an official in the Euratom Division of the Legal Service of the European Executives, Pierre 
Mathijsen, wrote in 1965: ‘the many exterior similarities between Euratom and the other two 
Communities do, in fact, cover essential differences as far as the main activities of the 
Institutions are concerned. And the question, therefore, arises whether the elaborate 
institutional structure of a Community with its delicate balance for instance between the 
Commission with its right of initiative and the Council with its practically exclusive 
regulatory powers, is the ideal solution for an agency whose main task is of scientific and 
semi-industrial nature (Mathijsen, 1965: 343)’. In the final analysis, the only way that 
Euratom could hope to achieve its industrial remit was to stimulate and coordinate 
investments and research in nuclear energy. Thus it could only have a directive effect on the 
industrial policy of the Member States, and the magnitude of Euratom’s ability to act as a 
guide and a coordinator was dependent upon a consensus among the Member States in the 
Council.  
I.15. A Target for Euratom 
 
Regardless of these enforced institutional and treaty limitations, the Euratom Treaty might 
still have fulfilled its objective of developing a vibrant civil nuclear industry in the 
succeeding decade, circumstances permitting. Superficially, at least, the Suez Crisis had 
appeared to provide ample evidence for the ‘energy gap’ thesis of Euratom adherents. The 
Crisis indicated the precariousness of overseas energy supplies. The Six’s imports of oil had 
more than doubled between 1950 and 1955, and 70% of Western Europe’s crude oil 
originated in the Middle East of which 70% was transported through the Suez Canal. 
Western Europe had been a net exporter of energy since the beginning of the Industrial 
Revolution owing to its large coal deposits, but now it was a net importer. Security of energy 
supplies became recognised as strategically important for the first time. For Euratom’s 
proponents the development of an indigenous Western European nuclear industry was an 
economic necessity. At a time when the region was experiencing a negative balance of 
payments (and oil imports had to be paid for with scarce US dollars) monetary concerns 
dictated a reduction in these oil imports (Polach, 1964: 37-39).  
 
These assumptions informed the report of the ‘Three Wise Men’, A Target for Euratom, 
which was published in May 1957. At face value the arguments marshalled were 
compelling. Any stoppage of oil would be an economic disaster for Europe. The Middle 
East’s political instability heightened the possibility of further oil crises. The ‘Three Wise 
Men’ estimated that the Six’s total energy requirements would rise by 83% from 1955 to 
1975. Moreover, electricity consumption would treble during the same period. The Six were 
not expected to be able to meet this from increased domestic coal production. France and 
Italy both lacked significant coal deposits and were becoming rapidly dependent on oil and 
natural gas imports (Polach, 1964: 30-33, 53). Another secure source of energy supplies was 
necessary, in particular for the production of the anticipated rise in demand for electricity 
(Armand, Etzel & Giordani, 1957). Consequently, the authors of A Target for Euratom 
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believed that this should be the mission of Euratom. The ‘Three Wise Men’ ambitiously 
proposed that the Six should install 15,000 megawatts of nuclear power by 1967, or a 
quarter of the electricity estimated necessary to meet total needs on that date (Goldschmidt, 
1982: 301). At the time a nuclear power plant was thought capable of producing 250 
megawatts, so the authors wanted to construct 60 nuclear power plants in a decade 
(Donnelly, 1972: 75). Since it took at least four years to ‘complete a nuclear power 
installation, it was mandatory to start immediately’ (Polach, 1964: 56). The penultimate 
objective of Euratom, according to Armand, Etzel and Giordani, should be the elimination as 
far as possible of the need for imported fuels for European thermal power stations.  
 
The propitious publication of the ‘Three Wise Men’ report in the aftermath of the Suez 
Crisis ensured that it received an optimistic public reception (Polach, 1964: 59). It may even 
have facilitated the speedy ratification of the Treaty by the Six’s parliaments (Goldschmidt, 
1982: 300). After all, A Target for Euratom had the active and enthusiastic support of the 
main nuclear power in the world, the USA. The ‘Three Wise Men’ had consulted 
extensively with the US in early 1957 to determine how Euratom could best build such a 
large nuclear programme. Eisenhower and Dulles supported Euratom as a ‘unique’ political 
opportunity to strengthen European solidarity and as an economic opportunity to promote 
US nuclear reactor technology in Europe (Helmreich, 1991: 387). The USA was determined 
that the ‘Three Wise Men’ should be permitted unheard of access to US nuclear installations 
and US scientific personnel when they were preparing A Target for Euratom. An academic 
think-thank, the American Assembly, summed up US policy when it stated that: ‘While it 
can be expected that highly industrialized countries such as those in Europe will ultimately 
establish their own facilities for building their atomic power plants, Euratom can provide 
American industry with experience as well as a market for its products and technology. Such 
an effort would assist with the aims of American foreign policy in developing the economic 
strength of, and American ties with, the Western European community, and … would 
provide experience in the operation of large-scale reactors of great and immediate benefit to 
our own development program’ (quoted in Donnelly, 1972: 76). The optimistic joint 
communiqué issued by the White House and the ‘Three Wise Men’ at the end of the latter’s 
visit to the USA, demonstrated publicly US support for Euratom and promised significant 
US aid (both material and skills) to the organisation. The fact that the Euratom Treaty 
fulfilled many of the US Administration’s wishes re-security control, regional integration, 
and cooperation in civil nuclear energy (as opposed to military atomics) increased US 
willingness to give more information and support to an integrated Euratom than to the 
European nations individually (Helmreich, 1991: 408). At the time it was believed that the 
‘Three Wise Men’ had provided Euratom with a nuclear power programme that was 
achievable with the backing of the USA.  
I.16. Gaseous Diffusion Politics and the US-Euratom Agreement 
 
A fundamental difficulty nevertheless existed. The US and European perspectives on 
Euratom’s objectives were not identical. Several of Euratom’s proponents saw the 
organisation primarily as having as a political objective: the re-establishment of ‘Little 
Europe’s’ influence in international power politics. The USA, on the other hand, disliked 
this ‘third force’ idea. In the joint US-‘Three Wise Men’ communiqué issued in Washington 
DC on 25 February 1957, the two parties nonetheless agreed that Euratom’s sole objective 
was to realise the objectives of developing peaceful nuclear power (Polach, 1964: 61; 
Donnelly, 1972: 76). This amounted to a reversal of the previous European position.  
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In practical terms, the ‘Three Wise Men’ were finally convinced by the Americans that it 
was unnecessary for Euratom to construct a gaseous diffusion plant (or isotopic separation 
plant) to enrich uranium. Following Eisenhower’s announcement (17 November 1956) that 
the price of enriched uranium for foreign customers would be significantly reduced, it was 
estimated that enriched uranium could be purchased from the USA at between one-third and 
one-half of the price that an indigenous Euratom plant could produce it. A Euratom gaseous 
diffusion plant would be costly to build and require exorbitant quantities of electricity to 
operate (Winand, 1993: 89).  
 
A Target for Euratom’s explicit discounting of the need to construct a uranium enrichment 
plant was the ‘fatal blow’ for French support of Euratom (see Winand, 1993: 93). Despite 
the fact that the Treaty had been weakened by substantial compromises, France had still 
maintained an interest because the Treaty had left open the possibility of a ‘joint enterprise’ 
in the production of enriched uranium. However, with the publication of A Target for 
Euratom, the study syndicate that had been established in November 1955 to investigate the 
possibility for such a Euratom plant was terminated (Goldschmidt, 1982: 298-9; Guillen, 
1994: 124-25). 
 
The CEA remained determined to build a uranium enrichment plant free of US controls. In 
late 1957 a new prospect presented itself. The USSR’s launch of its Sputnik satellite in 
October 1957 evoked widespread European doubts about the efficacy of the US nuclear 
guarantee to Europe (Winand, 1993: 98-99). France launched a new initiative involving Italy 
and Germany in an organisation that became known as F-I-G (France-Italy-Germany). The 
French-led F-I-G established a shadowy ‘advanced’ military research and development 
programme which sent shockwaves through the Atlantic Alliance because it was rumoured 
to have a ‘Euronuclear defence project’ at its core (Melissen, 1993: 106). In December 1957 
France canvassed Bonn with the idea of using F-I-G to fund and develop a uranium 
enrichment plant. In Easter 1958, the F-I-G countries signed an agreement to trilaterally 
fund the construction of such a plant (O’Driscoll, 1998b; Barbier, 1990)4.  
 
To restore Europe’s confidence, the US deployed Thor and/or Jupiter IRBMs (Intermediate 
Range Ballistic Missiles) and established stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons in 
European/NATO countries (Melissen, 1993: 93-115). Full and open US cooperation with 
Europe in the field of peaceful nuclear energy was another means that the Eisenhower 
administration pursued to allay European anxieties (Winand, 1993: 93; Nieburg, 1963: 615-
16). Thus, the US attempted to give greater material expression to its earlier rhetoric 
supporting Euratom. On 8 November 1958, the Agreement for Cooperation between 
Euratom and the USA was signed. The Euratom-USA agreement set up a joint nuclear 
power programme that had as its target the installation of 5,000 megawatts of nuclear 
generated electricity by 1965. European utilities were offered low interest loans from the 
Export-Import Bank to build nuclear power stations. The USAEC would lease fuel to 
Euratom and guarantee the supply of enriched uranium (Donnelly, 1972: 96). Euratom was 
granted control rights over this enriched uranium, rather than the USAEC (Scheinman, 1967: 
29). Thus the agreement seemed to offer advantageous terms to Euratom. By developing 
civil nuclear power in cooperation with Euratom the USA was intending to demonstrate her 
technological superiority over the USSR. Sputnik made it imperative to prove that US 
                                                 
4 De Gaulle terminated the F-I-G arrangement soon after he acceded to power in mid-1958, because he did not 
wish to be involved in an enterprise that might facilitate Germany's acquisition of nuclear weapons. Instead the 
CEA decided to commence research and construction of a French national plant at Pierrelatte to ensure its 
nuclear independence, notwithstanding the enormous undertaking involved. 
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civilian nuclear reactors were superior, and the US national interest ‘called for the spread of 
US technology’ (Cowan, 1990: 563).  
 
Herein lay a serious problem. The USA had ‘clearly oversold’ nuclear power to the ‘Three 
Wise Men’ and Euratom (Nau, 1975: 629). Civil nuclear energy was in its infancy and was 
still largely in its research and development (R & D) phase. Small competing prototypes of 
nuclear reactors had just begun operation. The world’s first electricity generating nuclear 
reactor was the UK’s Calder Hall natural uranium-fuelled, gas graphite moderated reactor 
plant which commenced operation in August 1956. The world’s second electricity 
generating reactor, the US light water reactor (LWR) at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, was 
only switched on in December 1957. France, like Britain, pursued a gas-graphite moderated 
reactor in its projected civil nuclear programme, because the military could use its by-
product, plutonium. The USA LWR model was a simple derivative of the one used in US 
nuclear submarines and had been hastily converted to civilian purposes in the mid-1950s to 
prove US leadership over the USSR in the civil nuclear field. The LWR was chosen by the 
USA because it was the only advanced reactor at its disposal that could ensure the necessary 
international demonstration effect that the US sought, not because it was proven to be a 
more efficient generator of electricity (Cowan, 1990: 562-64). In fact, a scientific debate 
conducted within the journal Nucleonics in 1957 concluded that it was unclear whether 
LWRs were technically or economically superior to gas graphite reactors because there was 
so little experience of operating them for electricity generation (Cowan, 1990: 558). 
 
Thus the development of the commercial nuclear power plants, including the LWR variety, 
was still at an early stage. Several years were required to ‘work the bugs out’ and reduce the 
costs of generating nuclear electricity before large-scale nuclear power plants would be 
accepted as commercial propositions by public utilities (Cowan, 1990: 549-52). The people 
involved in the Euratom negotiations and in the framing of A Target for Euratom lacked 
specific knowledge of the nuclear sector and uncritically accepted US ‘experts’ exaggerated 
claims for the potential of nuclear energy and, in particular, for the LWR (Nau, 1975: 629). 
Thus, A Target for Euratom was excessively ambitious. It was ‘reminiscent of school 
homework that is so often difficult to grade’ because of its reliance on ‘a great deal of 
guessing and rationalization’ (Goldschmidt, 1982: 300; Polach, 1964: 49). Furthermore, its 
‘grandiose industrial-scale plans contrasted sharply with the meager powers of the New 
Atomic Energy Community’ (Nau, 1974: 104). A clear capabilities-expectations gap thus 
existed. The LWR ‘turned out to be far more costly to develop than experts had originally 
estimated’ (Winand, 1993: 102). This reality only became gradually apparent in the decade 
after the signing of the Euratom Treaty and was not immediately apparent to 
contemporaries. 
I.17. The First Five-Year Plan 
 
Though technical, commercial and institutional challenges lay ahead, Euratom was launched 
amid considerable optimism on 1 January 1958. The Euratom Commission was established 
with Armand as its President. This gave Euratom a recognisable leadership. The signing of 
the US-Euratom Agreement seemed to offer a means to implement the ambitious goals of A 
Target for Euratom using first-generation US LWR technology, until such time as the US or 
Euratom would develop second-generation reactors. Euratom launched its first five-year 
programme (1958-62) which aimed at the development and coordination of a viable 
community-wide nuclear research effort necessary to run a large nuclear power programme.  
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This first five-year programme concentrated upon setting up, equipping, staffing and 
organising the Joint Nuclear Research Centre (JNRC) provided for in the Treaty. The JNRC 
was central to Euratom’s own research programme and eventually grew to include four 
research centres in the 1960s. These were Ispra (Italy), Geel (Belgium), Karlsruhe 
(Germany) and Petten (the Netherlands). Ispra was the principal JNRC research centre and 
concentrated on Euratom’s main research project, ORGEL (from the French ORGanique 
Eau Lourde). This was dedicated to the development of an experimental European second-
generation nuclear reactor that was heavy-water moderated, organic liquid-cooled and used 
natural uranium as fissile material. The aspiration behind ORGEL was the production of a 
European designed nuclear reactor to succeed the US LWR model (Nau, 1974: 157-83). In 
case the ORGEL Project failed, Euratom became involved in the OEEC (OECD after 
December 1960) European Nuclear Energy Agency’s (ENEA) Dragon project in 1959, 
which was dedicated the development of a high temperature gas graphite reactor. Euratom 
co-funded the Dragon project in the expectation that another viable European second-
generation power reactor could be developed reducing Euratom’s dependence on US 
technology.  
 
The second element of Euratom’s research programme was the use of ‘contracts of 
association’, by which the Community co-funded and shared in the work of national nuclear 
programmes extending its influence over the national projects of the member states. 
According to Christopher Layton, ‘For four years, the Euratom Community developed in a 
hopeful atmosphere’ (Layton, 1969: 107).  
 
Nevertheless, difficulties emerged during the first five-year programme and these intensified 
during the period of Euratom’s second five-year research programme (1963-67). An interim 
committee had monitored nuclear developments among the member states between the 
ratification of the Treaty and its coming into effect in 1958. Unfortunately, it had made no 
effort to coordinate existing national nuclear activities at this stage. Between 1955, when the 
Euratom negotiations commenced, and the establishment of Euratom in 1958, most member 
states inaugurated national nuclear programmes if they did not already have them. The 
Community officials nicknamed this duplicative nuclear nationalisation process as ‘planting 
the flag’ (Nau, 1974: 104-5). Among the new national nuclear research facilities established 
during this period were Grenoble (France), Jülich (Germany), Karlsruhe (Germany), Ispra 
(Italy), and Petten (the Netherlands). Belgium’s CEN centre was also dramatically expanded 
(Nau, 1975: 629-30). Vested national, commercial and organisational interests thus grew 
rapidly, diverged and became ‘entrenched’ before Euratom could coordinate the national 
efforts into a common nuclear policy (Scheinman, 1967: 35-37).  
 
When the Euratom Commission was finally formed in January 1958, it preoccupied itself 
with the highly visible area of external affairs, i.e., negotiating nuclear cooperation 
agreements with the USA and the UK in 1958 and 1959. Armand, as the first President of 
the Euratom Commission, understood the importance of publicity and promotion. He 
considered that external technology would permit Euratom to start-up quickly (Nau, 1974: 
106). This approach had two negative consequences. Firstly, France, the ‘nuclear giant’ 
within Euratom, was antagonised. It argued that Euratom should be drawing on French 
technology and expertise, rather than on outside technology, as the basis of its programmes. 
Secondly, the Commission’s international preoccupations at this early stage led it to ignore 
the progressive fragmentation of nuclear activities within the Community. Armand’s 
obsession with external cooperation was exacerbated by his ill-health which imposed 
frequent absences from his post as President of the Commission, leaving the Commission 
without a central direction during Euratom’s crucial start-up phase (Bitsch, 1999: 157). 
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When the Commission turned its attention towards creating the internal structures for 
Euratom in 1959 it discovered a major duplication and dispersal of resources between the 
member states (Euratom DG for Research and Education, 1959). One commentator 
perorated: ‘The rivalry between Euratom and national nuclear technology programs 
appeared at an early stage and has since afflicted Euratom’s program. Member states seem 
to have acted on the principle that a national nuclear development effort must necessarily 
precede or accompany multinational technological cooperation in Europe’ (Donnelly, 1972: 
83-4).  
 
Member states with a less developed nuclear sector feared permanent French domination 
would be institutionalised within Euratom. They reacted by developing their domestic 
nuclear sectors as rapidly as possible. For instance, a rule of thumb was established in 
Germany that ‘whatever one did internationally [in nuclear research], one must do at home 
on at least twice the scale’ (Nau, 1974: 109). By the mid-1960s the ratio was closer to four 
to one in favour of the German home laboratories. Thus the disequilibrium between the large 
French nuclear effort on the one hand, and the backward Italian, Dutch, Belgian, and 
German national programmes, on the other hand, created problems. France believed that 
Euratom should be used to close the external nuclear gap between Europe and the Anglo-
Americans. But Italy, France and Germany were more concerned with closing the internal 
nuclear gap within Euratom between France and their own national programmes. They 
considered that the use of external technology, i.e., LWR, was a perfectly legitimate means 
to end this internal disparity to the annoyance of Gaullist France. It permitted the less 
developed nuclear states to catch up quickly (Nau, 1974: 108). This basic divergence in 
perspective on Euratom’s strategic role and its choice of reactor technology fuelled the so-
called ‘reactor war’ that raged between France and the other members of Euratom and that 
reached its highpoint in the mid-1960s. This conflict revolved around whether Euratom 
should pursue natural uranium gas graphite moderated reactors on the French model or 
manufacture the US enriched uranium LWR model under licence.  
 
Consequently, when the Commission set about establishing the JNRC in 1959 there was no 
consensus within Euratom either on research priorities or reactor choice. Furthermore, 
Euratom found itself to be in direct competition with national programmes for scarce 
research resources, in particular scientists and technicians. The original Euratom plan to 
acquire a green field site and construct a purpose-built JNRC was impossible. France 
rejected the proposal because it did not conform to the French conception of Euratom as 
supplementing not supplanting national efforts. Thus, the Commission proposed a less 
contentious route of taking over an existing nuclear research centre, but first France, then 
Belgium, and finally Germany refused to hand over any of their facilities. The Ispra Centre 
in northern Italy was finally handed over to Euratom in late 1960 after ratification of the 
Italian-Euratom deal was delayed by domestic opposition. Thus it had taken nearly four 
years following the Treaty signing for Euratom to initiate the JNRC and commence in-house 
research on ORGEL (Nau, 1974: 107). 
 
By this time the principal raison d’être for Euratom, the energy crisis, had receded. By 1959 
Western Europe, contrary to earlier predictions, confronted a coal glut, undermining the 
enthusiasm of the main coal producers (Belgium and Germany) for the extensive 
development of nuclear energy (Polach, 1964: 116-118, 123). With the end of the Middle 
East crisis, oil imports recommenced. The increase in known oil reserves with the discovery 
of oil in the Sahara and the North Sea led to a reduction in oil prices and an increase in 
consumption (see Polach, 1964: 118-20). An additional factor was the hostile attitude of the 
USSR towards Euratom. The USSR conducted an ‘oil offensive’ against member states of 
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Euratom in the early 1960s, focussing on Italy, to undermine the attractiveness of nuclear 
energy. The prices of Soviet crude oil were reduced below the prices of those of 
international oil companies (Polach, 1964: 135). The accumulation of these forces ensured 
an abundance of cheap oil and this made it difficult for a new, untested energy technology to 
establish itself on a competitive basis. This changed energy context meant that nuclear 
energy could not become competitive by 1963 as predicted by the ‘Three Wise 
Men’(Polach, 1964: 125-27).  
 
The result was that there was an initial ‘weak European response’ to the joint US-Euratom 
nuclear programme. Despite the advantageous inducements offered to public utilities to 
construct LWR plants, the joint US-Euratom nuclear programme received a ‘disappointing’ 
response to its first call for bids from would-be contractors to build nuclear power plants in 
Europe (Donnelly, 1974: 103-5). Only one power station was contracted under its auspices, 
that of the 150 MW SENN Italian reactor. Subsequent calls for submissions had only 
marginal success. In 1960, the joint Franco-Belgian project, SENA was sanctioned to 
construct a 240 MW plant at Chooz on the Franco-Belgian border. In 1962 the joint US-
Euratom program approved the construction of a plant at Gundremmingen in Bavaria. All 
these ‘demonstration’ plants were of the US LWR variety (Goldschmidt, 1982: 308-9). 
According to Polach at the time: ‘The crux of the problem is willingness of the European 
utility companies to put credence in the cost calculations for nuclear power’ (Polach, 1964: 
126). 
 
Another premise upon which the Euratom Treaty was based proved incorrect almost as soon 
as the Euratom began operation. The framers of the Treaty had assumed that the shortage of 
nuclear materials before and during the 1950s would continue. Thus the ESA was to ensure 
the equitable distribution of nuclear materials between the member states and various 
industrial enterprises. However, after 1960 with the end of the US monopoly on the use of 
uranium produced in the Belgian Congo, the discovery of new deposits of nuclear materials, 
and US liberalisation of the international nuclear materials market through the IAEA, the 
shortage of nuclear materials ended. Thus, the principal function of the Supplies Agency, 
that of assuring equal access to nuclear materials, was undermined since all consumers had 
access to sufficient raw materials to meet their needs (Polach, 1964: 131-2; Donnelly, 1972: 
87).  
 
As there was less need for the ESA, some member states began to resist cooperating with it 
since they perceived it as interfering and offering limited benefits to national nuclear 
programmes. Several states failed to register their bilateral agreements arranging fuel 
supplies with Euratom. Germany and the Netherlands rushed through their bilateral 
agreements with the UK in 1957 to prevent them from coming under the Treaty (Polach, 
1964: 130). France became the most high profile objector to this Treaty requirement. After 
1964, France began to conclude external agreements with third parties for nuclear fuel 
supplies without the permission of Euratom. France’s recalcitrance on this issue was 
facilitated by the increased availability of non-US nuclear supplies, particularly enriched 
uranium from the USSR. Thus, it could bypass Euratom controls and develop an 
independent force de frappe (Nau, 1974: 100-1). These emerging difficulties disillusioned 
an already old and ill Armand, who resigned as President of the Commission in early 1959.  
 
His replacement by another Frenchman, Etienne Hirsch, appeared to signal an improvement 
in the fortunes of the Commission. Hirsch was a dynamic, close acquaintance of Jean 
Monnet. But de Gaulle’s instinctive antipathy towards Monnet the individual and Monnet 
the supranationalist integrator, ensured that difficulty that was developing concerning the 
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relationship of Euratom to national nuclear programmes was personalised in a clash between 
de Gaulle and Hirsch (Scheinman, 1967: 36, 40). 
 
Hence, the posture of France, the main initial supporter of Euratom during the negotiations, 
altered substantially during the first years of Euratom’s operation. Charles de Gaulle had 
been an opponent of European integration and, in particular, Euratom. After he regained 
power in mid 1958, his attitude was more constructive and only slowly changed to renewed 
hostility. His earliest pre-1958 fear that Euratom would undermine France’s nuclear 
independence and her ability to develop a military nuclear programme were proven to be 
largely unfounded, and upon being shown the Euratom Treaty he reportedly exclaimed ‘Is 
that all it is?’ (quoted in Nau, 1974: 100). His fears of, and consequently his initial hostility 
towards, Euratom were assuaged temporarily. Of all member states perhaps the attitude of 
France was essential to Euratom’s success or failure. In 1964 France’s civil nuclear budget 
($400m) accounted for two-thirds of the total of national nuclear funding in Euratom. It had 
‘as many nuclear scientists and technicians as the other five put together’ into the late 1960s 
(Scheinman, 1967: 31). The overriding objective of the French civil nuclear programme, like 
that of its military nuclear programme, was the grandeur of France in a Europe independent 
of outside influences and in a Europe which did not threaten the national autonomy of its 
constituent states. Thus, Euratom as a weak, promotional organisation could fit into de 
Gaulle’s vision of Europe.  
 
Of course, Euratom’s early discounting of France’s chief motivation for supporting nuclear 
integration, that of constructing a common uranium enrichment plant, ensured that future 
French policy towards Europe would be lukewarm at best. Additionally, France was critical 
of Euratom’s dependence on external cooperation agreements with the USA and the UK. 
The CEA unsuccessfully attempted to wean the Commission and the other member states (in 
particular Germany) away from technological and material reliance upon the USA. This was 
a continuation of France’s interest in Germany as a potential nuclear partner during the 
Euratom negotiations, because of the latter’s strength in advanced industrial sectors. France 
actively sought to cooperate with Germany in the early years of Euratom (Melissen, 1993: 
106). Among the French proposals for Franco-German nuclear cooperation in the years 
between 1958 and 1961 were: Electricité de France (EdF, the nationalised electricity utility) 
should participate in the construction of a German nuclear plant; German industry should 
participate in the ORGEL project; and German and French utilities should conduct common 
meetings on the nuclear power matters (Nau, 1974: 108). 
 
Thus there was considerable evidence to show that divergent national nuclear interests were 
‘firmly entrenched’ by 1960, the very time that Euratom was beginning to function properly 
and it acquired a pro-active President. ‘Reactor wars’ were already underway, while the 
international energy environment was unfriendly towards nuclear energy. Hirsch argued 
before the European Parliament in June 1961 that European integration needed a European 
spirit to succeed (Euratom Commission, ‘Speech by Mr Etienne Hirsch before the European 
Parliamentary Assembly’, Strasbourg, 1961, EUR/C/2280/61e, p. 6). With the international 
downturn in interest in nuclear energy and a redirection of Euratom’s efforts away from the 
immediate installation of nuclear power plants towards research, Hirsch became an avid 
supporter for the establishment of a European University as one means to develop a common 
European spirit. Subsequent developments in Hirsch’s career illustrated graphically the lack 
of a European spirit. 
 
In 1961 the Commission proposed that it should become involved in several reactor projects 
to help overcome some of the start-up costs, in return receiving information from the 
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operation of these plants (see Euratom Fifth Annual Report: 95-101). France objected to the 
use of Community funds for subsidising US nuclear technology (France had failed to get any 
of its nuclear reactor projects included in the joint power programme). Hirsch, using 
Euratom’s supranational rules, overruled French objections against the redirection of the 
first five-year research budget to aid reactors being constructed under the US-Euratom and 
UK-Euratom agreements (Scheinman, 1967: 41-42).  
 
Hirsch also angered French national interests when he sought to ensure that all member 
states complied with Article 106 of the Euratom Treaty, i.e., that all bilateral agreements 
concluded between member states and third countries before Euratom came into being 
should be registered with and approved by the Euratom Council, and ‘that the rights and 
obligations arising out of such agreements shall as far as possible be assumed by the 
Community’ (Euratom Treaty, 1957: Article 106). As part of Hirsch’s efforts to ensure that 
this Article was implemented, he unsuccessfully attempted to ensure that the enriched 
uranium France purchased under the US-French Agreement should in future be included 
under the US-Euratom Agreement. As Goldschmidt states: ‘This…. was, of course, intended 
to strengthen Euratom’s prerogatives in international relations as compared with those of the 
individual member states. It demonstrated a fundamental difference between Euratom’s and 
the French government’s concept of the respective roles of the community’s member states 
and of the commission itself’ (Goldschmidt, 1982: 310).  
 
A further point of controversy between the Hirsch Commission and France occurred when 
the former began to insist that the Euratom inspectors should be permitted access to the 
dual-purpose French plutonium facility at Marcoule in accordance with the Euratom 
Treaty’s control of fissile materials’ provisions. France objected to such an intrusion and 
declared that Marcoule was a military installation and thus exempt from the safeguards 
provisions (Howlett, 1990: 107-109). Thus, France won the exchange ‘between France and 
the Commission as to where national defense purposes began (Scheinman, 1967: 37). 
 
De Gaulle’s failure to renominate Hirsch for a second term, contrary to the wishes of the 
other five member states, was an indication of French displeasure at the Commission’s 
supranationalist tendencies under an assertive President. Instead a more docile and 
acceptable candidate to France, M. Chatenet, became the third President. These incidents 
cumulatively indicated that the French CEA ‘supported cooperation through Euratom as 
long as such cooperation supplemented French resources and did not become the basis of 
independent Community programs’ or subsidise Anglo-American penetration of the 
European nuclear market (Nau, 1974: 108).  
I.18. The Second Five-Year Plan 
 
Euratom’s problems and the dissension between the member states about its objectives 
escalated during the second five-year research programme (1962-67). The divergent 
interests of the member states became overtly irreconcilable. The less developed nuclear 
states, the Netherlands and Italy, who had JNRC research centres located in their countries 
wanted an extension of JNRC research activities. The other three states, Belgium, Germany 
and France, all of who had relatively strong or rapidly developing national nuclear 
programmes, either wanted to limit or reduce JNRC research. They favoured ‘association 
contracts’, by which the Euratom research budget would fund research in national research 
centres rather than in JNRC research centres. France and Germany, in particular, favoured 
Euratom involving itself in more long-term research projects rather than in projects with 
immediate industrial relevance (see Nau, 1974: 110-11). Thus the more advanced and 
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ambitious state and industrial interests sought to minimise Euratom’s interference in nuclear 
industrial matters. This substantive variation in national attitudes played havoc with 
Euratom’s second five-year programme, because it became impossible to agree upon 
priorities.  
 
Unfortunately, the Commission was a largely impotent force in this debate, because its 
power had largely been stymied by de Gaulle’s symbolic rejection of Hirsch and its 
remaining authority was undermined by the approaching merger of the institutions of the 
three communities in 1967. Thus, the ‘destructive dialogue’ between the member states was 
not solved by strong leadership from the Commission. Though the second five-year plan was 
almost double the first five-year research programme at $425 million there were a number of 
problems with it. A larger proportion of the second programme was devoted to association 
contracts than the first implying a relative downgrading of the JNRC. All future research 
programmes were to be conducted using association agreements and during 1962 flagship 
JNRC projects, such as ORGEL, were cut back. Commentators are in agreement about the 
state of Euratom at this time. According to Scheinman, Euratom in ‘seeking to satisfy 
all…really satisfied none’ (Scheinman, 1967: 45). Nau says that ‘The program sought to 
satisfy everyone, but succeeded in satisfying no one, paying least attention, in the process, to 
Community requirements’ (Nau, 1974: 111).  
 
Then in 1963 and 1964 the JNRC began to experience inflation. The main centre at Ispra, 
which had taken the brunt of the 1962 JNRC cuts and was in competition with national 
programmes for scientists and technicians, was worst effected. It experienced a severe 
financial crisis. In an attempt to solve the crisis the Commission proposed to increase 
Euratom’s subvention to Ispra. France reacted angrily and voted against the 1964 budget 
arguing that the Commission was overspending because it lacked strategic priorities (see 
Agence Europe, May 8, 1964). This period in 1964 and 1965 has been characterised as the 
highpoint of the ‘reactor war’, since it revolved around the choice of nuclear reactors by 
Euratom’s member states. The US LWR had entered its industrial stage and had finally 
become commercially competitive with conventional fossil-fuel power plants. The USA’s 
leading electrochemical companies, General Electric and Westinghouse, developed their 
first turnkey commercial industrial scale LWR nuclear power plants for sale in 1963 and 
1964, and a ‘nuclear boom’ ensued in the US and spread to Europe (see Walker & Lönnroth, 
1983: 25-28).  
 
The commercialisation of the American reactor type together with US guaranteed enriched 
uranium supplies and the joint US-Euratom reactor programme converged to overcome the 
previous obstacles to commercial nuclear power. In 1962 the joint reactor participation 
programme had approved the construction of a boiling water reactor (BWR) at 
Grundremmingen in Germany for Siemens. The success of, and information received from, 
this demonstration plant, together with the development of turnkey commercial reactors, 
convinced Siemens that LWR technology was preferable. Thus, the US-Euratom joint 
reactor programme was eventually responsible for familiarising many European states and 
firms with US technology permitting a US export surge to Europe in the mid-1960s. 
Siemens lost interest in natural uranium reactors, and in 1964 another two LWRs were 
ordered by German utilities (Goldschmidt, 1982: 309; Nau, 1974: 144-45).  
 
US LWRs progressive capture the European commercial nuclear energy market, undermined 
interest in Euratom’s own attempts to develop an indigenous European reactor in the 
ORGEL project. An ORGEL prototype reactor had not even been produced yet, while many 
of the problems of the LWR prototypes had been solved and the cost of their construction 
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had reduced substantially. In addition, fast breeder reactors were increasingly viewed as the 
technology of the future in Europe. Thus, after 1962 ORGEL was in retreat (Nau, 1974: 168-
70). 
 
In general, French nuclear interests opposed Euratom’s subsidisation of US technological 
penetration of Europe’s nuclear reactor market. They wanted Euratom to adopt France’s 
indigenous natural uranium fuelled, gas graphite moderated reactor model. Some French 
nuclear personnel even regretted de Gaulle’s veto of British membership of the EEC and 
Euratom in January 1963. Together France and Britain might have had a chance of 
persuading Euratom to accept a variety of a natural uranium gas graphite reactor that they 
were both developing (Goldschmidt, 1982: 309). French disappointment at the downgrading 
of its reactor model led it to criticise the distribution of Euratom’s funds. France criticised 
the development of saupoudrage, i.e., the division of research funds among the member 
states on political rather than technical or scientific grounds. This was linked to the growth 
of an unofficial policy of juste retour within the Commission, that is, each state regains a 
portion of research funding equal to its original contributions to the Community without 
regard to technical or scientific competence, or commercial viability. Juste retour was a 
Commission response to conciliate the fierce nuclear nationalism that had emerged and an 
attempt to maintain concord, but it led to a directionless and incoherent research agenda. 
Instead France argued for a research strategy of concentration. This would entail the 
focussing of Euratom’s funds on projects of major benefit to all of the member states. France 
recommended centring Euratom’s funds on: 
 fusion which held distant prospects for unlimited energy; 
 fast reactors (breeders) which required high long-term investment; 
 ORGEL which would develop an independent European reactor in the medium-term. 
 
Germany and Belgium largely agreed with the choice of the targets for concentration.  
 
Italy resisted vociferously and rejected any major revision of the second five-year plan. It 
favoured concentration on projects which would have immediate benefits, i.e., continued 
funding for the development of US LWRs. Research, according to Italy, should be focussed 
on making such ‘proven reactors’ (i.e., US LWRs) more competitive and productive for the 
benefit of Europe rather than pursuing the ‘holy grail’ of European nuclear autonomy. The 
objective should be cheap energy and European economic growth. The Netherlands was of a 
similar view. Though Germany did not believe in European nuclear independence, however 
it favoured ultimate industrial freedom, in line with its earlier antidirigiste mindset. In 1965, 
France largely achieved its objective obtaining a general programme revision in line with its 
proposals for concentration. However, this was achieved by a Qualified Majority Vote in the 
Euratom Council, the third such qualified majority decision in four years, and it alienated 
Italy (Scheinman, 1967: 48).  
 
Hence, the general problem of agreeing Euratom’s research objectives unleashed an 
amalgam of traditional and fundamental controversies concerning Euratom’s essence, i.e.:  
 internal versus external technology, 
 juste retour versus concentration, 
 national versus Euratom programmes, 
 industrial freedom versus centrally directed Euratom programmes. 
 
Consequently, after 1962 Euratom was largely immobilised by acrimonious debates 
concerning the revision of the research budget with the ‘reactor war’ at its heart. Successive 
budgetary compromises, which Nau appropriately terms ‘band-aids’ sufficed to ensure the 
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survival of the second five-year plan (Nau, 1974: 114). Pierre Chatenet coined the term 
‘additional programmes’ for these supplementary budgetary subventions which allowed the 
irreconcilable partners to pursue their own research agendas using Community funding.  
 
After 1964 an exponential growth in multilateral and bilateral arrangements occurred outside 
of Euratom. Under their 1963 Treaty of Cooperation, France and Germany commenced 
work on joint projects at Fessenheim and Grenoble. Later the Netherlands, Britain and 
Germany began work on a centrifuge uranium enrichment project. By 1965 the member 
states had grown disillusioned with the Euratom forcing Chatenet to admit that flexible 
nuclear cooperation (or Euratom á la carte) was the only way to make progress. This was an 
admission that there could no agreement on common policies and projects.  
 
This ‘destructive dialogue’ within Euratom paused during the ‘Empty Chair Crisis’ of late 
1965 and early 1966. During this controversy, all the European communities were affected 
by France’s boycott of their institutions. However, this was simply a temporary respite and 
the disagreements between Euratom’s member states continued in 1966 and 1967. The 
Commission presented its first target programme in April 1965. France wanted a common 
industrial European policy, as did the Commission, and lobbied for its natural uranium 
power reactors as the European prototype. Italy agreed with the concept of a common 
nuclear industrial policy, but disliked the proposal concerning French reactors. Germany and 
Benelux rejected any centralised direction of nuclear industrial policy, which they 
considered to be national matters. Thus, dissension was increasing (Nau, 1974: 115-16).  
 
Simultaneously, the Six were becoming increasingly aware of Europe’s R & D, as well as 
technological, inferiority relative to the USA. The publication of the 1965 OECD study of R 
& D indicated that the US was both spending more on R & D and accruing more industrial 
and commercial advantage from research than the Western Europeans. This was seen as the 
main factor in American capital penetration of Europe and the loss of Europe’s 
manufacturing competitiveness. This had always been the Gaullist position but now it 
appeared vindicated by the OECD research. The concept of a ‘technology gap’ between the 
USA and Europe gained widespread credence throughout Europe. Italy, Belgium, Germany 
and Britain all began to call for remedial action to reverse the alleged European 
overdependence on US technology in both the nuclear and non-nuclear fields. Servan-
Schreiber’s, Le Défi Américain, a hard-hitting critique of the alleged American economic 
invasion of Europe, became an instant bestseller when it was published in 1967 (see Nau, 
1974: 50-53).  
 
Investment in science and technology became an issue of vital national sovereignty. To 
coordinate the fragmented European R & D market, the ‘Six’ wanted to extend cooperation 
in science and technology beyond nuclear energy. In this environment, the consolidated EC 
Commission (after 1967) feared that Euratom would be downgraded in preference to 
cooperation in other technological areas (Nau, 1974: 116). After all, Euratom was in ‘deep 
crisis’. Despite the fact that the Community was co-funding national nuclear projects under 
‘association contracts’ the attempts to establish both common research and industrial 
programmes had failed. In late 1966 Italy declared that since the other member states were 
acting nationalistically, then Italy would begin doing so too and demanded Euratom funding 
for an Italian test reactor (Layton, 1969: 109). In the area of fast reactors where it was 
generally presumed that Europe was ahead of all other competitors, France and Germany’s 
fast reactor research programmes were in competition, rather than complementary, militating 
against the development of a joint prototype and a joint commercial reactor (see Nau, 1972).  
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By the late 1960s Germany’s commercial nuclear sector was developing and it was ‘staking 
its claim to be regarded as the leading civil nuclear industrial state in Europe’. AEG and 
Siemens, having acquired LWRs under licence and in partnership deals with General 
Electric and Westinghouse, steadily cut their ties with the US and began to export nuclear 
reactors themselves (Walker & Lönnroth, 1983: 30). This unleashed Franco-German 
commercial rivalry and prevented Euratom from coordinating the European nuclear sector.  
 
Dissension between the member states meant that a third five-year research plan, which was 
due to commence in 1968, could not be agreed. Thus, in 1968, Euratom had to depend on a 
‘stop-gap one year’ research budget amounting to half the 1967 amount (Donnelly, 1974: 
85). ‘Transitional’ or emergency one year budgets continued into the 1970s. Euratom had 
effectively failed in meeting its headline goals. The ‘Three Wise Men’s’ and Commission’s 
objective of 15,000 MW of installed nuclear power among the member states by 1968 far 
exceeded the technical and commercial capabilities at the time. Only approximately 1,500 
MW had been constructed by the deadline. It had also proved politically impossible to 
coordinate the diverse interests and views of the ‘Six’. Euratom’s role as seen in the 
activities of the JNRC (symbolically renamed Joint Research Centre thereafter) was now 
increasingly restricted to uncontentious areas such as basic or fundamental research which 
had little prospect of commercial applicability in the short or medium-term (such as plasma 
physics and high temperature fusion), necessary support services for the nuclear industry 
(for example nuclear measurements), regulation (health and safety) and controls. 
I.19. Conclusion: L’échec d’Euratom? 
 
Sectoral integration of nuclear energy was chosen by Spaak and Monnet because it was 
viewed as less ambitious than a general common market or customs union, and therefore 
less likely to fail. Nuclear energy was an appealing prestige technology, especially after the 
liberalisation of US nuclear policy. The Euratom proposal was expected to appeal to the 
French, since France had a strong interest in the development of the nuclear energy. The 
primary assumption of the integrationists was that the demands of a ‘big science’, such as 
nuclear energy, were probably beyond the capabilities of the individual medium and small 
states of Western Europe, but that together in an integrated collective programme they could 
build an industrial scale nuclear sector producing competitively priced electricity in a matter 
of years. 
 
The determination and ingenuity of Monnet and Spaak ultimately led to the breakthrough 
that placed nuclear integration on the agenda of the ‘Six’ in mid-1955, by linking it with 
Beyen’s idea of a customs union or common market. This junktim was inspired as a means 
to reconcile the divergent interests of France and the FRG in a package deal. Despite the 
wishes of Mollet, Pineau and Monnet, the junktim could not be unpackaged during 1956 to 
accelerate Euratom’s path towards a treaty though it appeared that the nuclear energy 
negotiations were making far more substantial progress than the Common Market ones. 
Nonetheless, the neoliberal priorities of Germany’s Economic Ministry and powerful 
sections of German industry militated against agreement on a strong supranational Euratom 
structure with a total monopoly on ownership of all fissile materials and control on their use. 
Even Adenauer who began to see virtue in Euratom as a stand-alone integration project in 
mid-1956, was unable to totally impose his will on his recalcitrant Ministers and domestic 
economic interests, especially the nascent German nuclear industry.  
 
Nevertheless, it was the presumed strongest supporters of Euratom who weakened the 
organisation irretrievably at the outset. Unrelenting French domestic insistence (right wing, 
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Gaullists and the CEA) upon the maintenance of their right to manufacture nuclear weapons, 
forced Mollet to retract his initial renunciation of France’s military intentions. France, 
therefore, undermined Monnet’s primary goal of utilising Euratom to demilitarise nuclear 
energy in Western Europe. As the FRG had voluntarily and unilaterally renounced her 
sovereign rights in this area as the price of admission into the Atlantic Alliance, French 
demands for monopolistic fissile material ownership and controls after Mollet’s reversal on 
the French military question was perceived as a confirmation in Euratom-sceptical German 
circles of their suspicions that the nuclear community was simply a discriminatory French 
device to exploit German resources and prevent the FRG from acquiring nuclear weapons. 
Thus the extremely tenuous assumptions upon which Euratom was conceived began to 
disentangle in the face of intransigent sectional interest groups within both the FRG and 
France.  
 
In sum, the Euratom concept initiated the relance and was considered the most likely vehicle 
for further European integration by Monnet, Spaak, France, the USA and the Action 
Committee. However, France eventually recognised that the EEC was in the best interests of 
the French economy if safeguards for French social provision, agriculture and overseas 
territories could be assured, while the FRG was prepared to make substantial concessions in 
these areas to ensure commercial benefit for German industry and the commencement of 
‘ever closer union’ (see Milward, 2000: 214-23). A turbulent international environment 
facilitated and accelerated the resolution of the outstanding issues related to the Common 
Market. In light of this substantial progress in the EEC negotiations, Franco-German 
fundamental difficulties over the Euratom Treaty appeared less salient and they effectively 
agreed to differ. Thus in the end Euratom was a ‘sectoral sideshow’ and ‘a “smokescreen” 
for the more controversial customs union’ (Moravcsik, 1998: 148).  
 
The isotope separation plant and the (de facto) French monopoly on the provision of 
uranium was rejected by the German industry. In the end, a centralised Euratom Supplies 
Agency was instituted but denied a de facto monopoly. It was clear by early 1957, that ‘there 
was little prospect that the community would support an isotope separator, which had been 
one of the “principal attractions of Euratom” for France’ (Stirk, 1996: 144). As early as 
December 1956, therefore, the French Quai d’Orsay was admitting internally that Euratom 
would not further European integration (DDF, 1956, III, doc. 146). France eventually went 
ahead with its own isotope separation programme. Domestic politics ensured that France had 
no room for manoeuvre as regards the military option. Euratom’s control stopped at the 
gates of military installations.  
 
In the final analysis, the Euratom Treaty was effectively ‘gutted’ (Moravscik, 1998: 120). 
The treaty was inadequate, civil nuclear energy was still in its commercial infancy, and the 
economic predictions for nuclear energy were wildly unrealistic. The primary underlying 
difficulty was that too much political importance was vested in an untested economic sector. 
As Kramish writes: ‘Looking hard at the economic and technical “facts,” one actually finds 
very little justification whatsoever for the existence of Euratom…. Euratom is justified 
largely by the expedient of political argument, by its role in contributing to a united Europe’ 
(Kramish, 1963: 233-34). 
 
The ‘myth’ of an energy shortage that had propelled Monnet’s efforts during 1955, 1956 and 
early 1957, dissipated thereafter when an abundance of cheap oil flooded Europe. This 
denied Euratom a major centripetal force that could have checked the fissiparous influences 
of national interest and motivated a common energy and nuclear policy. Ultimately, it was 
the absence of a Franco-German Axis in nuclear matters that was the undoing of the Treaty 
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during its negotiation and implementation stages. A workable and mutually beneficial 
Franco-German compromise was central to the success of the EEC Treaty, but nothing 
similar existed in Euratom.  
 
Consequently, despite the best efforts of Monnet’s inspiration, the fragmentation of the 
nuclear energy market of the Six already existed at the time of the signing of the Euratom 
Treaty, and the divergences grew in the subsequent decade. An economy of scale was not 
achieved. As the EC Commission’s ‘white paper’ on nuclear policy noted in 1968: ‘The 
effort of the Six, on both the national and Community levels as regards public spending on 
civilian research has been only marginally lower than in the USA, which means that it has 
been higher in proportion to the gross domestic product’ (Bulletin of the European 
Communities, Supplement, Sept/Oct 1968). 
 
Nevertheless, all the evidence pointed to a greatly inferior European commercial and 
industrial return than in the USA. In the USA four or five firms were building or planning to 
build 87 nuclear power stations, but in Europe 12 firms were involved in the construction of 
only 16 plants. The EC Commission thus argued that Europe’s comparative lack of progress 
was a product of the ‘fragmentation of the [European] effort, the bulk of which has been 
pursued at the national level with national objectives in view’. The damning conclusion was 
that: ‘Member countries have reserved appropriations and public contracts for their own 
domestic industries, and orders placed by the electricity utilities have been awarded solely to 
domestic contractors….The weakness of industrial structures within the Community is in 
fact the result as much as the cause of this lack of co-ordination of officially sponsored 
projects’ (Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement, Sept/Oct 1968). The EC 
Commission, in effect, admitted that Euratom had failed to meet even the whittled down 
objectives that survived the negotiation process to be included in the Treaty. Competing 
national interests made Euratom more ‘of a broker than a prime mover in the commercial 
use of energy in Europe’ (Camilleri, 1983: 33).  
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II. The Main Provisions of the Euratom Treaty 
II.1. Promotion of Research5 
 
The promotion of research was (and still is) a central feature of the Euratom Treaty. The key 
provisions are the following Treaty articles: 
 
 ‘Chapter 1. Promotion of Research 
 
Article 4 
1. The Commission shall be responsible for promoting and facilitating nuclear research in the 
Member States and for complementing it by carrying out a Community research and training 
programme. 
 
Article 6 
To encourage the carrying out of research programmes communicated to it the Commission 
may:  
 a. provide financial assistance within the framework of research contracts, without, 
however, offering subsidies; 
 b. supply, either free of charge or against payment, for carrying out such programmes, any 
source materials or special fissile materials which it has available; 
 c.  place installations, equipment or expert assistance at the disposal of Member States, 
persons or undertakings, either free of charge or against payment; 
 d. promote joint financing by the Member States, persons or undertakings concerned. 
[…] 
Article 7 
Community research and training programmes shall be determined by the Council, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, which shall consult the Scientific and 
Technical Committee. These programmes shall be drawn up for a period of not more than five 
years. The funds required for carrying out these programmes shall be included each year in the 
research and investment budget of the Community. The Commission shall ensure that these 
programmes are carried out and shall submit an annual report thereon to the Council. The 
Commission shall keep the Economic and Social Committee informed of the broad outlines of 
Community research and training programmes.  
[…] 
 
(Authors’ note: this article does not allocate any role to the European Parliament: 
merely to the non-elected Scientific and Technical Committee. Nonetheless, the 
Council does in fact request Parliament’s opinion, via a process known as a 
‘consultation facultative’ (optional consultation). This is a simple consultation, with a 
single reading in Parliament, which the Council is not obliged to respond to, or even 
take notice of). 
 
Article 8 
1. After consulting the Scientific and Technical Committee, the Commission shall establish a 
Joint Nuclear Research Centre.  
 
 
                                                 
5 This chapter makes considerable use of the excellent A Brief History of European Union Research Policy by 
Luca Guzzetti, European Commission DG XII, Office for Official Publications, 1995, ISBN 92-827-5353-0. 
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This Centre shall ensure that the research programmes and other tasks assigned to it by the 
Commission are carried out. It shall also ensure that a uniform nuclear terminology and a 
standard system of measurements are established.  
 
It shall set up a central bureau for nuclear measurements.  
 
2. The activities of the Centre may, for geographical or functional reasons, be carried out in 
separate establishments. 
[…]’. 
 
The subjects to be addressed by Euratom’s research and training programmes are spelled out 
in considerable detail in Annex I of the Treaty. They are presented in eight thematic groups: 
raw materials, physics applied to nuclear energy, physical chemistry of reactors, processing 
of radioactive material, applications of radioisotopes, study of the harmful effects of 
radiation on living organisms, equipment, and economic aspects of energy production. 
Furthermore, the Euratom Treaty, in its Article 215, explicitly provided for an initial 
research and training programme: 
 
‘Article 215 
 1. An initial research and training programme, which is set out in Annex V to this Treaty and 
the cost of which shall not, unless the Council unanimously decides otherwise, exceed 215 
million EPU units of account, shall be carried out within five years of the entry into force of 
this Treaty.  
 
 2. A breakdown of the expenditure necessary for the implementation of this programme is set 
out by way of illustration under main subdivisions in Annex V.  
 
 The Council may, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, modify 
this programme. 
 
 […]’ 
 
Annex V to the Treaty spells out the subjects to be addressed within this initial research 
programme, and indicates the division of tasks between the ‘Joint Centre’ (ie the JNRC), and 
other contractors. The JNRC was to include:  
a. general laboratories for chemistry, physics, electronics and metallurgy,  
b. special laboratories for the following subjects:  
 nuclear fusion; separation of isotopes other than Uranium 235 (with a 
laboratory to be equipped with a high resolution electromagnetic separator), 
 prototypes of prospecting instruments, 
 mineralogy, 
 radiobiology,  
 c. a bureau of standards specialising in nuclear measurements for isotope analysis 
and absolute measurements of radiation and neutron absorption, equipped with its 
own experimental reactor.  
 
Furthermore the JNRC was to ‘have at its disposal’ a high fast-neutron flux reactor. It was 
also to arrange for a large-scale exchange of information, and organise specialised courses 
relating particularly to the training of prospectors and to the applications of radioisotopes. 
The former provision was instrumental in defining the early responsibilities of what later 
became DG 13 (now part of DG Enterprise), including the dissemination (and promotion of 
the use of) research findings from the JNRC, and (later) other Community research 
programmes. 
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Not all of the 215 million units of account were spent in the course of the first five-year 
programme: some monies were carried over into the second programme. There were delays 
in the establishment of the JNRC, which was finally created at a number of separate sites, in 
some cases by ‘Europeanising’ an existing national research centre: this was the case, for 
example, with the largest JNRC establishment at Ispra in northern Italy, and with the Petten 
site in the Netherlands. The second five-year programme (1963-1967) was a continuation of, 
and indeed in some ways the real implementation of, the first programme, since a number of 
the original proposed activities did not really get under way until 1962. The programme was 
given a budget of 425 million U.A., plus the unspent 20.5 million U.A. from the first 
programme. The areas of research remained essentially the same, though a higher percentage 
of the budget (about 50%) was to be spent by ‘direct means’ ie by the JNRC – since the 
latter, in its various locations, was now ‘up-and-running’, with a staff complement planned 
to increase from 1,500 at the start to 2,530 by the end of the second five-year programme. 
The research programme was to concentrate on the Orgel reactor (an unusual design unique 
to JNRC Ispra, using natural uranium fuel, a heavy water moderator, and an organic liquid 
coolant), high-temperature gas-cooled reactors, and fast-neutron reactors, as well as thermo-
nuclear fusion. Orgel itself was the single most important research project, and even at that 
time there were concerns expressed that the Euratom Research Programme in general, and 
the JNRC in particular, was putting ‘all its eggs in one basket’. (The reply, that 
diversification of research projects would lose ‘that unity of purpose essential to its success’, 
is still at the core of similar debates on current research priorities, for example over the 
ITER project). 
 
In 1964 an acrimonious debate began in the Council (of Foreign ministers, not Research 
Ministers) concerning a proposal to increase the budget and modify in other respects the 
second five-year research programme. The eventual compromise accorded a modest increase 
in the budget (not as much as the Commission wanted) and further concentrated research on 
projects, including Orgel, which were far removed from the rapidly evolving market-place 
for power reactors. The difficulties encountered in making this decision were merely 
indicative of a more general malaise concerning the Euratom Treaty, which had clearly not 
lived (or not been permitted to live) up to its original expectations. The Commission 
presented a discouraging summary to the Council, on 9 October 1968, which, suggests Luca 
Guzzetti, may stand as an epitaph for EURATOM: 
 
‘The founding Treaty of the European Atomic Energy Community was intended to establish 
the conditions in which the nuclear industries could develop. Ten years later we must admit 
to having achieved very few of its aims. It is true that Euratom’s actions have often been 
fruitful within their limits, but the Community generally has not succeeded in co-ordinating 
and even less in drawing together into a coherent whole, the efforts of Member States. The 
dispersion of research and development programmes throughout the Community has been an 
obstacle to the effective realisation of a common nuclear market. Member States have 
reserved finance for their own industries, and orders from public institutions have been 
placed with national companies. Orders from electricity producers, too, have gone to 
national construction companies. The development of the nuclear industries within the 
Community have thus not benefited from the suppression of border tariffs and quotas which 
followed the EURATOM Treaty. This sequence of events has led to the present crisis, which 
is not only the crisis of EURATOM, but is a crisis in the development of the nuclear 
sector’6.  
                                                 
6 Secretary General of the Commission: ‘Survey of the nuclear policy of the European Communities’, 
Supplement to the Bulletin, n.9-19, 1968, p.5, and quoted in full in Guzzetti, op cit., p.31. 
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The 1967 merger of the three founding treaties resulted in responsibilities for the various 
chapters of the Euratom Treaty being divided up between various administrative units in the 
newly formed single Commission. One consequence of the temporary hiatus was that the 
life-time of the second research programme was extended by a series of ad-hoc decisions, 
and the decision on a third five-year research programme was at first postponed to 1968, and 
then subsequent postponements meant that the decision was not taken until February 1973, 
when the Council adopted a programme from 1973 to 1976. In the interim, an interesting 
decision had been taken during the 1969 financial year to set up, in addition to the ‘joint 
programme’, a series of ‘supplementary programmes’ in which Member States could 
participate, or not do so, on an ‘à la carte’ basis. One such programme concerned the 
operation of the high-flux reactor at Petten, which only involved the Dutch and the German 
governments; this was, and still is, one of the very few examples of ‘variable geometry’ in 
any EU research programme. 
 
The major problem was that the JNRC’s ‘flagship’ Orgel project was formally abandoned in 
June 1969, when it was finally acknowledged that there was simply no commercial interest 
in this type of reactor. This decision provoked a deep crisis (including protest strikes) in the 
JNRC’s Ispra establishment; so it was the attempts to solve the problems at the JNRC which 
led to the delay in the adoption of the next research programme. The Commission proposed 
that the JNRC be re-named the JRC, and should play a central role in the elaboration of 
Community science and technology policy, with a more independent management structure 
(proposals which, remarkably enough, find strong echoes in current thinking in the 
Commission on the future role of the JRC.) The Euratom Council met to discuss these 
proposals on 6 December 1971. The options considered were wide-ranging, including the 
possibility of closing the JNRC completely, and sacking all the staff. But in order to do so, 
in the face of opposition from the Commission, the Council would have required unanimity, 
which it clearly did not have. So even if no research programme was adopted (an option 
considered by some Member States), the staff salaries and maintenance expenditures would 
still have to be met. The result was the reluctant adoption, by the Council, of an annual 
research programme which was little more than a ‘holding operation’ while the recently 
appointed Commissioner for Industry, Research and Technology, Altiero Spinelli, continued 
his attempts to develop a more wide-ranging Community research policy7. These resulted 
inter alia, in an agreement at the December 1972 Paris Summit of the Heads of State to 
permit the JRC to work on non-nuclear research, and a new Council Decision in February 
1973 to provide a 1973-76 research programme for the JRC. 
 
The latter decision reflected once again a compromise between those Member States 
advocating closure, those still supporting a Community nuclear research programme, and 
those defending JRC establishments on their own territory: but perhaps more importantly 
represented, albeit hesitatingly, a new and wider vision of Community research. Progress 
was, however, to be painfully slow. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, every single 
research programme had to be unanimously approved by the Council, either on the basis of 
Article 7 Euratom, or (the then) Article 235 EEC, on an essentially ad-hoc basis. It is 
important to note that the 1957 EEC Treaty contained no explicit provisions for the 
promotion of research, and so the Euratom Treaty had thus effectively defined European 
Community research as nuclear research, and established the basic frameworks within which 
such Community research would be supported, including the creation of the JNRC (later 
JRC). Articles 7 and 215 are almost certainly the origin of the concept of the five-year 
                                                 
7 Spinelli's outspoken account of the December 1971 Euratom Council meeting is reproduced in English in 
Guzzetti, op cit., pp 46-47. 
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framework programme, later enshrined in the EEC Treaty. Indeed the neglect of research in 
the EEC Treaty only began to be challenged in the late 1970s, with the subsequent 
elaboration of EEC Framework Programmes, and their later incorporation into the EEC 
(later EC) Treaty, but nuclear research continues to be supported in the manner provided for 
in the Euratom Treaty. 
 
Thus EEC research activities gradually began to increase, and the need for some kind of 
over-arching political framework gradually became apparent, not least because of a 
perceived need to meet head-on the challenge represented by the American and Japanese 
economies. Nowhere was this perception more clearly felt than in the domain of scientific 
research and, more particularly, technological development: in order to meet this challenge, 
and strongly prompted by a series of reports from the European Parliament’s (then) 
Committee on Energy, Research, and Technology, it was felt necessary to create a 
competitive ‘European Technological Community’. Part of this process was to be aided by 
EEC R&TD programmes, the legitimacy for which was established by the new chapter on 
Research and Technological Development introduced into the EEC Treaty by the Single 
European Act (SEA), which came into force in 1987. In fact the Commission had launched 
its first framework programme in 1984, in an attempt to render coherent its disparate R&D 
support programmes, and the SEA enshrined this notion in the Treaty. The SEA also 
provided for a new two-reading co-operation procedure in the European Parliament, coupled 
with qualified majority voting in Council, for certain legislative proposals, mainly concerned 
with the completion of the internal market. With respect to the R&TD programmes, 
unanimity was required for the adoption of the Framework Programme in Council, after a 
single consultation of the European Parliament. Most of the specific programmes were to be 
adopted by qualified majority in Council, after the co-operation procedure with the 
European Parliament. Nuclear research programmes were still, however, based on Article 7 
of the Euratom Treaty, and thus required Council unanimity, after a single reading in 
Parliament, kindly requested by the Council (consultation facultative) in the absence of any 
Treaty requirement so to do. 
 
The Maastricht ‘Treaty on European Union’ (TEU), which came into force in November 
1993, modified the R&TD provisions as follows (new text in italics): 
 
‘Article 130f 
1.The Community shall have the objective of strengthening the scientific and technological bases of 
Community industry and encouraging it to become more competitive at international level, while 
promoting all the research activities deemed necessary by virtue of other Chapters of this Treaty’. 
 
One rather important procedural amendment was that the EC Framework Programme was in 
future to be adopted by Council and Parliament under the so-called ‘co-decision’ procedure 
created by the (then) new Article 189 (c), (unfortunately with an additional and exceptional 
requirement for unanimity in the Council); but that (almost as a trade-off) the Specific 
Programmes would in future be adopted by the Council after a simple one-reading 
consultation of Parliament, whereas this had previously involved the two-reading ‘co-
operation procedure’.  
 
The Euratom Treaty was not substantially amended by the TEU, so whereas Parliament now 
has formal powers of co-decision over the EC Framework Programme, it is only given a 
single reading on the so-called Euratom Framework Programme (so-called because the 
Euratom Treaty, unlike the EC Treaty, has never been amended to explicitly include the 
concept of a ‘Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development’). This 
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increased procedural and political asymmetry between the two Framework Programmes (EC 
and Euratom) is an issue of on-going concern to Parliament.  
 
The coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, in May 1999, means that the legal basis 
of EC Research policy is now Chapter XVIII of the newly amended EC Treaty. The 
significant change was that under the new provisions, the Council will act by qualified 
majority during the co-decisions on future Framework Programmes, pursuant to Article 166 
of the new Treaty. It is also worth noting that both for the adoption of the 4th and of the 5th 
Framework Programmes, the Council preferred not to adopt its final decision on the 
Euratom Framework Programme until the end of the co-decision procedure for the adoption 
of the EC Framework Programme. Nonetheless, the Research Council had in both cases 
agreed a ‘common political orientation’ at meetings held long before the final co-decision 
process. Thus both Council and Commission have sought to present each Euratom 
‘Framework Programme’ as being in many ways linked to, structurally similar to, and co-
terminous with, the EC Framework Programme, and to play down the clear and manifest 
asymmetry between the two decision-making procedures, and indeed the structure, 
character, and legal basis of the research work undertaken. 
 
One Euratom Research programme which has been of particular interest to the Parliament in 
recent years has been that of research into controlled thermonuclear fusion. This programme 
has been in existence since the very beginnings of Euratom research activities at the JNRC, 
and Euratom coordinates national research efforts in the so-called ‘associations’, as well as 
carrying out for many years a European research programme at the JET (Joint European 
Torus) Joint Undertaking in the UK. 
 
In 1987 the Parliament established within its secretariat the STOA (Scientific and 
Technological Options Assessment) service, and one of the first studies which STOA was 
asked to perform was an appraisal of the European fusion research programme. The resultant 
external study (Criteria for the Assessment of European Fusion Research, volume I, STOA, 
EP, May 1988) was rather critical, arguing that far too little attention had been given to the 
difficulties that would have to be faced in bringing fusion energy to the market place, in the 
shape of reactors which would be of interest to electric power utilities. This prompted a very 
lively debate both inside and outside the Parliament, which eventually led to a second set of 
studies by STOA which included work by both supporters and critics of fusion research 
(Study on European Research into Controlled Thermonuclear Fusion, vols 1 to 5, STOA, 
EP, July 1991), all of which contributed a great deal to subsequent Parliamentary 
considerations of the on-going fusion research programme within the 4th and 5th Euratom 
Framework Programmes (see below). 
 
II.1.1. The Fourth Euratom Framework Programme 
 
The so-called ‘4th Euratom Framework Programme (1994-8)’ included three so-called 
‘Specific Programmes’ within it (despite the absence of any Euratom Treaty mention of, or 
requirement to adopt, ‘Specific Programmes’). The involvement of the European Parliament 
in the adoption of these research programmes is summarised below: 
The EP and the Euratom Treaty: past, present and future 
PE 313.072 
 
 
51 
 
II.1.1.1. JRC (Euratom):(Legal basis of proposal: Art. 7 Euratom) 
 
 
Document 
Ref. 
 
Rapporteur 
 
Title 
 
Adopted by 
EP Plenary 
 
A4-0069/94 
 
Claude 
DESAMA 
 
Report of the Committee on Research, 
Technological Development and Energy 
on the proposal for a Council Decision 
adopting a specific research and 
technological development programme to 
be implemented by the Joint Research 
Centre for the European Atomic Energy 
Community (1994-1998) 
 
17-11-1994* 
 
* Final Act : OJ L 361, 31 December 1994, p.132 
 
Parliament, in following the proposal from the Committee and its rapporteur, adopted 16 
amendments to the proposal, including a series of horizontal amendments. These covered, 
inter alia, the authority of the EP and the Council to check the implementation of the 
programme and its cost; the importance of safeguarding the environment: the 
encouragement of cooperation between laboratories, scientific institutions and the Joint 
Research Centre; assistance to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and to the former 
Soviet Union with regard to improving reactor safety; the prospect of the Community’s 
future accession to the International Convention on Nuclear Safety; the extension of the 
areas covered by Community support concerning institutional scientific and technical 
support activities and, in practical terms, safeguards; and the involvement of Parliament in 
Council decisions based on the evaluations of the activities covered by the programme. 
 
The Commission accepted all the amendments put forward by the European Parliament. The 
final Council Decision incorporated 9 of Parliament’s amendments, concerning the 
extension of the areas covered by Community support concerning institutional scientific and 
technical support activities and, in practical terms, nuclear safeguards; the involvement of 
Parliament in Council decisions based on the evaluations of the activities covered by the 
programme; the JRC’s contribution to the training and mobility of researchers; and the 
encouragement of cooperation between laboratories and public and private scientific 
institutions.  
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II.1.1.2. Thermo-nuclear Fusion (Euratom): (Legal basis of proposal: Art. 7 Euratom) 
 
 
Document 
Ref. 
 
Rapporteur 
 
Title 
 
Adopted by 
EP Plenary 
 
A4-0066/94 
 
Elly 
PLOOIJ-VAN 
GORSEL 
 
Report of the Committee on Research, 
Technological Development and Energy 
on the proposal for a Council Decision 
adopting a specific programme of 
research and training in the field of 
controlled thermo-nuclear fusion  
(1994-1998) 
 
17-11-1994* 
 
* Final Act : OJ L 331, 21 December 1994, p.22 
 
Parliament, in following the proposal from the Committee and its rapporteur, adopted 7 
amendments to the proposal, including the horizontal amendments. These covered, inter alia, 
the need to carry out studies to assess the social acceptability of such research; the 
availability of resources under the financial perspective; the inclusion of potential 
commercial viability as a criterion for assessing the programme; and the setting of a ceiling 
of 17% of the programme’s budget for staff and administrative expenditure.  
 
The Commission accepted some of the horizontal amendments put forward by the European 
Parliament. The final Council Decision incorporated all the amendments adopted by 
Parliament.  
 
II.1.1.3. Nuclear safety and safeguards: (Legal basis of proposal: Art. 7 Euratom) 
 
 
Document 
Ref. 
 
Rapporteur 
 
Title 
 
Adopted by 
EP Plenary 
 
A4-0068/94 
 
Gordon 
ADAM 
 
Report of the Committee on Research, 
Technological Development and Energy 
on the Commission proposal for a Council 
Decision adopting a specific research and 
training programme in the field of nuclear 
safety and safeguards (1994-1998) 
 
18-11-1994* 
 
* Final Act : OJ L 361, 31 December 1994, p.143 
 
Parliament, in following the proposal from the Committee and its rapporteur, adopted 32 
amendments to the proposal, including the horizontal amendments. These covered, inter alia, 
disposal in deep geological strata of radioactive waste; the inclusion of medical and 
industrial establishments in efforts to achieve common safety and radioactive protection 
standards in using nuclear energy; and the shutdown of certain nuclear installations. 
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The Commission accepted most of the amendments. The final Council Decision 
incorporated fully or partially 7 of Parliament’s amendments (including the horizontal 
elements): allocation of a minimum of 30% of the total budget for fundamental research; a 
reduction in the expenditure envisaged by the Commission for staff and running costs 
(although it did not adopt Parliament’s figures); the dosimetric approach to epidemiological 
studies of populations exposed to radiation; and recognition of storage in deep geological 
strata as the only known method of long-term isolation of radioactive substances from the 
biosphere. 
 
II.1.2. The Fifth Euratom Framework Programme 
 
The EP’s involvement in the adoption of the so-called ‘5th Euratom Framework Programme 
(1998-2000)’ can be summarised as follows: 
 
II.1.2.1. Euratom Framework Programme Proposal: (Legal basis of proposal: Art. 7 
Euratom) 
 
 
Document 
Ref. 
 
Rapporteur 
 
Title 
 
Adopted by EP 
Plenary 
 
A4-0395/97 
 
Godelieve 
QUISTHOUDT 
–ROWOHL 
 
Report on the proposal for a Council 
Decision concerning the fifth 
framework programme of the 
European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) for research and training 
(1998-2000) 
 
17-12-1997 
(single reading 
only)* 
 
 
* Final Act: 22-12-1998, OJ L026, 1 February 1999 
 
Parliament, in following the proposal from the Committee and its rapporteur, set the 
financial reference amount for the implementation of the Euratom framework programme 
for 1998-2002 at €1 300 million (of which €326 million for the JRC). (The Commission had 
proposed €1 460 million). 
 
Parliament considered that Chernobyl should serve internationally (including the European 
Union, Russia and the United States) as a focal point of concentration for scientific and 
industrial R & D with regard to nuclear safety. It called on the Commission to prepare the 
ground for such an international venture. With respect to radiation protection, Parliament 
called for emphasis to be placed on awareness of the hazards related to ionising radiation, 
and especially the effects of low-dose radiation on human beings, and general research on 
genomic instability. Parliament also stressed the importance of the management of nuclear 
emergencies and the restoration of contaminated environments. 
 
With respect to controlled thermo-nuclear fusion it considered that the objective of the 
action should be the maintenance of scientific and technological expertise in this field with a 
view in the long term to the possible construction of safe, clean and economically 
competitive prototype reactors for power stations operated in an increasingly liberalised and 
privatised market. 
 
The EP and the Euratom Treaty: past, present and future 
PE 313.072 
 
 
54 
Lastly, Parliament advocated support for nuclear disarmament by technical contributions in 
cooperation with the nuclear powers and the IAEA in Vienna, including research into 
stepping up the pace of nuclear disarmament by the development of techniques for the safe 
removal of the radioactive components of nuclear weapons. 
 
Since Parliament was (and still is) only given a simple consultation on the so-called Euratom 
Framework Programme, its role in the legislative process terminated at this point. The 
Council, however, preferred not to adopt its final decision until the end of the co-decision 
procedure for the adoption of the EC 5th Framework Programme. Nonetheless, the Research 
Council had in fact agreed a ‘common political orientation’ at its meeting of 12 February 
1998. 
 
The decision by the Council on 22 December 1998 modified the budget to €1.260 million in 
the light of the agreement with Parliament on the EC Framework Programme. It did not, 
however, incorporate many of Parliament’s amendments to the content of the Programme, 
illustrating once more the weak position of Parliament vis-à-vis the Euratom Treaty 
Framework Programme, in comparison with the co-decision on the EC Programme. 
 
In the EC Fifth Framework Programme, the Commission, supported by the Parliament and 
the Council, had sought to dramatically reduce the number of Specific Programmes, and to 
concentrate research efforts in broad thematic areas. This presented a considerable difficulty 
for the presentation of the Specific Programmes within the Euratom Framework Programme, 
since the Commission effectively argued that these were part of the same thematic structure 
established within the EC Framework Programme. Thus it was that the two programmes 
hitherto known in FP4 as ‘Nuclear Safety’ and ‘Controlled thermonuclear fusion’, were 
deemed to be the constituent parts of a Euratom Specific Programme entitled ‘Preserving the 
ecosystem’, a title also of a Specific Programme within the EC Framework Programme. 
(Once again, the impression is given of a close relationship between the Euratom 
Programme and the EC Programme, although in reality they are separated by a wide 
political and procedural gulf).  
 
In addition, a separate programme was proposed for the JRC. The involvement of the 
European Parliament in the adoption of these research programmes is summarised below: 
 
II.1.2.2. JRC Programme: [Legal basis of proposal: Art. 7 (Euratom] 
 
Document 
Ref. 
Rapporteur Title Adopted 
A4-0458/98 Eryl McNALLY II. on the proposal for a Council 
Decision adopting a specific programme 
for research and training to be 
implemented by the Joint Research 
Centre by means of direct actions for 
the European Atomic Energy 
Community (1998-2002) 
15-12-1998* 
 
 
 
* Final Act: 25-01-1999, OJ L064, 12 March 1999, p. 154 
 
Parliament, in following the proposal from the Committee and its rapporteur, approved its 
opinion on this specific RTD programme. The Parliament put forward an overall budget of 
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€281 million for the 1998-2000 period; of which €71.8 million would be available for the 
period 1998/99 and €209.2 million for the period 2000/02. Another of the amendments 
adopted dealt with the carrying out of prospective studies in order to foresee the safeguard 
implications of proposed changes in the fuel cycle, in particular with respect to accelerator 
driven systems, and also thermonuclear fusion. Parliament also called for studies and 
activities relating to the lowering of the radio-toxicity of nuclear waste, via transformation of 
hazardous radionuclides.  
 
In relation to nuclear fission safety, Parliament called for the theoretical study of severe 
accidents, whereas the Commission asked for such a study to include the operation of the 
FARO facility - to allow the study of in-vessel and ex-vessel phenomena following core 
meltdown using real materials and representative configurations. The Commission’s 
proposal was, in the end, favoured by the Council. 
 
II.1.2.3. ‘Preserving the eco-system’: (Legal basis of proposal: Art. 7 (Euratom)) 
 
Document 
Ref. 
Rapporteur Title Adopted 
A4-0459/98 Marjo 
MATIKAINEN 
-KALLSTRÖM 
Report on the proposal for a Council 
Decision adopting a specific programme 
(Euratom) for research and training on 
"Preserving the ecosystem" (1998 to 
2002) 
 
15-12-1998* 
 
 
* Final Act: 25-01-1999, OJ L064, 12 March 1999, p.142 
 
Parliament, in following the proposal from the Committee and its rapporteur, approved its 
opinion on this specific RTD programme. The title of the programme was amended to that 
of research and training on ‘Nuclear Energy’. The overall budget for the programme was set 
at €979 million, of which €238.2 million will be available for the period 1998/99, and 
€740.8 million for the period 2000/02. Parliament also adopted an amendment which 
repeated the concerns expressed in Mrs Quisthoudt-Rowohl’s report on the ‘Euratom 
Framework Programme’, by stating that the purpose of the fusion research programme 
should be the maintenance of scientific and technological expertise in the domain of 
controlled thermonuclear fusion, with a view, in the long term, to the possible construction 
of safe, clean and economically competitive prototype reactors for power stations operated 
by utilities in an increasingly liberalised and privatised market. The Parliament also called 
for the establishment of a parliamentary committee to oversee the next step of nuclear fusion 
- the ITER programme involving co-operation with the US, Japan and Russia and several 
other nations, so as to ensure more transparency and closer monitoring of thermo-nuclear 
fusion research. In addition, the Parliament wants to see a full assessment of current 
proposals for fusion reactors by an independent consultancy.  
 
Parliament also wanted any possible engagement in international agreements not only to be 
based on Article 101 of the Euratom Treaty, but also (and more importantly) on Article 206, 
which gives Parliament the right to be heard. The Council did not accept this, although 
further progress has since been made in keeping Parliament better informed of international 
agreements being negotiated by the Commission on the basis of the Euratom Treaty, 
following the adoption in plenary of the Tindemans Report on KEDO.  
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Parliament also asked for a select International Parliamentary Committee (IPC) to be set up 
in which members of the parliaments of the ITER participants shall be represented, and shall 
be kept informed of the achievements of ITER. The IPC is also to be asked for its opinion. 
This proposal was not adopted in the final Council Decision, though other mechanisms are 
being sought to implement this proposal. The Council did however agree that ‘Nuclear 
Energy’ was a more accurate title than ‘Preserving the Eco-system’, and changed it 
accordingly. 
 
II.1.3. The 6th Annual Framework Programme 2002-2006: [Legal basis of proposal: 
Art. 7 (Euratom)] 
 
 
Document 
Ref. 
 
Rapporteur 
 
Title 
 
Adopted by EP 
Plenary 
 
A5-0355/ 
2001 
 
Gérard 
CAUDRON 
 
Report on the proposal for a Council 
Decision concerning the multi-annual 
framework programme 2002-2006 of 
the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EURATOM) for 
research and training activities aimed 
at contributing towards the creation of 
the European Research Area. 
 
14-11-2001 
 
 
On 21 February 2001 the Commission made its two proposals for the 6th Framework 
Programme (2002-2006). The proposed Euratom Framework Programme is summarised by 
Parliament’s legislative observatory as follows: 
 
‘in the space of just over a year, the European Research Area (ERA) has become the reference 
framework for research policy issues in Europe. The EU has a specific role to play through its legal 
instruments, such as, for example, the Community patent and also its financial instrument for 
promoting research and European cooperation in this area, namely the framework programme. 
 
The raison d’être of this new framework programme is to help to make a reality of the European 
Research Area with a view to stepping up innovation in Europe, in conjunction with all the efforts 
made to this end at national, regional and European level. 
 
The new framework programme will be based on the following main principles: concentrating on a 
selected number of research areas in which EU action can add the greatest possible value; defining 
the various activities in such a way as to enable them to exert a more structuring effect on the 
research activities conducted in Europe thanks to a stronger link with national, regional and other 
European initiatives; simplifying and streamlining the implementation arrangements, on the basis of 
the intervention methods defined and the decentralised management procedures envisaged. Two 
fundamental aspects of this new framework programme are the opportunity for the candidate 
countries to participate fully in all the activities as countries associated with its implementation, and 
the fact that to a large extent it opens up EU research activities to the rest of the world. This proposal 
lays down that the multiannual framework programme for research and training activities in the field 
of nuclear energy (2002-2006) shall comprise all research, technological development, international 
cooperation, dissemination and exploitation activities as well as training in the following fields:  
- treatment and storage of waste; 
- controlled thermonuclear fusion; 
- other Euratom activities; 
- the Joint research Centre’s Euratom activities.  
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The financial reference amount for the implementation of this framework programme for the period 
2002-2006 shall be EUR 1 230 million, of which EUR 150 million for the treatment and storage of 
waste, EUR 700 million for controlled thermonuclear fusion, EUR 50 million for other Euratom 
activities, and EUR 330 million for the Joint Research Centre’s activities. The framework 
programme is open to the participation of: the EEA countries, in accordance with the conditions 
established in the EEA agreements; the central and eastern European candidate countries (CEEC), in 
accordance with the conditions established in the Europe Agreements, in the additional protocols 
thereto and in the decisions of the respective Association Councils; Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, on 
the basis of bilateral agreements to be concluded with these countries; Switzerland and Israel, on the 
basis of bilateral agreements to be concluded with these countries. To enable this new framework 
programme to be implemented on schedule, the aim is that it should be adopted no later than the first 
half of 2002’. 
 
Parliament’s rapporteur for both the EC Framework Programme and the Euratom 
Framework Programme is Gérard CAUDRON (PSE, France). The Committee on Industry, 
External Trade, Research and Energy adopted Mr Caudron’s report on the Euratom 
Framework Programme on 18 October 2001. In supporting the Rapporteur’s position, the 
Committee, inter alia, ‘called for the funds for research into thermonuclear fusion provided 
for in the proposal to be increased by EUR 100m (making a total of EUR 800m), thereby 
maintaining funding at the level provided for in the 5th framework programme. The 
committee also wanted the proposal to attach greater importance to the safety of existing 
nuclear reactors, with priority for reactors in the candidate countries, as well as reactors of 
the new generation. Moreover, it felt that the proposal should be complemented with a 
further emphasis on gender equality and cooperation with the candidate countries. Another 
key point raised in the report was the need for budgetary transparency and accountability. 
The Commission was urged to present a programming report each year on all activities to be 
financed under Heading 3 of the financial perspective, with a separate budget line for each 
specific programme, as well as an annual report on financial implementation. It should also 
inform the budgetary authority in advance whenever it intended to depart from the 
breakdown of expenditure stated in the general budget’.  
 
But of particular significance for this study is amendment no. 4 in the Committee’s report. 
This proposes a new recital 13(d) to read as follows: 
 
‘(13d) With a view to planning future framework programmes for research, technological 
development and demonstration and all other political instruments pertaining to the 
European Research Area, preparatory work should begin forthwith on measures to make 
good the democratic deficit in various European research policy areas, particularly 
nuclear research, by ensuring that Europe’s citizens are deeply involved in discussions 
and the decision-making process,’ 
 
which is justified as follows: 
 
‘Justification 
 
The diverse range of provisions laid down in the different treaties has resulted in a variety of 
procedures, thereby hindering supervision by Parliament (and, by extension, public involvement) in 
many European research policy areas. By way of example, it is unreasonable to exclude research in 
the area of nuclear physics from the framework programme itself on the basis of its having been set 
apart from the other research areas and brought under the EURATOM programme - all the more so 
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since the latter is not subject to codecision. There is ample time available between the sixth and 
seventh framework programmes to make good the resultant democratic deficit’8. 
 
Parliament adopted the Caudron reports on both the EC and Euratom Framework 
Programmes on 14 November 20019. Amendment No. 4 on the Euratom Framework 
Programme was adopted unchanged. 
 
The Commission published its modified proposals for both Framework Programmes on 22 
November 200110. It did not incorporate amendment No. 4 into its modified Euratom 
proposal. 
 
II.1.4. Conclusions 
 
The development, over the years, of EC Treaty provisions which oblige a co-decision by 
Parliament and Council to adopt EC Research Framework Programmes, stands in stark 
contrast to the complete and total failure to amend the corresponding Euratom Treaty 
provisions. The European Parliament has hitherto reluctantly accepted the status quo, though 
whether it will be prepared to do so for much longer is at least debatable, not least because 
as part of the Budgetary Authority, it has the final say on non-compulsory expenditure, such 
as research activities under the Euratom Treaty.  
 
One strategic option which Parliament might consider presupposes a disagreement arising 
between it and the Council in the adoption process of both any future EC Framework 
Programme and the ‘any future Euratom Framework Programme’. In such a case, a 
Conciliation procedure would be introduced for the EC Programme, based on Articles 166 
and 251 EC. But a Conciliation procedure (albeit technically a different one) can also be 
introduced where Parliament only has a simple consultation (single reading) – but where the 
act concerned has ‘appreciable financial implications’. This possibility was created by the 
‘Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the 
institution of a conciliation procedure, of 4 March 1975’, which states, inter alia, that the 
procedure ‘may be followed for Community acts of general application which have 
appreciable financial implications, and of which the adoption is not required by virtue of 
acts already in existence’. Furthermore, ‘The conciliation shall take place in a Conciliation 
Committee’ consisting of the Council and representatives of the European Parliament. ‘The 
Commission shall participate in the work of the Conciliation Committee,’ and ‘The aim of 
the procedure shall be to seek an agreement between the European Parliament and the 
Council’. Thus, although the rules concerning any final agreement differ, the structure of the 
Conciliation Committee is essentially the same as that later established for the co-decision 
procedure. 
 
Accordingly, should the Council intend to depart from the Parliament’s opinion on any 
future ‘Euratom Framework Programme’, Parliament could request the above Conciliation 
procedure. Moreover, and most interestingly, if Parliament and Council were at the same 
time involved in a co-decision Conciliation procedure for the parallel EC Framework 
Programme, then Parliament could try to ensure that both Conciliation Committees were 
comprised of the same members, and met on the same day in the same building. The Council 
would then arguably find it very difficult to negotiate in a wholly different manner and spirit 
                                                 
8 EP Doc. A5-0355/2001, pp 6-7. 
9 EP minutes of 14/10/2001. 
10 COM (2001)709 final. 
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in the Euratom Conciliation, with the result that the latter process might actually be likened 
to a ‘co-décision facultative’. An alternative strategy would be for Parliament to deny the 
legitimation sought by the Commission’s and Council’s presentation of ‘Euratom 
Framework Programmes’ as being closely akin to the EC Framework Programmes, and to 
insist that they be presented simply as individual Euratom Research Programmes. 
(Reserving the term ‘Framework Programme’ for strategic programmes co-decided by 
Parliament and Council). 
 
II.2. Health and Safety 
 
It will be recalled that the fundamental task assigned by the Euratom Treaty to the European 
Atomic Energy Community is ‘to contribute to the raising of the standard of living in the 
Member States and to the development of relations with other countries by creating the 
conditions necessary for the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear industries’. (Article 
1 Euratom). Article 2 then lists the actions the Community shall undertake ‘in order to 
perform its task’. One of these, defined in Article 2(b), is to ‘establish uniform safety 
standards to protect the health of workers and of the general public and ensure that they are 
applied’. This provision is further elaborated in Chapter III of the Euratom Treaty, entitled 
‘Health and Safety’. Since the chapter is relatively short, the essential elements can be 
reproduced here in their entirety. 
 
‘Article 30 
Basic standards shall be laid down within the Community for the protection of the health of workers 
and the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiations. 
 
The expression basic standards’ means:  
 a. maximum permissible doses compatible with adequate safety;  
 b. maximum permissible levels of exposure and contamination;  
 c. the fundamental principles governing the health surveillance of workers.  
 
Article 31 
The basic standards shall be worked out by the Commission after it has obtained the opinion of a 
group of persons appointed by the Scientific and Technical Committee from among scientific 
experts, and in particular public health experts, in the Member States. The Commission shall obtain 
the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on these basic standards.  
 
After consulting the European Parliament the Council shall, on a proposal from the Commission, 
which shall forward to it the opinions obtained from these Committees, establish the basic standards; 
the Council shall act by a qualified majority.  
 
Article 32 
At the request of the Commission or of a Member State, the basic standards may be revised or 
supplemented in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 31. 
 
The Commission shall examine any request made by a Member State.  
 
Article 33 
Each Member State shall lay down the appropriate provisions, whether by legislation, regulation or 
administrative action, to ensure compliance with the basic standards which have been established and 
shall take the necessary measures with regard to teaching, education and vocational training.  
 
The Commission shall make appropriate recommendations for harmonizing the provisions applicable 
in this field in the Member States.  
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To this end, the Member States shall communicate to the Commission the provisions applicable at 
the date of entry into force of this Treaty and any subsequent draft provisions of the same kind.  
 
Any recommendations the Commission may wish to issue with regard to such draft provisions shall 
be made within three months of the date on which such draft provisions are communicated.  
 
Article 34 
Any Member State in whose territories particularly dangerous experiments are to take place shall 
take additional health and safety measures, on which it shall first obtain the opinion of the 
Commission.  
 
The assent of the Commission shall be required where the effects of such experiments are liable to 
affect the territories of other Member States.  
 
Article 35 
Each Member State shall establish the facilities necessary to carry out continuous monitoring of the 
level of radioactivity in the air, water and soil and to ensure compliance with the basic standards. 
 
The Commission shall have the right of access to such facilities; it may verify their operation and 
efficiency.  
 
Article 36 
The appropriate authorities shall periodically communicate information on the checks referred to in 
Article 35 to the Commission so that it is kept informed of the level of radioactivity to which the 
public is exposed.  
 
Article 37 
Each Member State shall provide the Commission with such general data relating to any plan for the 
disposal of radioactive waste in whatever forms will make it possible to determine whether the 
implementation of such plan is liable to result in the radioactive contamination of the water, soil or 
airspace of another Member State.  
 
The Commission shall deliver its opinion within six months, after consulting the group of experts 
referred to in Article 31.  
 
Article 38 
The Commission shall make recommendations to the Member States with regard to the level of 
radioactivity in the air, water and soil. 
 
In cases of urgency, the Commission shall issue a directive requiring the Member State concerned to 
take, within a period laid down by the Commission, all necessary measures to prevent infringement 
of the basic standards and to ensure compliance with regulations.  
 
Should the State in question fail to comply with the Commission directive within the period laid 
down, the Commission or any Member State concerned may forthwith, by way of derogation from 
Articles 141 and 142, bring the matter before the Court of Justice.  
 
Article 39 
The Commission shall set up within the framework of the Joint Nuclear Research Centre, as soon as 
the latter has been established, a health and safety documentation and study section.  
 
This section shall in particular have the task of collecting the documentation and information referred 
to in Articles 33, 36 and 37 and of assisting the Commission in carrying out the tasks assigned to it 
by this Chapter’. 
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We have already noted that the implementation mechanisms foreseen in the Euratom Treaty 
are essentially the same as those provided for in the EC Treaty: via Commission or Council 
Regulations, Directives, Decisions and Recommendations. Over the years the Health and 
Safety provisions in the Euratom Treaty have indeed been implemented via secondary 
legislation within this framework. The Commission has regularly published a compilation of 
all the current legislation in this domain11. 
 
The observant reader will by now have noted something rather surprising. The Euratom 
Treaty (and in particular its Chapter III) provides no competence whatsoever to the 
European Atomic Energy Community concerning the safety of nuclear reactors, or other 
nuclear installations. 
 
This was, and, as we shall see, still is, regarded by the Member States as an exclusively 
national competence. The only current legal basis for Euratom activities in the domain of 
nuclear reactor safety are two Council Resolutions which establish what is an essentially 
inter-governmental (or inter-regulator) framework for such activities, which are focussed on 
improving safety standards in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
Thus the Euratom Treaty provides for the establishment of basic safety standards (i.e. 
maximum dose/exposure limits) for workers, and for the general public against the dangers 
of ionising radiation; it provides for the exchange of information between the Member States 
(and the Commission) in the event of a radiological emergency such as a nuclear reactor 
accident); and it has enabled the establishment of maximum permitted levels of radioactive 
contamination of foodstuffs following a nuclear accident. But, remarkably, it has nothing 
whatsoever to say about the standards to be applied in the design, construction, or operation 
of nuclear reactors, the failure of which could provoke exactly the kind of radiological 
emergency: the consequences of which the Euratom Health and Safety secondary legislation 
is designed to address. 
 
II.2.1. Radiation Protection Standards 
 
This study cannot comment on the appropriateness, or otherwise, of the basic radiation 
protection standards which have been set by Euratom. By and large these have followed (but 
have occasionally led) the recommendations issued periodically by the International 
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), an authoritative (but essentially self-
appointed) group of scientific experts in the field of radiation protection. Exposure limits 
have been significantly reduced over time, as further research has been carried out into the 
health consequences of exposure to ionising radiation. The cohort of survivors of the atomic 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are the most important study group in this regard, but 
medical exposure via X-rays, and its consequences, is also widely monitored, as is the health 
of workers in the nuclear industry. 
 
There has always been a lively debate in the scientific community about the shape of the so-
called ‘dose-response’ curve, especially concerning exposure to low doses of radiation. 
Some have argued that the curve can simply be extrapolated back to zero, others that there 
are significant effects even at very low doses and others that below certain ‘threshold’ doses 
                                                 
11 Radiation Protection: Community Radiation Protection Legislation (available free of charge from European 
Commission, DG ENV.C.I (Radiation Protection Unit), rue Alcide de Gasperi, L-2920 Luxembourg. Available 
also at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/environment/radprot/legislation/legis.htm). 
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the effects are insignificant. The debate is on-going. The important point to note, 
however, and one which is often overlooked, is that any ‘above zero’ radiation 
exposure standard embodies some form of risk-benefit analysis. X-rays do damage 
tissues to a certain extent - but they also enable life-saving diagnoses, or more mundanely 
the prevention of handicap via the accurate setting of broken bones. Everyone is exposed to 
a natural background radiation: those who live on granite sub-strata, or those who spend a 
great deal of time in aircraft, more so than some of the rest of us. Few, if any, industries can 
afford to reduce the risk to their workforce to zero - be it the construction industry, the 
chemical industry, or even the commercial sector with its company representatives driving 
company cars on a daily basis. Thus the basic standards proposed by the ICRP, and those 
adopted by Euratom, represent a balance between socio-economic benefit, and individual 
risk. In the case of Euratom, the task of the Community, as we have seen, is, inter alia, that 
of ‘creating the conditions necessary for the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear 
industries’. The setting of basic safety standards by the Community is to be done ‘in order to 
perform its task’. It is not to be done so as to render impossible the growth and establishment 
of nuclear industries. 
 
If the industry (including in particular the nuclear reprocessing industry) is ever in a techno-
economic position to be able to live with the concept of zero emissions and zero ‘above-
background’ exposure (and this is the long-term goal it sets itself), then standards could be 
adjusted accordingly. It is important just to note that radiation standards are not simply 
arrived at by the application of science, but by the application of science in a real world 
socio-economic context - which is why parliamentary scrutiny of such standards is both 
legitimate and necessary. 
 
II.2.2. Radioactive Waste 
 
The Euratom Treaty provides very little Community competence concerning radioactive 
wastes, indeed only Article 37 (reproduced above) makes mention of the subject and simply 
obliges the Member States to provide the Commission with such data relating to any plan for 
the disposal of radioactive waste ‘as will make it possible [for the Commission] to determine 
whether the implementation of a such plan (sic) is liable to result in the radioactive 
contamination of the water, soil or airspace of another Member State’. It is thus quite 
probable that most of the activities carried out relating to radioactive wastes within the 
Member States will not involve Euratom, other than with respect to basic radiation 
protection standards. The same applies to shipments of radioactive wastes. Internal 
shipments within a Member State must of course respect the basic exposure limits to 
workers and the general public, but are not subject to any other Community legislation 
(unless Euratom safeguards have to be informed because of the fissile material content of the 
wastes). 
 
The major pieces of Community legislation regulating the shipment of radioactive wastes is 
Council Directive 92/3/EURATOM ‘on the supervision and control of shipments of 
radioactive waste between Member States and into and out of the Community12, which, as 
its title plainly states, is only concerned with trans-frontier shipments. 
 
It is, incidentally, instructive to read some of the recitals of this Directive. There we read, for 
example, that ‘Council Directive 84/631/EEC of 6 December 1984 on the supervision and 
                                                 
12 OJ L 35, 12/02/92, p.24ff. 
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control within the European Community of the trans-frontier shipment of hazardous waste 
does not apply to radioactive waste;’ 
 
and furthermore that 
 
‘Whereas by Decision No 90/170/EEC the Council has decided that the Community should 
be Part to the Basel Convention on the control of trans-boundary movements of hazardous 
wastes and their disposal of 22 March 1989; whereas that Convention does not apply to 
radioactive waste;’ 
 
These recitals are revelatory of the typical exclusion of radioactive substances from both EC 
and international legal provisions controlling hazardous substances. 
 
But the Euratom Treaty sets only the legal basis for legislation covering the protection of 
human beings against radiation: it is debatable which legal basis applies to the protection 
of the environment from radiation. The position of some Member States is quite clear: 
radiation as it affects the environment (earth, water and soil) is not covered by the EC Treaty 
(which would imply that the codecision procedure was to apply). However, it is not 
particularly clear which legal basis could be applied. In this context the Commission has 
pursued a strategy of systematically including man-made radioactive substances in 
legislative proposals. The recent Framework Directive on Water Policy is a case in point13. 
Whereas the Council did not include man-made radioactive substances in the list of main 
pollutants (Annex VIII of the proposed directive), the Commission did so and was supported 
by Parliament: in the recommendation for a second reading, Parliament’s rapporteur, Mrs 
Lienemann, explicitly emphasised the inclusion of radioactive substances in the 
recommendation14. Thus, Parliament in its second reading went along with the 
recommendation of its rapporteur and the Commission that there should not be a natural 
right to discharge hazardous or (man-made) radioactive substances into water. Parliament 
chose a similar approach in the negotiations leading to the future adoption of a Community 
framework directive for cooperation concerning accidental marine pollution15. Rapporteur 
McKenna called for the inclusion of radioactive substances to be included in a definition of 
harmful substances as regards marine pollution, a stance that was endorsed by the 
Commission. 
 
The radioactive wastes shipment Directive essentially imposes a system of prior informed 
consent by national competent authorities for trans-frontier shipments, similar to that 
required for hazardous wastes. 
 
The latest manifestation of the complex relationship between the Euratom Treaty and the EC 
Treaty in matters of environmental protection is the recent Commission proposal for two 
Council Decisions, the first ‘to approve on behalf of the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EURATOM) the "International Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Mangement"’16,  
 
and the second 
                                                 
13 This can be located on the European Parliament's website www.europarl.eu.int. Legistlative Observatory 
(OEIL) code: COD/1997/0067, initial proposal COM(1997)0049 and COM(1997)0614 (modified). 
14 ‘Recommendation for second reading on the common position adopted by the Council with a view to the 
adoption of a European Parliament and Council directive on establishing a framework for Community action in 
the field of water policy’, A5-0027/2000, rapporteur Lienemann, 03/02/2000. 
15 OEIL code: COD/1998/0350, initial proposal COM(1998)0769. 
16 COM(2001)520 final, 15/10/2001. 
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‘to conclude for the European Community (EC) the "International Joint Convention on the 
Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management"’17.  
 
The Commission’s reasoning behind the presentation of these two related proposals is 
spelled out in the Explanatory Memorandum: 
 
‘4. Objectives Of The European Atomic Energy Community And The European 
Community Reflected In The Scope And The Objectives Covered By The Joint 
Convention 
 
The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community in its preamble requests the 
creation, within the framework of the development of a nuclear industry, of the “conditions of safety 
necessary to eliminate hazards to the life and health of the public” and expresses the desire “to 
cooperate with international organisations concerned with the peaceful development of atomic 
energy”. 
 
To this purpose “the Community may, within the limits of its powers and jurisdiction, enter into 
obligations by concluding agreements or contracts with… an international organisation …”. (Article 
101 EAEC-Treaty). 
 
Within the concept of the European Atomic Energy Community in the first place human beings 
(“workers and the general public”) are protected against the dangers arising from ionising radiation 
and only ancillary aspects of the environment which are conditions for human health as e.g. water, 
air, soil. The environment as an independent concept, equivalent to human health, is not covered in 
the Euratom Treaty or, concomitantly, by derived law enacted under it. 
 
On the contrary, the Treaty establishing the European Community, in parallel to the objectiveof 
“protecting human health”, stipulates the equivalent concept of the protection of the environment. It 
requires that “Community policy on the environment shall contribute to pursuit the “… objectives” 
of “preserving” and “protecting … the quality of the environment”. And further: “promoting 
measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems” (Article 
174 paragraph 1 EC-Treaty). 
 
To achieve these objectives “within their respective spheres of competence, the Community and the 
Member States shall cooperate with third countries and with the competent international 
organisations” (Article 174 paragraph 4 EC-Treaty). 
 
In the area of radioactive waste management important aspects of environmental protection are 
included that go beyond the scope of the Euratom Treaty. Therefore, there is a major environmental 
dimension, which, as it has not been included in the Euratom Treaty, requires reference to the 
environmental provisions both in and resulting from the EC-Treaty’. 
 
It remains to be seen how the Council of Ministers will react to these two proposals, but they 
do illustrate the uncertainty and confusion which inevitably result from the existence of two 
sets of Treaty provisions which can be used to address the problems of the management of 
spent nuclear fuel and radioactive wastes. 
II.2.3. Nuclear Reactor Safety 
 
We have already noted the complete absence from the Euratom Treaty of any provisions 
directly concerning safety of nuclear installations in the European Atomic Energy 
Community. It is also worth noting that there is widespread misunderstanding and confusion 
                                                 
17 ibid. 
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about this, because of the existence of the Euratom Safeguards system and the inspectors it 
employs. But the concept of safeguards in the context of the Euratom Treaty has got nothing 
to do with ‘safety’. Rather it concerns the systems put in place to prevent or detect the 
diversion of ‘special fissile materials’ (i.e. Plutonium - 239, Uranium - 233, and Uranium - 
235) from their ‘declared use’. In other words, it concerns the ‘accountancy’ systems for the 
control of fissile materials in the civil nuclear fuel cycle that could be diverted from their 
declared use - i.e. the covert construction of nuclear weapons. Euratom Safeguards system is 
described in more detail in Chapter 5, but essentially it is the job of Euratom Safeguards 
inspectors to monitor and control the flow of ‘special fissile materials’, which activity has no 
formal connection whatsoever with the issue of nuclear safety, be it in reactors, in 
reprocessing plants, enrichment plants or fuel fabrication facilities. 
 
The Member States, via the Euratom Treaty, handed over control of nuclear safeguards in 
the civil cycle to a supranational authority, and have given that authority considerable 
powers. But they were (and by and large still are) extremely reluctant to do the same with 
respect to the safety of nuclear installations, and thus the latter has remained a more-or-less 
exclusively national competence, controlled by national regulatory bodies. 
 
Thus while there is extensive talk of ‘international safety standards’ and ‘Western standards’ 
in many EU documents dealing with nuclear safety issues, especially in the context of 
Enlargement, there is no Euratom Directive establishing the basic safety standards for the 
design, construction and operation of nuclear reactors in the EU. A recent report by the 
Court of Auditors makes this point rather forcibly: ‘At the end of 1997, owing to the absence of 
a binding legal basis, there was still no formal consensus at [the] European level concerning 
technical standards in the area of design and operational safety of nuclear installations. The 25 basic 
nuclear-safety principles published by the IAEA are still implemented in accordance with each 
Member State’s own technical standards and regulations, which has not facilitated the action the EU 
has been taking with regard to the safety authorities in the CEECs and the NIS’18. 
 
It is also noteworthy that the Commission, in its replies to the Court, does not comment on 
this observation. 
 
The nearest equivalent EC Directive is the so-called ‘Seveso Directive’. The original version 
of this Directive, as specified by its Article 2, did not apply (inter alia) to ‘nuclear 
installations and plant for the reprocessing of radioactive substances and material’. 
Subsequent amendments to the ‘Seveso Directive’ have all left in place this exclusion of 
nuclear power. The latest version of this Directive, which repealed earlier versions, excludes 
from its coverage: ‘(b) hazards created by ionising radiation’ (in Article 4). The justification 
for this on-going exclusion has always been that, according to the Commission, the nuclear 
sector was covered by ‘specific, specialised legislation’. This is rather a remarkable (as well 
as remarkably vague) assumption, given the effective exclusion from the Euratom Treaty of 
any provisions concerning nuclear reactor safety. Thus it is up to each Member State to 
define its own nuclear reactor safety regulations, and regulatory structure, with some 
possible co-ordination via the IAEA.  
 
Given the more-or-less inevitably cross-border nature of any major nuclear accident, and 
given the aim of the Euratom Treaty of creating a Common Market for nuclear energy, the 
omission of any harmonisation provisions for nuclear reactor safety does seem quite 
remarkable, even more so in the light of the enlargement negotiations. In Agenda 2000, 
published in 1997, the Commission expressed its concern about nuclear safety in Central and 
                                                 
18 Court of Auditors Special Report 25/98, OJ C 35, 09/02/1999, p.10, para 3.1. 
The EP and the Euratom Treaty: past, present and future 
PE 313.072 
 
 
66 
Eastern Europe, while at the same time it recognised these countries’ strong wish to keep the 
nuclear option open and their sovereign right to do so. The Commission stated that: 
 
‘The problem of nuclear safety in some candidate countries causes serious concern to the EU, even 
independently of enlargement, and should urgently and effectively be addressed. It is imperative that 
solutions, including closure where required, be found to these issues in accordance with the 
Community nuclear acquis and a “nuclear safety culture” as established in the western world as soon 
as possible and even before accession’. 
 
and: 
 
‘The solution is not simply to close them down, as they do not all pose the same risk and the 
cost of obtaining alternative energy supplies would be extremely high’. 
 
In order to deal with unsafe reactors in the region, Agenda 2000 sets out the implementation 
of a number of nuclear safety programmes for some, and calls for the early closure of others. 
Unfortunately, as noted above, the Euratom Treaty provides no explicit Communautaire 
legal basis for such a policy, although it does possess, in its Article 203, the equivalent of the 
EC Treaty ‘general purpose’ Article 308, although this does require unanimity in Council. 
 
It would, however, not be correct to assume that therefore no initiatives have been taken, 
under the ‘umbrella’ of the Euratom Treaty (or at least standing somewhere near to the 
‘umbrella’…), in the field of nuclear safety, especially concerning the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe - initially out of post-Chernobyl self-interest, and now because of the 
question of Enlargement. 
 
The Euratom Council of Ministers, which is, of course, institutionally distinct from the EC 
Council of Ministers, has adopted two resolutions on nuclear safety issues, which have 
provided a modest on-going mandate for the Commission to develop policy initiatives in this 
area. The Commission’s web-site provides a good summary of these developments19. In its 
Resolution of 22 July 197520, the Council considered that the technological problems 
relating to nuclear safety, in view of their environmental and health implications, called for 
appropriate action at Community level which would take into account the prerogatives and 
responsibilities assumed by national authorities (i.e., preserving the inter-governmental, non-
Communautaire approach). The Council Resolution of 18 June 199221 encouraged the 
continuation of the process of consultation and co-operation established by the resolution of 
1975, and recommended its extension to third countries, notably to the CEEC and the NIS. 
The Commission states that these two Council resolutions ‘give a framework and working 
methods for the progressive harmonisation of safety requirements and practices’; but in the 
absence of any formal Treaty base, or formal Council Decision, such ‘inter-governmental’ or 
‘inter-operator/regulator’ standards (or breaches thereof) could not be enforced by the 
European Court of Justice. And it is the supremacy of Community law over national law that 
is the cornerstone of the European Communities. 
 
The Commission tries hard to maintain the impression that it has some competence in the 
domain of nuclear reactor safety, especially in the context of enlargement. Witness this 
Parliamentary written question and Commission response: - 
 
                                                 
19 http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/nuclear/nuclearsafety/htm. 
20 OJ C 185/1, 14/08/1975. 
21 OJ C 172/2, 08/07/1992. 
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‘(2000/C 225 E/108)     WRITTEN QUESTION E-2335/99 
by Rolf Linkohr (PSE) to the Commission 
(13 December 1999) 
 
 Subject: Nuclear reactors in the applicant countries 
 
 1. What is the Commission’s position with regard to nuclear reactors in the applicant 
countries. 
 
 2. Does the Commission intend that the reactors should be shut down ahead of schedule and if 
so, what is its timetable for this? 
 
3. Does the Commission agree with the closure plans for reactors contained, in particular, in 
the national energy plans of Lithuania and Slovakia? 
 
 4. Can the Commission say whether and when nuclear reactors in Lithuania are due to be 
inspected? 
 
Answer given by Mr Verheugen on behalf of the Commission 
(11 January 2000) 
 
 1. The Commission has always accorded particular attention to nuclear safety in the context of 
enlargement. This area will be subject to continued scrutiny and supportive action by the 
Commission in the pre-accession period. The Commission has entered into close co-operation 
with the safety authorities of the candidate countries in order to strengthen their resources and 
their independence and thereby to further extend the nuclear safety culture which has 
developed within the Community. 
 
 2. The Commission’s policy on these issues is clearly outlined in Agenda 2000 of July 1997, 
where the reactors of the nuclear power plants in the candidate countries are divided into three 
categories: reactors of Western design, Soviet-designed plants which can be upgraded to meet 
international safety standards, and Soviet-designed units which can not be upgraded at a 
reasonable cost. The Commission has repeatedly stated that the third category nuclear power 
plants operating in candidate countries should be closed at earliest practical dates, in the 
framework of a comprehensive energy strategy. This applies to Bohunice V-1 in Slovakia and 
to the Ignalina nuclear power plan (NPP) in Lithuania, as well as to units 1-4 of the Kozloduy 
NPP in Bulgaria. 
 
 3. The Commission has had intense and fruitful discussion on this issue with the authorities of 
the candidate countries. In the second regular reports on progress of candidates towards 
accession of 13 October 1999, the Commission welcomed the decisions of the Lithuanian and 
Slovak authorities on early closure of the Ignalina an Bohunice V-1 reactors. The Commission 
also welcomes the recent understanding with Bulgaria with regard to early closure of 
Kozloduy 1-4. The Commission regards these decisions as an expression of the countries’ 
commitment to integration and as an important contribution to nuclear safety in Europe. The 
Commission will certainly continue the dialogue on this issue with the authorities concerned. 
 
 4. The Lithuanian safety authority ensures on a regular basis that the operator of the nuclear 
reactors implements the safety provisions of the safety improvement programme. Granting of 
operation permits is conditional on the results of these safety revisions, the safety evaluation 
reports. The Commission supports the Lithuanian safety authority and its work with resources 
from the PHARE programme’22.  
 
                                                 
22 OJ C 225E, 08/08/2000, pp. 106-107. 
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The European Parliament has, to a certain extent, acknowledged the difficulties concerning 
Community competence (or the lack of it) in this domain. In its resolution of 11 March 1999 
‘on the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
on nuclear sector related activities for the applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
and the new Independent States’ (COM(98)0134)23 the Parliament, in paragraph 4, called on 
the Commission - 
 
‘to seek an accord on nuclear safety standards and regulation for the construction and operation of 
nuclear power stations, the fuel cycle and transport conditions with the CEEC and NIS, within the 
framework of the International Convention on Nuclear Safety and with EURATOM, if and when 
EURATOM guidelines are established;’ 
 
and in paragraphs 5 & 6 
 
 ‘5. Proposes that the accession negotiations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
should ensure that compliance with these safety standards is guaranteed; 
 
 6. Welcomes the formation of the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association and its 
contribution both to a definition of nuclear safety standards which could apply to the European 
Union, and to the creation of independent authorities to ensure compliance with the rules on 
reactor safety and transport safety in the candidate countries;’ 
 
Thus it was that in 1999 the Commission launched a project ‘to produce indicators that 
should assist in assessing nuclear safety in the candidate countries’. Furthermore, a forum 
was established, bringing together nuclear regulators and power plant operators from the 
Acceding States. This in fact meant enlarging the existing Nuclear Regulators Working 
Group (NRWG) to include the applicant countries. 
 
Furthermore, in paragraph 5 of its Resolution of 18/05/2000 ‘on falsification of data 
concerning MOX fuels at Sellafield’24, Parliament, concerned about nuclear safety, 
requested ‘the Commission to propose legislation for establishing EU-wide high minimum 
standards for the safe and reliable design, construction and operation of nuclear and nuclear-
related installations and for nuclear safety management systems, particularly in view of the 
practical, and possibly political, problems arising from the forthcoming accession of new 
Member States’. 
 
II.2.4. Recent initiatives with respect to nuclear installations 
 
One of the more ‘fully-fledged’ initiatives to have emerged from the determinedly non-
Communautaire approach emanating from the Member States has come from WENRA - the 
Western European Nuclear Regulators’ Association. 
 
This is the association of the Heads of nuclear regulatory authorities of Western European 
countries with nuclear power plants, namely Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The association has the 
following objectives:  
 To develop a common approach to nuclear safety and regulation, in particular within the 
European Union,  
                                                 
23 OJ C 175, 21/06/1999, p. 288. 
24 OJ C 059, 23/02/2001, p. 237. 
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 To provide the European Union with an independent capability to examine nuclear 
safety and regulation in candidate countries,  
 To evaluate and achieve a common approach to nuclear safety and regulatory issues 
which arise.  
 
These objectives seem rather similar to those that a Euratom ‘Communautaire’ approach to 
the issue might have come up with - except, of course, that WENRA is self-created, and 
emphatically non-Communautaire. Having created itself, one of the issues it has chosen to 
address is the problem of nuclear safety in the applicant countries applying to join the EU. 
 
In October 2000 WENRA published a report entitled "Nuclear safety in EU candidate 
countries"25. The report justifies its own existence in the following paragraphs in the 
‘foreword’ to the report, which are so concise that they can be reproduced here in their 
entirety: 
 
 ‘Nuclear safety in the candidate countries to the European Union is a major issue that needs to 
be addressed in the framework of the enlargement process. Therefore WENRA members 
considered it was their duty to offer their technical assistance to their Governments and the 
European Union Institutions. They decided to express their collective opinion on nuclear 
safety in those candidate countries having at least one nuclear power plant: Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
 
 The report is structured as follows:  
 A foreword including background information, structure of the report and the 
methodology used,  
 General conclusions of WENRA members reflecting their collective opinion, 
 For each candidate country, an executive summary, a chapter on the status of the 
regulatory regime and regulatory body, and a chapter on the nuclear power plant safety 
status. 
 
 Two annexes are added to address the generic safety characteristics and safety issues for 
RBMK and VVER plants. The report does not cover radiation protection and 
decommissioning issues, while safety aspects of spent fuel and radioactive waste management 
are only covered as regards on-site provisions.  
 
 In order to produce this report, WENRA used different means: 
 For the chapters on the regulatory regimes and regulatory bodies, experts from WENRA 
did the work, 
 For the chapters on nuclear power plant safety status, experts from WENRA and from 
French and German technical support organisations did the work, 
 Taking into account the contents of these chapters, WENRA has formulated its general 
conclusions in this report. 
 
 WENRA’s methodology for reaching the collective opinion expressed in the general 
conclusions has been to compare the current situation in the candidate countries to that in 
Western European countries using a common format which is reflected in the structure of the 
chapters. All major safety issues identified in past international co-operation have been 
considered. For each candidate country, a comparison was made with the current Western 
European practices and, whenever appropriate, discrepancies or deficiencies were clearly 
identified.  
 
                                                 
25 http://www.asn.gouv.fr/data/information/wenraRpt02.htm. 
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 WENRA has not made a detailed safety assessment of the different nuclear power plants. 
Nuclear safety is a national responsibility and it belongs to the regulatory body of the various 
candidate countries to regulate the safety of all nuclear installations on their national territory, 
in line with the national legislative and regulatory framework.  
 
 WENRA’s collective opinion on the regulatory systems is based on generic preconditions for 
an independent and strong regulatory regime such as a comprehensive nuclear legislation, the 
existence of an adequate licensing system, appropriate resources and technical support. 
WENRA’s collective opinion on nuclear power plant safety is based on widely applied 
standards in Western European countries for the defence-in-depth and associated barriers. 
Quantitative comparisons of probabilistic safety assessments have not been used as the 
available results are of different depth and quality.  
 
 A first version of this report was issued in March 1999. It was solely based on the direct 
evidence WENRA had gathered through the different activities of its members (participation 
in multilateral assistance programmes, and in particular the PHARE programmes and the 
IAEA extra-budgetary programme, and in bilateral contacts). In particular, information 
necessary to formulate an opinion on the regulatory regimes and the regulatory bodies were in 
many cases derived from the regulatory assistance projects of the RAMG implemented under 
the PHARE programme. With regards to the safety status of nuclear power plants, WENRA 
had to recognise that in some cases the direct information was not sufficient to formulate an 
opinion.  
 
 For the present version, WENRA took the appropriate steps to collect the necessary 
information. In addition to the direct evidence already available, supplementary information 
was gathered through meetings with the candidate countries’ regulatory bodies and plant 
operators. In particular, an ad-hoc Task Force was established to gather and evaluate 
additional information on VVER-440/230 reactors.  
 
WENRA’s analysis of the situation with respect to nuclear safety in each of the candidate countries 
(and these analyses are reasonably detailed) is then introduced with the following words: 
 
"We, Heads of the Nuclear Regulatory Authorities assembled in WENRA, considering the 
status achieved on nuclear safety in the candidate countries to the European Union and taking 
into account the results of the investigations of experts from WENRA and from French and 
German technical support organisations, come to the following conclusions:’ 
 
What is the European Parliament to make of all this? WENRA is undoubtedly authoritative, 
but since its report is presented entirely outwith the European Communities framework, 
Parliament has no institutional mechanism to react to it, either positively or negatively. It 
does not even have an institutional mechanism to deal with the rather peculiar goings-on in 
the Council of the European Union, in which a Community Institution is elaborating an 
approach to nuclear safety in the context of enlargement which is decidedly and avowedly 
non-Communautaire.  
 
The details are as follows: 
 
On 26 July 2000 the Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Member States at the 
European Union (Coreper) adopted a mandate instructing the Working party on Atomic 
Questions (usually known as ‘The Atomic Questions Group’) to supply a contribution with a 
view to defining the European Union’s position on nuclear safety in the context of 
enlargement. The Working Party was requested to report to Coreper before the end of 2000. 
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The report was in fact submitted to Coreper at the end of November 200026. The report 
states its purpose with admirable clarity27. 
 
 ‘I. PURPOSE OF THE REPORT 
 
 The purpose of this contribution is to provide relevant methodology and documents on how to 
evaluate legislation in the nuclear sector, the organisation of management and regulatory 
authorities and the level of safety of the installations in each of the candidate States with a 
view to defining the Union’s position on a "high level of nuclear safety" to be requested in 
those countries. 
 
 The following comments should be kept in mind when looking at the other sections of the 
report: 
 
 i. The report addresses nuclear safety only in the context of the enlargement process. It will 
focus on the means of defining the EU position on a "high level of nuclear safety". 
 
 ii. This contribution ought not in any circumstances to lead to any transfer of competences 
from the Member States to the Community. 
 
 iii. There should be no time limit as to the validity of this contribution be it with respect to the 
date of accession of a given country or a specific stage in the enlargement process. In other 
words the methodology and documentation to be recommended should remain valid 
throughout the enlargement process; to that effect some review mechanism could be foreseen. 
 
 iv. The competence and responsibilities relating to the safety of the design, construction and 
operation of a nuclear installation lie with the State which has jurisdiction for the installation 
concerned. 
 
 v. The methodology for the evaluation process should be universal with respect to candidate 
States. This means that there is no prior identification of specific States to which this 
information should be applied, which implies that: 
 a) it is not limited to candidate States with a nuclear power programme up and running 
at present. 
 b) it should be applicable to all types of reactor designs and varied regulatory 
environments encountered in the candidate States. 
 
 In any case it is understood that the demands made of the candidate States for them to achieve 
the expected "high level of nuclear safety" ought not to be stricter than the requirements in 
force in the EU’. 
 
The Atomic Questions Group in particular, and the Council in a more general sense, thus 
gave themselves the rather difficult task of defining a sort of ‘general acquis’ in the domain 
of nuclear safety, whilst at the same time insisting that it was in no sense a European Atomic 
Energy Community acquis, but rather the embodiment of the collective wisdom and 
experience of the national regulators within the EU. (In fact, on 29 September 2000, the 
                                                 
26 Council of the European Union, Document Ref. 13789/00 ATO 74 ELARG210, 24/11/2000. (Note.  This 
report does not carry a security classification within the meaning of the ‘Decision of the Secretary-General of 
the Council/High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy of 27 July 2000 on measures for the 
protection of classified information applicable to the General Secretariat of the Council’. It is classed as limité. 
This classification and its consequences, are explained in Article 2.2 of this Decision. Members of the public 
can request a copy of the report by sending an e-mail request to: access@consilium.eu.int quoting the reference 
number). 
27 ibid. p.3. 
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Commission had provided the Atomic Questions Group with a ‘non-paper’ which 
summarises ‘non-binding EU acquis in the field of nuclear installation safety’)28. 
 
The report by the Atomic Questions Group is quite explicit about the ‘non-communautaire’ 
nature of the ‘acquis’: 
 
 ‘IV.  ACQUIS RELATED TO THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS: 
 
 Although the mandate makes use of the term "acquis" this term refers to the corpus of legally 
binding Community acts, already subject to the formal screening process, and ultimately to the 
appreciation of the Court. But the achievements in EU Member States towards a "high level of 
safety", to a large extent, do not find their origin in the acquis in its strict legal sense, given 
their unique responsibility in the field of safety of the design, construction and operation of 
nuclear installation. 
 
 The purpose of this section of the report is to identify where can be found the appropriate 
information to define a "high level of nuclear safety", irrespective of the binding or non-
binding nature of this information’29.  
 
The report therefore considers two sources of such a ‘non-Communautaire acquis’: existing 
international conventions relevant to nuclear safety; and ‘common principles and views on 
nuclear safety issues reached by the EU’. 
 
The report stresses that a high degree of convergence on the substance of technical and 
organisational requirements and criteria has been achieved in the EU, within the framework 
of national responsibility for nuclear safety regulation, but that this ‘has been developed 
through voluntary co-operation’ - though adding that the Commission has, via a variety of 
mechanisms, supported this co-operative work. So, although there is no Community 
‘acquis’, there is by now a ‘common EU perspective’ which ‘has to be made available to 
candidate States and [which] must be reflected when defining a high level of nuclear safety’. 
(In fact one of the main mechanisms which has been established to facilitate this process 
was the establishment of ‘WENRA’, the Western European Nuclear Regulators 
Association). 
 
The report proposes the creation of a ‘Working Party on nuclear safety’ ‘established for the 
sole purpose of the enlargement process under the auspices of the Council’. It would 
comprise experts nominated by the Member States, and representatives of the Commission, 
and ‘will follow the confidentiality rules for the Council Working Parties’. It would in fact 
be an ad-hoc formation of the Atomic Questions Group. 
 
The task of the Working Group on Nuclear Safety would be to undertake the technical 
review process of the safety standards in the nuclear installations in the applicant countries, 
and to recommend improvements where necessary. 
 
Coreper, at its meeting of 6 December 2000 approved the proposal from the Atomic 
Questions Group, and duly established the Working Party on Nuclear Safety. The Member 
States and the Commission have nominated representatives to it. Moreover, in April 2001 
the Commission presented a report entitled ‘Nuclear Safety in Central and Eastern Europe’ 
(EUR19895EN)30, which contributed to the ongoing work in the Atomic Questions Group. 
                                                 
28 http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/en/nuclearsafety/pdf/non_binding_acquis.pdf. 
29 ibid. p.6. 
30 http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/en/nuclearsafety/pdf/eur19895_main.pdf. 
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The European Parliament had no role or involvement in this process, or in the subsequent 
activities of the Working Party, which presented its report in May 200131. At the time of 
writing, this report represents the latest thinking by the Member States on the issue of 
nuclear reactor safety in Central and Eastern Europe. But in order for the European 
Parliament to be involved in this process, nuclear installation safety would have to become a 
Community matter. 
 
The Euratom Treaty provides, in its Article 203, the potential legal basis for a Community 
Directive to establish basic standards for, in current parlance, ‘benchmarking’, the criteria 
for the safe design, construction, and operation of nuclear installations in the European 
Energy Community. 
 
 
‘Article 203 
 If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain one of the objectives of the 
Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European 
Parliament, take the appropriate measures’. 
 
Such a Directive, being implemented by the Member States, who already have in place 
Nuclear Regulatory Authorities which doubtless already meet the requirements for expertise 
and independence which such a Directive would require, would not alter the current status 
quo at all: French inspectors would continue to monitor and control French nuclear 
installations; and the same for the British, the Germans, the Spanish, the Dutch, and so on. 
So, it is quite difficult to understand the hostility to this concept which is manifested by the 
Member States, especially the ‘nuclear’ States, which appear to have a pathological fear of 
even considering a possible Euratom Directive on the safety of nuclear installations, 
including the establishment of basic safety criteria for the design, construction and operation 
of nuclear reactors in the Community. Why is this the case? Perhaps because they appear to 
assume, erroneously, that this would necessitate the creation of a European Nuclear 
Installations Safety Inspectorate, which would involve teams of staff from other Member 
States being allowed to wander around sensitive national nuclear installations. This fear 
seems to arise from the model provided by Euratom Safeguards provisions (see below), and 
the existence of Euratom Safeguards inspectors who do have such powers. But this model 
would not of course apply in the case of a Community Directive. A nuclear 
installations/reactor safety Directive would be implemented via the existing national nuclear 
regulatory provisions and organisations, and would thus not require the creation of any 
European Inspectorate at all. 
 
Other elements may also contribute to explaining the phenomenon. Perhaps the Member 
States are concerned that any safety standards they considered it necessary to apply in 
central and Eastern Europe would also, logically, be imposed in Western Europe too, with 
possible consequences for some of the older reactors in current operation. A Community 
Directive would, necessarily, be intended to establish uniform standards - a level playing 
field - which would rule out the possibility of special pleading that experienced operators 
who have the requisite expertise should be permitted to operate older reactor-types which 
don’t quite meet current safety requirements. Lastly, the Member States simply seek to limit 
the acquisition of further competences by the European Communities. Having resisted 
                                                 
31 Council Document 9181/01 of 27 May 2001. http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/01/st09/09181en1.pdf 
  and addendum: http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/01/st09/09181-a1en1.pdf. 
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Community competence in this domain for over 40 years, they will not be easily persuaded 
that it must now be envisaged. 
 
The applicant countries, faced with a requirement to meet Western European Nuclear Safety 
standards, might be tempted to ask just where these standards are defined and how they are 
enforced within the Framework of Community law. On the other hand, they wish to join the 
EU, so may conclude that rocking the nuclear safety boat is not a propitious approach to so 
doing. 
 
The European Parliament, on the other hand, is increasingly frustrated by its non-
involvement in nuclear safety issues, and is calling with increasing insistence for some kind 
of Community approach. 
 
II.3. Euratom Loans 
 
The Euratom Treaty makes no mention of the provision of Euratom Loans. Nevertheless 
they have in recent years become a particularly visible feature in the Euratom political 
landscape, because of their (potential and actual) use to modernise and upgrade the safety 
systems and other technical features of nuclear reactors in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
Euratom Loans was first established by ‘Council Decision 77/270/EURATOM of 29 March 
197732 empowering the Commission to issue Euratom Loans for the purpose of contributing 
to the financing of nuclear power stations’. 
 
Article 1 of this Decision is clear and to the point: 
 
‘Article 1 
The Commission is hereby empowered to issue loans, on behalf of the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom) and within amounts fixed by the Council, the proceeds of which will be lent 
for the purpose of financing investment projects relating to the industrial production of electricity in 
nuclear power stations and to industrial fuel cycle installations. 
 
The Commission shall borrow no more than the amounts of the loans for which it has received 
applications’. 
 
 
Article 3 allocates to the Commission the responsibility for the decisions on Euratom loans. 
 
‘Article 3 
The Commission shall decide on the grant of each loan. Its decision shall be based in particular on 
the principle that preference will be given to the use of resources under the most profitable 
conditions in installations of optimum size. 
 
Loans shall be guaranteed in the manner customary in banking practice’. 
 
The 1977 decision only concerns projects within the Member States of Euratom, and in 
fact, few such loans were ever made. Since most nuclear power developments in Europe 
were essentially designed and built either by State-run enterprises, or those with close 
affiliations to the State concerned, there was little incentive to pursue Euratom loans, since 
                                                 
32 OJ L88 of 6 April 1977. 
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such enterprises could typically raise capital on much the same terms as Euratom. The 
consequence was that the Euratom loans unit was subsequently mothballed, only to be re-
established following the Council Decision 94/179/Euratom of 21 March 199433; 
 
‘amending Decision 77/279/Euratom, to authorize the Commission to contract Euratom 
borrowings in order to contribute to the financing required for improving the degree of 
safety and efficiency of nuclear power stations in certain non-member countries’. 
 
This revitalisation and reorientation of Euratom loans obviously reflected increasing 
concerns, following both the Chernobyl accident, and then the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
about the safety of soviet-designed nuclear reactors in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
Since this Council (amending) Decision has a sole article, it is reproduced here in its 
entirety: 
 
‘Sole Article 
 
Article 1 of Decision 77/270/Euratom shall be replaced by the following: 
 
Article 1 
The Commission is hereby empowered to contract, on behalf of the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom), and within the limits fixed by the Council, borrowings, the proceeds of 
which will be allocated in the form of loans to finance, within the Community, investment projects 
relating to the industrial production of electricity in nuclear power stations and to industrial 
installations in the nuclear fuel cycle. The Commission shall also be empowered to contract, within 
the same limits, borrowings, the proceeds of which will be allocated in the form of loans to finance 
projects to increase the safety and efficiency of the nuclear power stations of the non-member 
countries listed in the Annex. For these projects to be eligible they must: 
 
- relate to nuclear power stations or installations in the nuclear fuel cycle which are in service, 
or under construction, or to the dismantling of installations where modification cannot be 
justified in technical or economic terms, 
 
- have received all the necessary authorization at national level and in particular the approval of 
the safety authorities, 
 
- have received a favourable opinion from the Commission in technical and economic terms. 
 
The Commission may borrow only within the limits of loans requested of it. 
 
The borrowing and corresponding lending operations shall be denominated in the same monetary 
unit and carried out under the same conditions as regards repayment of the principal and interest 
payments. Cost incurred by the Community in concluding and executing each operation shall be 
borne by the recipient undertakings. 
 
 ANNEX 
 
 List of eligible non-member countries 
 
 - Republic of Bulgaria 
 - Republic of Hungary 
 - Republic of Lithuania 
 - Romania 
                                                 
33 OJ L84 of 29 March 1994, pp 41-43. 
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 - Republic of Slovenia 
 - Czech Republic 
 - Slovak Republic 
 - Russian Federation 
 - Republic of Armenia 
 - Ukraine’ 
 
Once again the Commission is empowered to issue these loans: there is no apparent role for 
the Council, and certainly, as with the original 1977 decision, no requirement to consult the 
European Parliament. Appearances, can, however, be deceptive. Annexed to the minutes of 
the Council meeting of 21 March 1994 is a set of ‘guidelines’. Their official title is 
‘Guidelines relating to the financing required for improving the safety and efficiency of 
nuclear power stations in certain non-member countries’. These guidelines are not 
mentioned in the Council Decision. Accordingly we must assume that they are somewhat 
akin to a Council Declaration in the minutes of Council meetings, and the Court of Justice 
has clearly stated that such declarations have no legal force. Nonetheless, it is quite clear 
that the Commission treats these particular ‘guidelines’ as a clear set of instructions from 
the Council, which determine what kind of projects, undertaken by what kind of 
organisation, can be financed. 
 
Unfortunately, like all non-co-decision Council Declarations, these guidelines would seem 
at first sight to be confidential. The European Parliament, at the time of writing this report, 
has never been formally given them. Indeed it only became formally aware of their 
existence during the year 2000, when the Commission, on two separate occasions, 
presented proposals for Euratom loans to the European Parliament. It did so, not because of 
any legal requirement so to do (there is none), but ‘provided voluntarily to the European 
Parliament in the spirit of transparency and in a way similar to that applied under the 
understanding reached in July 1998 between the Commission and the Parliament for the 
treatment of cases covered by Article 101, 2nd paragraph of the Euratom Treaty’34. 
 
The meeting of the European Parliament’s ITRE Committee in April 2000 which was 
convened for the Commission to ‘present’ this Euratom loan proposal for the Kozloduy 
project in Bulgaria, was organised at very short notice, which did not really give enough 
time for Members to digest the large dossier which was distributed to them. The Committee 
thanked the Commission for this modest further step along the road to democratisation of 
the Euratom Treaty, but was not able, given the short notice, to ask many further questions. 
 
However, on 28 November 2000, another extraordinary meeting of the European 
Parliament’s ITRE Committee was held in Brussels, as a dedicated ‘question-time’ to the 
Commission on various nuclear issues, one of which was the proposed Euratom loan to 
Ukraine for the ‘post Chernobyl closure’ K2R4 project. The Commission once again 
presented the complete Euratom loan dossier to the Committee. Following the main 
questions concerning the desirability or otherwise of going ahead with the planned project, 
Mrs Eryl McNally MEP asked the following question: 
 
 ‘My understanding of the current situation with respect to Euratom loans, is that in addition 
to the Council Decisions empowering the Commission to issue Euratom Loans, which were 
                                                 
34 Letter from Mr G Ravasio, Director-General, DG Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission, to 
Mr C Westendorp, Chairman on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy, dated 28.03.00, concerning 
"Bulgaria-Euratom loan to Natsionalna Electricheska Kompania EAD (NEK) for the Kozloduy 586 project".  
(The letter and attached dossier was distributed to Members of the ITRE Committee for an extraordinary 
Committee meeting held in Strasbourg on 11 April 2000. 
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adopted after consulting the European Parliament, (the co-budgetary authority), the Council 
also issued sets of guidelines, annexed to the Council minutes, which effectively constrain 
and guide the Commission’s Euratom lending policies. Those relating to the 1994 Council 
Decision are apparently entitled "Guidelines relating to the financing required for improving 
the safety and efficiency of nuclear power stations in certain non-member countries." (And 
are referred to in footnote 1 on p.13 of the briefing document kindly provided by the 
Commission on the proposed Ukraine loan.) Will the Commission make a copy of these 
guidelines available to the European Parliament?’ 
 
To which the Commission replied unhesitatingly, ‘YES’. 
 
It seems, at the time of writing, that the Commission may either have been a little too hasty 
with its reply, or misunderstood the question somewhat. The ‘guidelines’ are of course of a 
hitherto confidential Council document, and only the Council, not the Commission, can 
agree to provide a copy to the European Parliament. Fortunately, under the Council’s new 
arrangements to improve public access to its documents, the guidelines can be obtained, 
and indeed the Council Secretariat kindly provided a copy in response to an e-mail request. 
They are reproduced below35: 
 
 
‘GUIDELINES RELATING TO THE FINANCING REQUIRED FOR IMPROVING THE 
SAFETY AND EFFICIENCY OF NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS IN CERTAIN 
NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES 
 
COVER NOTE 
 
Subject:  Council Decision amending Decision 77/270/Euratom to authorize the Commission 
to contract Euratom borrowings in order to contribute to the financing required for 
improving the degree of safety and efficiency of nuclear power stations in certain 
non-member countries 
 
Statements 
 
Delegations will find attached the texts for entry in the Council minutes concerning the above 
Decision: 
 
– in section A, the guidelines relating to the financing required for improving the safety and 
efficiency of nuclear power stations in certain non-member countries, 
– in section B, the organization of co-operation with the EIB and the Member States’ 
participation in the decisions to grant loans to third countries, 
– and in section C, the other statements. 
 
 
ANNEX 
 
A. GUIDELINES RELATING TO THE FINANCING REQUIRED FOR IMPROVING THE 
SAFETY AND EFFICIENCY OF NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS IN CERTAIN 
NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES 
 
The guidelines relating to Decision 77/270/Euratom and contained in the Council minutes of 29 
March 1977 will continue to apply to Euratom loans to Member States. As regards operations to 
contribute to the financing required for improving the safety and efficiency of nuclear power stations 
                                                 
35 Council document 5311/94, of 8 March 1994. 
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in the non-member countries referred to in the Annex to this Decision, the Council invites the 
Commission to follow the guidelines below. 
 
I.  BORROWINGS 
 
(a) The costs involved in contracting the borrowings must correspond to those paid by category-one 
issuers, and the Commission will take all the necessary steps to ensure that the Euratom 
borrowings benefit from the same favourable conditions as those enjoyed by other Community 
borrowings. 
(b) Given the type of investment to be financed, the borrowings must be contracted over as long a 
period as possible; short or medium-term loans may also be concluded should such a 
requirement be expressed by the enterprises concerned. 
(c) The repayment schedule of the borrowings will, as far as possible, be accompanied by a grace 
period. 
 
II. LOANS 
 
1.  Technical and economic acceptability of applications 
 
1.1. Types of project involved 
 
The projects must give priority to improving the safety and efficiency of nuclear power stations and 
installations in the nuclear fuel cycle which are in service or under construction (see points 1.2 and 
1.3). 
 
Projects may also relate to the decommissioning of installations for which modification to bring 
them up to standard is not feasible in technical or economic terms and which would pose a safety 
hazard if simply abandoned. The financing granted may relate to investment during the period 
between shut-down and the start of decommissioning and to the decommissioning measures 
themselves. The financing of decommissioning measures will be considered only where no provision 
to finance these measures has been made during the operating life of the installation. 
 
1.2. Obtaining authorization at national level 
 
Financing will be granted only to projects which have received the approval of the competent 
national authorities, particularly the safety authorities. 
 
1.3. Obtaining a favourable opinion from the Commission in technical and economic terms 
 
(a) At technical level, the Commission will, with the support of experts from the Member States, 
examine the extent to which the project provides a solution to the safety problem which exists. 
The examination will also include an assessment of the environmental impact of the project. 
 
  The Commission’s examination will refer to the studies on nuclear safety carried out by the 
international bodies, IAEA and WANO, and under the PHARE and TACIS programmes, and 
will, with the support of experts from the Member States, assess the project in comparison with 
measures implemented in the Member States to solve similar types of problem, taking account 
of the recommendations made by the international bodies. 
 
  Although the list below is not exhaustive, the Council invites the Commission to give particular 
consideration to the following modification measures: 
 
  - improving the containment of the primary circuit (reactor vessel and primary piping); 
  - improving the reactor cooling system, particularly the emergency cooling system; 
  - fire detection and extinguishing systems; 
  - installation of specific and independent alarm systems; 
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  - improving the reactor protection and monitoring system; 
  - control room equipment. 
 
Other measures resulting from the studies under way will also be taken into consideration. 
 
(b) At economic level, the Commission will establish that the projects are justifiable, by comparing 
the economic characteristics and the efficiency of the projects in question with those of non-
nuclear alternatives which are potentially available. Investment must relate to installations 
which are economically viable. The opinion will refer to the overall energy plan which has been 
defined for the recipient country, insofar as such guidelines exist. 
 
  The economic and efficiency studies will be based on assumptions which reflect the reality of a 
market economy in terms of both the positive financial flows (price and quantity produced) and 
the negative financial flows (investment costs, cost of factors utilized, etc.). 
 
(c) The Commission will establish regular contacts with the EBRD, with which it will seek to 
promote the closest possible mutual co-operation. 
 
1.4. Necessity of close co-operation with at least one Community enterprise 
 
This condition will be considered to have been met if a major proportion of the capital goods item or 
service which is to be financed is provided by a Community enterprise. 
 
1.5. Securities 
 
The guarantee of the State on whose territory the project is situated will be required. 
 
The Commission will ensure that in prudential terms the securities obtained are equivalent to those 
provided for in the 1976 guidelines for operations within the Community. 
 
Where appropriate, other first-class securities will also be contemplated. 
 
 
2.  Limits of loan amounts 
 
2.1. The Commission will grant only loans which supplement those which the enterprise has 
contracted with other parties. 
 
2.2. The Commission will limit its loans to 50% of the total cost of the projects mentioned in point 
1.1 (in one or several tranches). The total Community financing for a particular project will not 
exceed 50%. 
 
2.3. In the event of co-financing with the EBRD, the cumulative total of Community financing will 
under no circumstances exceed 70% of the total cost of the project mentioned in point 1.1. 
 
 
3.  Order of granting of loans 
 
3.1. Applications concerning the financing of expenditure effected after 1 July 1992 will be 
acceptable. 
 
3.2. The Commission will use the technical and economic studies to decide, if necessary, which 
projects are to receive priority treatment. 
The EP and the Euratom Treaty: past, present and future 
PE 313.072 
 
 
80 
 
4.  Other financing conditions 
 
4.1. Currencies 
 
Loans will be paid out in several currencies (a combination) or in a single currency, according to the 
recipient’s preferences and subject to availability. The main currencies used will be those of the EEC 
Member States, the ecu, the US dollar, the Swiss franc and the yen. 
 
4.2. Duration 
 
Loans will be granted on a medium and long-term basis, with the particular duration depending on 
the type of project and life of the assets financed. The maximum duration of loans will be 
twenty years. 
 
4.3. Interest rates 
 
The interest rates will closely follow the cost of the borrowings from which the loans are granted, 
and they will not vary according to the nature or location of the project, nor according to the type or 
nationality of the recipient. Rates will be set for each of the currencies used. 
 
The loans will be at a fixed or variable rate, according to the recipient’s preferences and subject to 
availability. 
 
4.4. Reimbursement 
 
Reimbursement of the loans will be carried out in line with reimbursement of the borrowings 
utilized. Reimbursements will be made in the same currencies and in the same proportions as the 
loan payouts. 
 
 
B. ORGANIZATION OF CO-OPERATION WITH THE EIB AND THE MEMBER 
STATES’ PARTICIPATION IN THE DECISIONS TO GRANT LOANS TO THIRD 
COUNTRIES 
 
  The Council notes that the rules, which have already been agreed with the EIB, for Community 
participation in the financing of investment referred to in Decision 77/270/Euratom and listed in 
the Council minutes36 relating to that Decision will continue to apply in respect of investment 
carried out in the Member States. 
 
  The Commission will define with the EIB how these rules are to be extended to apply to the 
loans aimed at improving the safety and efficiency of nuclear power stations in the list attached 
to the Council Decision. 
 
  Decisions on loans for third countries will be taken by the Commission after consultation with 
the Committee set up under the PHARE/TACIS programmes (Working Party of Experts on 
Nuclear Questions) and after a recommendation from the EIB. 
 
C. OTHER STATEMENTS 
 
1. Re the Council Decision 
 
(a) The Council and the Commission note that there are not, at present, any applications for the 
financing of nuclear projects within the Community. 
                                                 
36 See R/1124/76, Annex III. 
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  The Council therefore considers it appropriate to use the Euratom facility to improve the degree 
of safety and efficiency of nuclear power stations in certain non-member countries, within the 
limit laid down by Decision 90/212/Euratom. If applications for financing are submitted in 
respect of projects within the Member States, they will be given priority. 
 
(b) The Council and the Commission state that, as far as decommissioning is concerned, financing 
should normally be provided by means of other instruments; however, exceptionally, where 
there are serious concerns about the safety of the installation verified by the competent 
international organizations and where the project is part of a programme showing overall 
profitability or is otherwise linked to an adequate income stream and adequate guarantees are 
provided, recourse to the loan mechanism established under this Decision could be envisaged. 
 
  This statement does not constitute a decision by the Council to grant financing in the form of aid 
for the decommissioning of former power stations. 
 
(c) The Greek delegation in a spirit of compromise and aware of the urgent need to approve this 
Council Decision, is withdrawing the substantive reservation it expressed concerning the joint 
statement by the Council and the Commission on the financing of the decommissioning of 
nuclear power stations. 
 
  However, it considers that the statement is exceptionally restrictive in its wording and that it 
renders the financing of the decommissioning of nuclear power stations by means of loans 
virtually impossible in practice, given that the main consideration is the protection of human 
lives which may be endangered by the operation of unsafe installations. 
 
(d) The Council and the Commission consider that Community enterprises must be encouraged to 
play an important role in projects for the modification of nuclear power stations in the CCEE 
and the CIS States. To that end, the Council and the Commission consider that projects financed 
by Euratom must involve close industrial or commercial co-operation with at least one 
Community enterprise. They also consider that third countries should be associated in the 
financing of the projects concerned. 
 
(e) The Commission states that, with the Monetary Committee, it will keep a close watch on the 
overall balance of payments and external debt situation of third country recipients under the 
lending operations covered by this Decision. 
 
  Should a recipient country’s balance of payments situation be unsustainable and that country be 
unable to service its external debt regularly, particularly vis-à-vis the Community, the 
Commission will take this into account in its assessment of the securities given by the State 
concerned and, if the circumstances so require, may, on advice from the Monetary Committee 
and having informed the Council, suspend the grant of loans in respect of that country. 
 
(f) The Council and the Commission take note that the World Bank is currently carrying out studies 
of the nuclear energy sector in Central and Eastern Europe and the countries of the former 
Soviet Union. They agree that the findings of these studies should be taken into account in the 
implementation of the EURATOM facility and that, where appropriate, lending should be co-
ordinated with assistance provided by other international bodies. 
 
(g) The Commission states that loans under this Decision cannot be given to finance new nuclear 
power stations or installations in the nuclear fuel cycle. 
 
(h) The Commission states that, having regard to the objectives of the Euratom Treaty, financing 
granted under this Decision may not under any circumstances benefit military installations. 
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2. Re point II.1.1 of the guidelines 
 
The Council and the Commission state that, in implementing this Decision, priority will be given, in 
compliance with all the economic and financial criteria, to investment projects concerning 
installations which present the highest level of risk’. 
 
II.4. Supplies 
(Note: this chapter has a separate bibliography at the end of the chapter). 
 
Asked to describe the role and function of the Euratom Supplies Agency, many seasoned EU 
commentators would be reduced to silence. It does not exactly have a high profile. Before 
their move on 4 December 2000, to rue de la Loi, the Euratom Supplies Agency was located 
at no.3, Rond Point Schuman, in Brussels. Visitors to this building would encounter the 
following enigmatic inscription on the front door: 
 
   ‘This building is NOT A BANK 
   The bank is NEXT DOOR 
   Ce bâtiment n’est PAS UNE BANQUE 
   La banque est à DROITE en sortant’ 
 
There was, however, no indication that it was indeed the headquarters of the Euratom 
Supplies Agency. All of which is perhaps unsurprising, given the somewhat surreal history 
of this Agency, and its role in the Euratom Treaty: both of which are the subject of this 
chapter. 
 
II.4.1. Origins and Basic Provisions of Chapter 6 
Article 2 (d) of the Euratom Treaty stipulates that the Community shall ‘ensure that all users 
in the Community receive a regular and equitable supply of ores and nuclear fuels’ in order to 
contribute to the Treaty’s overarching goal laid down in Article 1, i.e. of creating conditions 
‘necessary for the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear industries’. The objective of 
ensuring regular supply implies that prices should be relatively stable and that the quantities 
supplied should correspond to the needs of the utilities so as to impede any threat to the 
realisation of nuclear programmes and undertakings. Hence, the equitable supply-objective 
condemns any kind of discrimination that could thwart the realisation of these latter aims37. 
 
Chapter 6 of the Treaty was designed to meet these broad goals. Article 52 (1) sets out the 
basic guiding principle in achieving the aim of regular and equitable supply: ‘The supply of 
ores, source materials and special fissile materials shall be ensured … by means of a 
common supply policy on the principle of equal access to sources of supply’, thus putting 
all Community utilities on an equal footing (emphasis added). These provisions aim, inter 
alia, to prevent any utility from abusing a ‘dominant position’ (Art. 52, Para.2 (a)). To fulfil 
these broad policy goals, Article 52, Para.2 (b) foresaw the creation of the Euratom Supplies 
Agency, which has been operational since 1 June 196038. The Agency possesses legal 
personality and financial autonomy (Art. 54, Para.1). It operates under the supervision of the 
                                                 
37 See Pirotte et al. (1988: 59-60). 
38 See ‘Decision fixing the date on which the Euratom Supplies Agency shall take up its duties and approving 
the Agency Rules of 5 May 1960 determining the manner in which demand is to be balanced against the supply 
of ores, source materials and special fissile materials’, OJ 32, 11/05/1960; p. 776/60. See also ‘The statutes of 
the Euratom Supplies Agency’, OJ 27, 06/12/1958, p. 534. 
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Commission, which has the right to exercise a veto over all its decisions, and the 
Commission appoints its Director General. Pursuant to Article 52 (2 b), the Agency has two 
major tools at its disposal to achieve its mission: It ‘shall have the right of option on ores, 
source materials and special fissile materials produced in the territories of Member States 
and an exclusive right to conclude contracts relating to the supply of ores, source materials 
and special fissile materials coming from inside the Community or from outside’ (emphasis 
added). In addition to its two major ‘tools’, the Agency also possesses some other specific 
means of action: (a) the right to receive small amount contracts and notification of 
transformation of nuclear materials (‘processing, conversion, or shaping’) (Arts. 74 and 75), 
(b) its intervention to obtain Commission export authorisation for export of Community 
production (Art. 59), (c) its contacts with Euratom Safeguards (Chapter 7), and (d) its role in 
the management of the Community’s ownership right for special fissile materials (Chapter 
V8). Furthermore, the Treaty envisaged some other means of intervention for the 
Commission and the Agency in the nuclear fuel cycle. However, these provisions were 
never applied, such as the establishment of commercial stocks by the Agency to facilitate 
supply (Art. 72, Para.1), the establishment of emergency stocks by the Commission (Art. 72, 
Para.2), as well as Commission support and recommendations in the field of uranium 
prospection (Art. 70) (see Bouquet, 1998: 6-7). 
 
II.4.1.1. The Agency’s Right of Option and its Exclusive Right to Conclude Contracts 
 
The Agency’s right of option applies to material produced inside the Community, and 
affects the full ownership of ores and source materials and the right of use and consumption 
of special fissile materials39. Although this right was considered an essential tool in 
successfully executing the Community’s supply policy, the provision never actually fully 
materialised. It can be argued, albeit in more abstract terms, that the Agency exercises this 
right indirectly through the conclusion of supply contracts (see Bouquet, 1998: 7). The right 
to conclude contracts is regarded as the Supplies Agency’s ‘central operating tool’ (Bouquet, 
1998: 8). It applies to different kinds of contractual relationships as well as to different types 
of materials: (a) purchases and sales of materials (natural, depleted and enriched uranium; 
thorium and plutonium); (b) exchanges and loans, (c) enrichment contracts. It has to be 
emphasised that this view is shared by the Agency and, of course the Commission. 
However, it does not represent the view of all the Member States, notably France. This 
contrasting view posits that enrichment contracts would only be contracts covering 
‘processing, conversion or shaping’, i.e. transformation-contracts subject to the notification 
obligation under Art. 75. In the Agency’s view, to be valid under Community law, the above 
mentioned contracts all have to be concluded by the Supplies Agency. 
 
II.4.1.2. Treaty Intentions Fail to Match Initially Expected Conditions 
 
When the Euratom Treaty entered into force in 1958, the provisions laid down in Chapter 6 
had already been challenged by the course of events. The supply-monopoly, so dear to some 
of the negotiating parties in the mid-1950s, had become – in practice – a watered down 
version of what its creators intended. In 1955, when the “Six” signed the Messina 
Declaration, one of the means to achieve the goal of the rapid development and the peaceful 
use of nuclear energy was considered the provision of ‘free and adequate access to raw 
                                                 
39 This is due to the provisions of Chapter 8 which stipulate that Community-produced and imported special 
fissile materials are owned by the Community (see Bouquet, 1998: 7). 
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materials’40. Following Messina, a working group was set up in order to develop more 
concrete measures which the prospective Member States of a future Euratom Treaty would 
have to comply with in order to support the rapid development of the nuclear industry, 
including non-discriminatory access to resources and a common price-level. It was argued 
that governments would have to delegate the right to purchase and the right of ownership 
with regard to fissile materials to a Community agency. It was furthermore envisaged that 
this agency would possess a Community monopoly over supplies and, at the same time, it 
should be the legal owner of the material. Thus, one of the most crucial aspects of the then 
embryonic treaty was this envisaged de facto trade monopoly with regard to fissile 
materials41. However, this monopoly was not undisputed and differences in opinion as to the 
Agency’s competencies surfaced strongly. The main differences as to how this Agency was 
to operate materialised in fierce disputes between supporters of the idea of ‘public authority 
interventionism’ and state dirigisme (particularly the French government), and ‘a more free 
market approach’42 which was advocated by the German industry and parts of the German 
government, notably the Ministries for Economic and Nuclear Affairs headed by Erhard and 
Strauss respectively. The more dirigiste approach resulted in a monopolistic system of 
supplies embodied in the right of option and the exclusive right to conclude contracts by the 
Supplies Agency (see below). The free-market ideas had been translated in the ‘commercial 
organisation of the [Supplies Agency] responsible for the implementation of supply 
provisions (separate legal entity, market economy pricing)’43.  
 
It has often been argued that the perceived scarcity of uranium supply was one of the central 
motives that led the Member States negotiating the Treaties of Rome to provide for a 
Euratom Supplies Agency that was to guarantee regular and equitable supply as set out in 
Article 2 (d) of the Euratom Treaty. Yet, already in 1956 there was the widespread view that 
uranium supply on the world-market would exceed demand and that most of the prospective 
Member States wished to pursue their own bilateral contracts for the supply of fissile 
materials. Even before the entry into force of the Euratom Treaty, in late 1957, Germany 
entered bilateral agreements with the United States and Canada to ensure the provision of 
fissile material. Germany was followed by France and Italy, both of which established 
bilateral contracts to purchase fissile material from the US. Consequently, these practices 
undermined some of the Agency’s basic goals: the Agency could neither exercise its right of 
option, nor was it able to fulfil its mandate of guaranteeing community-wide regular and 
equitable supply: it was the Member States that ‘did the job’ and, quite logically, they 
tolerated this state of affairs. At the point of Treaty ratification the Agency was thus already 
deprived of its core purpose, because it could not authoritatively purchase and distribute 
fissile materials (as was initially envisaged)44. Added to which, the ‘threat’ of a shortage of 
fissile materials was more remote than it was a few years earlier. As a result, not only was 
the initial French call for a supply-monopoly for uranium rejected outright by the German 
industry and the Ministries for Economic and Nuclear Affairs on ‘ideological’ grounds, but 
Germany also continued to prefer bilateral trade agreements with the USA and the UK to 
cover its demand for resources. Germany was able to purchase cheap supplies of enriched 
uranium from the USA and France had also entered bilateral supply agreements. In the end, 
a Supplies Agency was instituted but denied a de facto monopoly. 
 
                                                 
40 The Messina Declaration [1955], History of European Integration Site, University of Leiden, 
http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/history/rtg/res1/messina.htm. 
41 See Weilemann (1983: 42-47). 
42 See Bouquet (1998: 3). 
43 ibid. 
44 See Deubner (1977: 119). 
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II.4.2. The First Years: Early Reorientation in Times of Abundance 
With one of the ‘original’ concerns of the Treaty founders being largely obsolete (the 
perceived scarcity of uranium in the mid-1950s had turned into a permanent situation of 
abundance), together with the lax de facto application of Chapter 6, it was only two years 
after the entry into force of the Treaty that the principles enshrined in the treaty-wording of 
Chapter 6 lost much of their force. 
 
II.4.2.1. The 'Simplified Procedure': Adjusting to Reality 
 
The Council Resolution of 5 May 196045, laying down the ‘Rules of the Supplies Agency of 
[Euratom] determining the manner in which demand is to be balanced against supply of 
[fissile materials]’ basically rendered the Agency’s ‘exclusive right to conclude contracts’ 
(Art. 52; Para.2 (b)) futile. The Member States decided that in the context of uranium 
abundance, the Agency would employ a ‘simplified procedure’ for the conclusion of supply 
contracts. Article 5 of the ‘Rules’ states: 
 
‘If, in respect of a specific product and where particular the Agency takes the initiative, the 
Commission, having heard the Advisory Committee, finds that the situation on the market 
shows a clear surplus of supply over demand, it may, by means of an appropriate directive call 
upon the Agency to apply the simplified procedure…’46 
 
Part (b) of Art. 5 stipulates, that producers and users of fissile materials ‘shall then be 
empowered to negotiate directly and to sign contracts’47. In return, the contract has to be 
‘communicated’ to the Agency and is deemed concluded by it ‘if no objection is notified by 
the Agency to the party concerned within eight days from the time of the receipt of the 
contracts’48. In effect, the Agency was thus given the role of an officier d’état civile49 instead 
of an active ‘configurator’ of supply policy. The adoption of the ‘simplified procedure’ 
acknowledged the independence of the nuclear industry and the practice of direct negotiation 
and signature of contracts by the parties involved. This early regulation, therefore, reduced 
the Agency’s right to conclude contracts, rendering it an exercise of pure formality. As early 
as 1960, the interpretation of the Agency’s role followed a minimaliste conception, and, at 
most, it could be attributed a ‘watchdog’ role50. 
 
This ‘simplified procedure’ which was essentially a means to adapt to the exigencies of the 
supply situation, however, was amended in 1975 when the economic terms for energy 
supply changed. The preamble to the revised Agency rules provide that the ‘uncertain 
outlook for the short and medium term’51 be met with a more attentive role to be assumed by 
the Supplies Agency. Under the amended rules, a new Article 5bis was inserted. Although 
producers and users may still directly negotiate contracts52, they have to be sent to the 
Agency for signature. Even under the amended rules, contracts are deemed concluded if the 
Agency solely co-signs the agreement negotiated between the two contracting parties within 
ten working days of receipt. 
 
                                                 
45 OJ No 32, 11/05/1960, p. 770. 
46 ibid. Art. 5, Para.1. Art. 5 does not apply to special fissile materials. 
47 ibid. Art. 5 (b). 
48 ibid. Art. 5 (c). 
49 Pirotte et al. (1988: 90). 
50 Allen (1984: 480). 
51 OJ L 193, 25/07/1975, p. 37. 
52 See OJ L 193, 25/07/1975, Art. 1 (a). 
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II.4.2.2. The Gradual Loss of the Agency’s Monopoly 
 
The suppression of the active role the Agency was supposed to play according to the Treaty 
but could never exercise, was more than confirmed by the fact that the USA effectively 
possessed the monopoly for enrichment services53, which bore far-reaching consequences 
for the role of the Supplies Agency. The role assigned to the Agency by the Treaty is one of 
an intermediary between the USA (supplier) and a Community user. The 1954 Atomic 
Energy Act stipulates that a cooperation agreement was necessary for the delivery of 
nuclear materials from the USA to third parties. The implication of this piece of legislation 
was that the Agency’s role was strongly tied to U.S. legal provisions governing the 
exchange between U.S. suppliers and Community users. It was especially the 1964 Private 
Owner of Special Material Act that challenged the (already minimaliste) role of the 
Supplies Agency. Under this provision, it was no longer obligatory for the Agency to act as 
an intermediary between the Euratom Member States and the United States owing to the 
possibility of different contractual procedures. Article 64 (Euratom), which stipulates that 
the ‘Agency, acting where appropriate within a framework of agreements concluded 
between the Community and a third State or an international organization, shall … have the 
exclusive right to enter into agreements or contracts whose principal aim is the supply of 
ores, source materials or special fissile materials coming from outside the Community’ was 
thus deprived of its core content’. In addition, the fact that France adopted its own supply 
policy, negotiating directly and signing contracts with the USA underlined the weakness of 
Chapter 6. The Agency, being reduced to the role of a material-registrar, intervenes, if at all, 
on a purely a posteriori basis (receiving notification of the conclusion of contracts). The 
Agency’s exclusive right to conclude contracts thus never materialised and neither did its 
right of option54. 
 
The Commission itself draws a somewhat less ‘damaging’ picture. Although admitting that 
the monopolistic character of the Agency had to be considerably attenuated, for example, by 
introducing the ‘simplified procedure’ or by the only “virtual and implicit” exercise of its 
right of option, the Commission refers to the application of Chapter 6 as a ‘flexible 
regime’55. However, an Aide-Mémoire prepared by the Commission in 1993 on the 
application of Chapter 6 of the Euratom Treaty sheds more light on the difficulties 
accompanying the application of the alleged ‘flexible regime’. The Aide Mémoire identified 
three cases undermining the application of the Commission’s approach, with France being 
the main reason for concern. For example, France at that time refused to communicate 
contracts concluded by two parties with ‘direct contact’ (‘entreprises liées’). The Aide 
Mémoire stated that practically all French nuclear undertakings were ‘liées’. The same 
applied to acquisition contracts concluded by suppliers (intermediaries and producers). At 
the time the Aide Mémoire was published (1993), contracts by COGEMA were still not 
subjected to the rule of notification and co-signature. Another factor for concern was the 
French interpretation of Article 75 of the Treaty56. The basic question was whether 
                                                 
53 The following paragraph is based on Pirotte et al. (1988: 90-91). 
54 See Pirotte et al. (1988: 91) and Délégation du Sénat pour l’Union Européenne (2000: 86). 
55 See Commission (1993) ‘Aide Mémoire: Application du Chapitre VI du Traité Euratom’, 29/10/1993. 
56 Art. 75 of the Euratom Treaty reads: ‘(Para.1) The provisions of the Chapter shall not apply to commitments 
relating to the processing, conversion or shaping of ores, source materials or special fissile materials into: (a) 
by several persons or undertakings, where the material is to return to the original person or undertaking after 
being processed, converted or shaped; or (b) by a person or undertaking and an international organization or a 
national of a third State, where the material is processed, converted or shaped outside the Community and then 
returned to the original person or undertaking; or (c) by a person or undertaking and an international 
organization or a national of a third State, where the material is processed, converted or shaped inside the 
Community and is then returned either to the original organization or national or to any other consignee 
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enrichment services constituted a supply contract which, if so, required the Agency to 
intervene in order to conclude the contract. France’s reading of Article 75 exempted 
contracts relating to enriched fuels through reprocessing from Agency intervention57. 
Consequently, the exclusive right to conclude contracts applied neither to imports of 
enrichment services to France from outside, nor to intra-community exchanges of these type 
of goods, nor to exports to extra-community countries58. However, the Commission’s 
conclusion was that, apart from the French ‘infringements’ of the provisions of Chapter 6, 
the situation in the other Member States was broadly ‘acceptable’59. In contrast, a recent 
report by the French Sénat Delegation for the European Union draws a rather more ‘grim’ 
picture. Published in 2000, the report states: 
 
‘Presently, the effective role of the Supplies Agency consists in signing supply contracts, 
verifying their conformity with regard to Community law and in the engagement by Euratom 
in the realm of international agreements’60. 
 
Pirotte et al. summarise this state of affairs by pointing out that the ‘Treaty practice has 
profoundly watered down the text initially ratified’61. The apparent gap between the de jure 
provisions as laid down in Chapter 6 and their de facto operation has resulted in a situation 
which is, from a legal point of view, unsatisfactory. As far as the practical execution of 
Chapter 6 is concerned, this state of affairs increases rather than reduces legal uncertainty. 
Politically, it led the Commission and some Member States to produce various proposals 
with a view to revise Chapter 6 and adjust it to the ‘real world’. Art. 76 of the Euratom 
Treaty provides two possible pathways to achieve revision, one of which has been subject to 
much discussion but also to much frustration. In the following section, this pathway and the 
various difficulties encountered will be addressed. 
                                                                                                                                                      
likewise outside the Community designated by such organization or national. (Para.2) The persons and 
undertakings concerned shall, however, notify the Agency of the existence of such commitments and, as soon 
as the contracts are signed, of the quantities of material involved in the movements. The Commission may 
prevent the commitments referred to in subparagraph (b) from being undertaken if it considers that the 
conversion or shaping cannot be carried out efficiently and safely and without the loss of material to the 
detriment of the Community. (Para.3) The materials to which such commitments relate shall be subject in the 
territories of the Member States to the safeguards laid down in Chapter 7. The provisions of Chapter 8 shall 
not, however, be applicable to special fissile materials covered by the commitments referred to in subparagraph 
(c)’. 
57 Pirotte et al. (1988: 95) state: ‘…il s’agit d’une opération de transformation de l’uranium (plutôt qu’une 
opération de production). Il se fond sur le fait que la séparation isotopique de l’uranium 238 et de l’uranium 
235 s’effectue avec conservation de la masse des deux composants; l’usine ne fournissant qu’un ‘travail’ de 
séparation’. The Commission does not agree with this interpretation. The Treaty founders, for example, could 
not know that enrichment processessing would be such a widely used contracting formula. 
58 The report of the Délégation du Sénat pour l’Union Européenne (2000: 87) states in this regard: ‘La France a 
développé une practique d’application minimale du Chapitre VI … qui about it à faire échapper la quasi-
totalité des contrats de fournitures conclu par les opérateurs français à la cosignature de l’Agence 
d’approvisionnement. En effet, la COGEMA ne transmet pas ses contrats d’approvisionnement car; selon la 
France, elle n’est pas ‘utilisateur’ au sens du traité Euratom, tandis que les contrats d’enrichissement d’Eurodif 
relèvent, toujours selon la France, d’un simple ‘façonnage’ et non pas d’une ‘production’ de matières 
nucléaires.’ 
59 Commission (1993) ‘Aide Mémoire: Application du Chapitre VI du Traité Euratom’, 29/10/1993. 
60 Délégation du Sénat pour l’Union Européenne (2000: 86). 
61 Pirotte et al. (1988: 91). 
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II.4.3. Article 76, the Court’s Interpretations and the Subsequent Failure(s) to 
Revise Chapter 6 
 
Article 76, Para.2 of the Euratom Treaty reads: ‘Seven years after the entry into force of this 
Treaty, the Council may confirm these provisions [Chapter 6] in their entirety. Failing 
confirmation, new provisions relating to the subject matter of this Chapter shall be adopted 
…’. On 31 December 1964, the seven years period after the entry into force of the Treaty 
expired. Although the Commission came up with a proposal for revision, the Council failed 
to act. Hence, no ‘new provisions’ were adopted. What followed was a controversy over the 
question of the validity of the Chapter 6 provisions after 1964. 
 
II.4.3.1. French ‘Exceptionalism’: Chapter 6 is ‘Caduque’ – The European Court of 
Justice disagrees  
 
France stuck to the position that the failure to act, i.e. the failure to confirm or revise 
Chapter 6, implied that the provisions laid down in Chapter 6 were no longer valid 
(‘caduque’). Yet, other Member States were in favour of maintaining Chapter 6 
provisionally until new dispositions were adopted. Following the French unwillingness to 
apply the provisions laid down in Chapter 6, the Commission brought before the Court, 
under Article 141 of the Euratom Treaty, ‘an action seeking a declaration that the French 
Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under the provisions of … Chapter 6 … by 
refusing to submit to the Commission the annual reports prescribed by Article 70 of the 
Treaty, by concluding, without knowledge of the Supplies Agency, contracts relating to the 
importation from the Federal Republic of Germany, from Canada and from Italy, and to the 
supply to Italy of special fissile materials, and finally by refusing to notify to the Agency the 
existence of an undertaking relating to the processing of uranium imported from South 
Africa, and the quantities involved in the delivery in question’62. 
 
As to the latter claim, which is of greater interest as it covers a much broader range of 
activities covered by Chapter 6, France continued to apply its own supply policy, instead of 
applying the provisions foreseen in the Treaty. Following the lapse of the seven-year period, 
the French government had consistently expressed the opinion that the provisions of Chapter 
6 were no longer in force. Furthermore, France affirmed that ‘it is not open to the 
Commission to bring before the Court of Justice in 1971 a situation which has lasted since 
1965 and which it has known about since that time’63. The Court, however, was of the 
opinion that the Treaty provisions laid down in Chapter 6 were still valid. It argued that the 
‘member states agreed to establish a community of unlimited duration, having permanent 
institutions invested with real powers, stemming from a limitation of authority or a transfer 
of powers from the states to that community’64. It follows that powers which have been 
delegated in this spirit ‘could not, therefore, be withdrawn from the community, nor could 
the objectives with which such powers are concerned be restored to the field of authority of 
the member states alone, except by virtue of an express provision of the treaty’65. The Court, 
furthermore, found that ‘the fact that market conditions may during a given period have 
rendered less necessary the use of the supply mechanisms prescribed by the treaty does not 
                                                 
62 Judgement of the Court of Justice, Case 7/71, para 1, Commission v French Republic [1971] ECR 1003. 
63 ibid. Para.4. 
64 ibid. Para.19. 
65 ibid. Para.20. 
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suffice to deprive the provisions relating to these mechanisms of their mandatory 
character’66. The French government has also contended that the lack of any decision by the 
Council at the end of the seven-year period prescribed by Article 76 has led to a legal 
situation characterised by uncertainty and ambiguity. However, the Court’s judgement reads 
that is not possible to justify a failure to fulfil an obligation by invoking the uncertainty of 
the legal situation in which the Member State found itself, and against which the Treaty 
affords it means of action67. 
 
The Court thus concluded that the French Republic had failed to fulfil its obligations under 
the Euratom Treaty (especially Articles 52, 55, 57, 64). It is often suggested that the theory 
of the effet utile has inspired the judgement by the Court. The Court’s interpretation of the 
provisions of Chapter 6 stuck closely to the Treaty wording. Despite the changes in 
circumstances which had made the application of Chapter 6, as foreseen in the initial Treaty 
wording, an illusion rather than a reality, a fundamental re-interpretation of the Treaty did 
not occur. In sum, the Court’s judgement was mainly in line with the Commission’s attitude 
that the non-application of Chapter 6 by France was not justifiable on Treaty grounds. Yet, 
even after the Court’s judgement, a revision of Chapter 6 did not take place. 
 
II.4.3.2. The Court’s 1978 Ruling: Interpreting the Present from the Past 
 
However, a further Court judgement, delivered in 1978, vividly demonstrated that Chapter 
6, in the Court’s interpretation, was alive and well68. Following an initiative by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, a convention on physical protection of nuclear 
materials, installations and transports was drawn up. This (draft) convention (finally adopted 
in 1979 and entered into force in 198769) aimed to deal with the risk of theft and misuse of 
nuclear materials put to civil uses. The provisions laid down in the convention therefore 
intended to protect states and their inhabitants against the dangers that could arise as a result 
of sabotage of nuclear installations and if nuclear material fell into the hands of unauthorised 
persons. Ensuring the physical protection of installations and materials was therefore the 
prime goal of the convention. 
 
Why should the adoption of this convention pose a problem to the Euratom Treaty in 
general, and Chapter 6 in particular? The reason why the Belgian government, pursuant to 
Article 103, Para.370 of the Treaty, called upon the Court to issue a ruling, was the question 
of whether the adhesion to the convention of Community Member States was compatible 
with the rules laid down in the Treaty. Could the convention be adopted without the 
Community being party to the convention? Article 103, Para. 3 of Chapter 10 (External 
Relations) of the Euratom Treaty reads: 
 
                                                 
66 ibid. Para.43. 
67 ibid. Para.47. 
68 Ruling 1/78, Draft Convention of the IAEA on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Facilities and 
Transports [1978]. 
69 International Atomic Energy Agency (INFCIRC/274/Rev. 1) ‘The Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material’. 
70 Article 103 (3) of Chapter 10 (External Relations) of the Euratom Treaty reads: ‘The State shall not conclude 
the proposed agreement or contract until it has satisfied the objections of the Commission or complied with a 
ruling by the Court of Justice … on the compatibility of the proposed clauses with the provisions of this 
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‘The State shall not conclude the proposed agreement or contract until it has satisfied the 
objections of the Commission or complied with a ruling by the Court of Justice … on the 
compatibility of the proposed clauses with the provisions of this Treaty …’. 
 
In line with the comments issued by the Commission, the Court found that several 
fundamental provisions of the Euratom Treaty, such as those relating to supplies, safeguards, 
property ownership and the nuclear common market, were affected if Community Member 
States were to become party to the convention. Although the actual reasoning for the ruling 
is of less interest here, the Court’s handling of the Chapter 6 provisions is of interest as it 
mirrors the Court’s interpretation of these provisions. The Chapter 6-related question to be 
answered by the Court was ‘whether the Community exercises, in the fields of supply … 
jurisdiction and powers which give it the right to participate in the proposed convention’71. 
The obligations for the prospective signatories of the convention laid down in Article 4 of 
the draft convention were of particular concern: This article defines the precautions to be 
taken on the import, export, storage, transport and transit of nuclear materials and then 
divides the relevant materials into different categories and lays down the minimum measures 
of physical protection applicable to each of the categories. According to the Court, the 
Euratom Treaty makes explicit, through Article 64, that with regard to nuclear materials 
coming from outside the Community, the Supplies Agency has an exclusive right to enter 
into agreements or contracts relating to the supply of such products ‘acting where 
appropriate within the framework of agreements concluded between the Community and a 
third State or an international organization’. Furthermore, the Court argued that, following 
from the provisions of Article 60 in conjunction with Article 65, the Supplies Agency must 
be used as an intermediary between users of nuclear materials and suppliers who are outside 
the Community. The Court then stated that ‘[t]hese provisions … show the care taken in the 
Treaty to define in a precise and binding manner the exclusive right exercised by the 
Community in the field of nuclear supply in … external relations’72. The Court concluded on 
this issue that it would not be possible for the Community to define a supply policy, as 
foreseen by the Treaty, if it could not also, as a party of the convention, decide itself on the 
obligations to be entered into with regard to the physical protection of nuclear materials in 
so far as its functions in the field of supply were affected73. Therefore, if the Community 
Member States were to enter into and implement obligations such as defined under Article 4 
of the draft convention, without the participation of the Community, the Member States 
‘would necessarily interfere with the scope and jurisdiction of the Community and they 
would thus impede the application of the Euratom Treaty’74. The ruling concluded that the 
draft convention could be implemented as regards the Community ‘only by means of a close 
association between the institutions of the Community and the Member States both in the 
process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfilment of the obligations entered into’75. 
With its ruling, the Court reaffirmed the Community’s exclusive jurisdiction over issues 
affecting Community supply of fissile materials. 
 
According to Pirotte and his collaborators, the Court of Justice, in its ruling of 14 November 
1978, has adopted a rigid interpretation (“interprétation stricte”) of the Euratom Treaty76. 
They observe that the Court’s interpretation of Chapter 6, mirrored in the 1971 judgement 
and its 1978 ruling, is biased towards a teleological interpretation of the European 
                                                 
71 op. cit. Footnote 65, Para.13. 
72 ibid. Para.14. 
73 ibid. Para.15. 
74 ibid. Para.18. 
75 ibid. Para.34. 
76 Pirotte et al. (1988: 86). 
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‘enterprise’. The authors see a danger in this practice adopted by the Court. Citing law 
professor Charles de Visscher: 
 
‘[S]i l’on doit en principe interpréter un traité de manière à lui permettre d’atteindre le but voulu 
par les parties …, la recherche de ce but ne peut dégénérer en un raisonnement abstrait autour du 
but que l’on suppose avoir été celui des parties alors que l’inefficacité partielle du Traité peut 
s’expliquer, en fait, par leur volonté réfléchie de ne pas s’engager au-delà d’un certain point’77. 
 
The often perceived necessity for adjusting the provisions relating to the Supplies Agency’s 
right to conclude contracts and its right of option in order to match the exigencies of the 
changes in the ‘nuclear environment’ has thus not been met by the Court, whose 
interpretations seem to mirror relatively closely the intentions of the Treaty founders in the 
mid-1950s. Pirotte and his collaborators view the Court’s jurisprudence rather critically. 
They argue that the bulk of the Treaty provisions are mainly the result of a particular 
political and economic context and are ill-suited to correspond to the past and present 
environment: ‘Nombre de ces dispositions … avaient été dictées plus par des circonstances 
inhérentes à l’époque que par un accord réel portant sur le long terme’78. But clearly 
developments aimed at rendering the Treaty provisions more flexible, for example, by 
introducing the ‘simplified procedure’, had to emanate from the Commission together with 
the Member States. The Court’s judgement of 1971 and its ruling of 1978 provided further 
incentives for some actors to aim for revision. However, the attempt to narrow the gap 
between the de facto operation of the Treaty and the de jure provision was anything but a 
success story. 
 
II.4.3.3. The Attempt to Revise Chapter 6 in 1982/84: The Most Prominent Failure to 
Adjust to Reality 
 
The Commission has on numerous occasions taken up the initiative to achieve the revision 
of Chapter 6 pursuant to Article 76 of the Euratom Treaty. However, none of these 
initiatives, which were presented to the Council in 1964, 1975, 1979, and 1982 (revised in 
1984) have succeeded79. The most ‘recent’ Commission proposal submitted to the Council 
dates back to 198280, with the Commission adopting a revised version of the 1982 proposal 
in 198481. The amended proposal which was, again, transmitted to the Council has not been 
subject to discussion inside the Council.  
 
Ten years after the Court’s 1971 judgement and shortly after the 1978 ruling reaffirmed the 
validity of the provisions laid down in Chapter 6, and after a number of unsuccessful 
Commission proposals for revision, the time was considered ripe to adjust the ‘words’ to the 
‘facts’. The most striking feature of the Commission’s 1982 proposal was the complete 
renunciation of the supply monopoly so dear to the Treaty founders in the mid-1950s: 
 
‘Gone is the right of option, … gone is the exclusive right to conclude contracts. Gone with 
them is the obligatory involvement of the Community instrument in nuclear commerce’82. 
 
                                                 
77 Pirotte et al. (1988: 86-87). 
78 Pirotte et al. (1988: 87). 
79 Pirotte and his collaborators provide an overview on previous attempts to revise Chapter VI (Pirotte et al. 
1988: 96-101). 
80 OJ C 330, 16/12/1982, pp. 4-8. 
81 COM(84) 606 final/2. 
82 Allen (1984: 485). 
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The declared aim of the 1982 proposal was thus to reconcile the basic Treaty provision laid 
down in Art. 2 (d) ensuring that ‘all users in the Community receive a regular and equitable 
supply of ores and nuclear fuels’ and the need for a more flexible interpretation of the 
provisions of Chapter 6 in the light of new challenges and circumstances. The basic thrust of 
this proposal was that the (new) mission of the Agency should be that of an observer and 
market analyst rather than of a monopoly supplier and price setter. However, this did not 
imply that the Agency’s role was to become negligible. According to Art. 52, Para.1 (new), 
the Agency shall continue to ensure the regular and equitable supply of fissile materials ‘by 
means of a common policy based on the principle of the unity of the market and covering, in 
particular, the conclusion by the Community of international agreements and the adoption of 
specific solidarity measures’. The 1982 document thus acknowledged that the nuclear 
industry was able to ‘look after itself’ commercially. In addition, the Commission identified 
those areas in which it considered Community intervention to be justified, i.e. being in the 
Community’s public interest. The first area, as mentioned in Article 52 (new) relates to the 
free movement of nuclear materials within the Community (‘unity of the market’)83, and the 
second relates to the conditions that shall be applied for the use, storage, and transfer of 
materials supplied from outside the Community (‘international relations’)84. 
 
As to the former, Article 53, Para.1 states that ‘all restrictions on the transfer of materials 
within the Community and on imports from outside the Community are prohibited, together 
with any conditions governing use and storage within the Community’85. As to the latter, the 
newly proposed Article 55, Para.1 states: ‘The Community shall conclude international 
agreements concerning supplies from outside the Community’. And Art. 55, Para.2 lays 
down the procedural mechanisms: ‘The negotiation of the agreement … shall be conducted 
by the Commission in accordance with the procedures laid down in Article 101 in 
consultation with a special committee appointed by the Council to assist it in that task’. 
Allen states that in ‘practice the Commission has over the years accepted that Member 
States conclude international agreements affecting the supply of nuclear materials, provided 
that … the agreement does not contain clauses which impede the application of the 
Treaty’86. With its proposal, the Commission has attempted to formally legitimise this 
practice. The ‘Community interest’ will be preserved here in two ways: first, the application 
of Article 103 to such agreements is preserved and second, the right of the Community to 
take over the Member States’ rights and obligations wherever the Community itself 
concludes an agreement covering the same grounds is ensured. According to Allen, the ‘new 
6 Chapter 6 provisions’ contained in the 1982 Commission proposal ‘abolished the 
Community monopoly of supply and replaced it by a Community monopoly of public 
interest’87. 
 
However, the reactions to this proposal, especially those of the European Parliament, were 
critical, to say the least. Parliament was invited by the Council, pursuant to Art. 76, Para.2 of 
the Euratom Treaty to deliver its opinion on the proposal of the Commission. The 
Parliament’s Committee on Energy, Research and Technology adopted an ‘Interim Report’ 
                                                 
83 Proposed Articles 53 (new) and 54 (new) of the Commission proposal for the revision of Chapter 6, OJ C 
330, 16/12/1982, pp. 4-8. 
84 Proposed Articles 55 (new) to 57 (new) of the Commission proposal for the revision of Chapter 6, OJ C 330, 
16/12/1982, pp. 4-8. 
85 Exceptions to Article 53, Para.1 are laid down in Art. 53, Para.2, and affect in particular the conditions 
accepted in the framework of international agreements. 
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on the proposal from the Commission88. In this report, rapporteur Ippolito heavily criticised 
the Commission’s proposal. One main point of criticism refers to the impression ‘that 
priority has been given to the interests of the most powerful nuclear countries’89. For 
example, the principle of the ‘unity of the market’ so forcefully proclaimed by the 
Commission is not fully respected: ‘It is clear that Community countries such as France and 
the United Kingdom, which possess nuclear weapons, will be able to enjoy a privileged 
market,’ because the new text of Article 52 ‘not only fails to mention the need to avoid 
discrimination, but it actually creates the principle of discrimination by affirming that the 
Community’s action should apply only to materials intended for ‘civil and non-explosive 
purposes’90. Although the ‘Ippolito Report’ welcomed the Commission proposal from the 
viewpoint that a debate on revision is better than no debate, it further emphasised that the 
Commission failed to insert its ideas into the broader institutional image of the Community: 
‘… the Commission’s proposal weakens the image of Community solidarity and goes 
against the European Parliament’s aim of achieving greater European integration’91. 
However, the plenary never cast a vote on the Commission proposal. The Chairman of the 
Committee on Energy, Research and Technology (Mrs Waltz) pointed out that the ‘Ippolito 
Report’ was an ‘Interim Report’ and thus, the Commission proposal of 1983 should not be 
voted upon. The plenary agreed. Instead a Resolution was adopted that called upon the 
Commission to adjourn the discussion on Chapter 6 revision to the EP’s next term following 
the 1984 elections and to make ‘appropriate amendments to the original proposal’ taking 
into account the suggestions made in the ‘Interim Report’92. 
 
Following reception of the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, of the 
Parliament’s ‘Interim Report’ and the Resolution adopted on 24 May 1984, and after 
consultations within Council working groups, Commission Vice-President Davignon wrote 
to the President of the Council, Peter Barry, explaining that the main goal was to ‘bring to an 
end discrimination which is characteristic of the present situation, in which a growing 
proportion of civil supply contracts … falls outside the rules of the Community supply 
system’93. Furthermore, the Commission affirmed its position adopted in 1982 that the 
application of the new Chapter 6 shall be ‘limited to supplies for civil and non-explosive 
uses’94 thereby ignoring the criticism brought forward by the European Parliament. The 
Commission thus recognised and formally enshrined in the new revised proposal the 
common practice since the entry into force of the Euratom Treaty: supplies for military 
purposes were excluded from the jurisdiction of the Treaty and left to the (nuclear-weapon) 
Member States. However, the ‘unity of the market’ emphasis was upheld and continued to 
cover both the prohibition of all restrictions on intra-Community transfers and on imports 
from outside the Community (Art. 53, Para.1) and the possibility of introducing provisions 
for special precautions relating to such transfers and imports (Art. 53, Para.2). In the end, 
remedies were found in the revised Commission proposal for previous ‘misunderstandings’ 
and ‘misgivings’. 
 
                                                 
88 Session doc number 1-0228/84. Ref doc noc 1-1164/82, COM ref. no. COM/82/0732. OJ C330 16 
December 1982, p.004 (PE 84.748 final). 
89 PE 84.748 final, p. 12. 
90 PE 84.748 final, p. 15. 
91 PE 84.748 final, p. 9. 
92 ‘Resolution on the proposal from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council for a 
Decision adopting new provisions relating to Chapter 6 ‘Supplies’ of the Treaty establishing the European 
Atomic Energy Community’, OJ C 172, 02/07/1984, pp. 152-153. 
93 COM(84) 606 final/2, p. 1. 
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In the course of 1983 and 1984, discussions among the Member States were extended, 
especially in the context of the non-proliferation working group in the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) framework, an intergovernmental mechanism established in 1970. The 
problem with respect to the issue of non-proliferation was to find a way to reconcile the 
application of national non-proliferation policies with the principle of the ‘unity of the 
market’, i.e. the free circulation of nuclear materials within the Community. In 1984, the 
‘wish’ to cooperate in the field of non-proliferation was met with concrete action: the 
adoption of the ‘London Directives’ on nuclear exports, announced on 20 November 1984, 
which was the first substantive result of harmonisation in the EPC framework95. The 
‘London Directives’ introduced uniform Community transfer-rules with regard to highly 
sensitive nuclear materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium)96. These ‘directives’ 
spelt out the conditions that must be fulfilled for the transfer of nuclear materials between 
states in order to satisfy the non-proliferation policy of each of the (then) ten Member 
States.97 The revised Commission proposal of 198498 has been drafted in the very light of 
the ‘London Directives’. Essentially, the Commission did not demand anything more of the 
Member States than to translate their agreement under the EPC framework into Community 
law99. As Commission Vice-President Davignon stated clearly in 1984: 
 
‘A new situation has thus been created which is in fact such as to simplify the further work on 
revision of Chapter 6. On the one hand, the fact that the position of Member States with regard to the 
London Guidelines … have been defined in an inter-governmental framework averts all ambiguity 
on the exclusivity of the competence of the Member States in the field of non-proliferation. On the 
other hand, this harmonization … constitutes the indispensable political base which enables there to 
be a reconciliation between the imperatives of their policies of non-proliferation and the need for a 
regular and equitable supply system’100. 
 
These reflections were incorporated in the Commission’s new version of Article 53, Para.2, 
setting up a procedure for the adoption of special conditions relating to intra-Community 
transfers and imports of nuclear materials. The Commission, in its revised 1984 version of 
Article 53, Para.2 proposed a new procedure with the aim of reconciling the Member States’ 
non-proliferation concerns with the general principle of the ‘unity of the market’. The 
revised proposal was thus much more Member State ‘friendly’, responding to the criticism 
of the initial 1982 Commission proposal that the delicate conditions laid down in Art. 53, 
Para.2 (1982 version) would result in insufficient involvement of the Council. Juxtaposing 
Article 53, Para.2 (1982) and Article 53, Para.2 (1984), it is obvious that the emphasis has 
changed profoundly, and in the 1984 version, it is the Council who is now in the ‘driver’s 
seat’ with regard to laying down the conditions relating to transfers of nuclear materials so 
as to satisfy the different Member States’ non-proliferation and security concerns (while at 
the same time respecting the ‘unity of the market’)101. 
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 Commission proposal of December 
1982102 
 
Amended Commission proposal of 
1984103 
Art. 53, Para.2 […] the Commission shall lay down, in a 
Regulation, conditions relating to the transfers 
of materials within the Community and to 
imports from outside the Community together 
with conditions governing the use and storage 
within the Community. […] 
[…] the Council, acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission, shall lay 
down, in a Regulation, conditions relating to 
transfers of materials between Member States 
and to imports from outside the Community. 
Art. 53, Para.3 n.a. In exceptional and unforeseen circumstances, 
any Member State may, in the absence of an 
appropriate Regulation within the meaning of 
paragraph 2 above, take whatever measures it 
considers necessary to protect its essential 
security interests … 
Art. 53, Para.4 n.a. The Member State concerned shall forthwith 
consult the other member States and the 
Commission with regard to the measures taken 
pursuant paragraph 3, so as to ensure that such 
measures are not incommensurate with the 
objectives pursued and not unduly affect the 
unity of the market. 
Art. 53, Para.5 n.a. [Possibility of Court action against improper 
use of powers provide for by paragraph 3 to be 
brought before the Court by the Commission 
or a Member State] 
 
Why did the Member States not adopt the revised Commission proposal of 1984? According 
to the Commission’s Aide-Mémoire, the problem was essentially one of an institutional 
nature featuring the problem of the distribution of competencies between national 
governments on the one hand, and Community institutions on the other. It seems that the 
Member States preferred the existing status quo to the Commission’s revised proposal and in 
the context of the intergovernmental agreement on harmonising non-proliferation policies 
(‘London Directives’) some Member States saw no urgency to amend Chapter 6. Even the 
revised Commission proposal of 1984, strongly emphasising the intergovernmental 
component, was probably too much of a commitment for some Member States that did not 
like the idea of potentially being the object of Court action or involvement by the 
Commission and other Member States (even if only consulted) on measures taken to ‘protect 
its essential security interests’104. 
 
The end of the story was unspectacular: the 1984 Commission proposal was never an object 
of discussion in the Council. It disappeared completely from the agenda. In the course of 
1985, the responsible Commissioner held meetings with French, British and German 
Member State representatives which hinted at the unlikelihood of this proposal ever getting 
the Council’s unanimous support. 
 
Furthermore, Parliament never produced a follow-up of its resolution on the Commission’s 
1984 proposal105. As the Commission Aide Mémoire of 1993 unmistakably emphasises: ‘Il 
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est à noter que le Parlement n’a pas été en mesure d’adopter un avis sur les propositions les 
plus récentes faites par la Commission en la matière’106. One part of the reasons that explain 
this ‘neglect’ was the unfavourable view vis-à-vis the Commission proposal expressed in a 
working document published by the Committee on Energy, Research and Technology 
(Rapporteur Mr Staes), which noted that the revised Commission proposal of 1984 regarding 
Chapter 6 was considered insufficient in two respects: first, because the proposal would 
result in the implementation of ‘extensive liberalization measures’ so that ‘the Agency 
would in fact be downgraded into a sort of marketing bureau and would be able to perform 
ex post facto inspections only’107. Additionally, the ‘Chapter 6 only’approach was 
considered too modest in scope: ‘There is a world of difference between the sixties and the 
present; circumstances are different. The entire Treaty should be revised; it should bear 
witness to the dynamic of man’s spirit’108. Secondly, and more importantly, in a letter to the 
Committee’s chairman Mr Michel Poniatowski, dated 16 September 1986, Ippolito 
expressed his reservations as to the renewed attempt to make the revision of Chapter 6 an 
item for the committee’s agenda: 
 
‘During the present Parliament neither the Commission nor the Member States have raised the matter 
so far. Rather, since the accident at Chernobyl, not only parliament, but also the public opinion have 
demanded stricter safeguards and more decisive action on the nuclear problem on the part of the 
Commission. In this situation, therefore, where what is called for is the application by the 
Commission, at the very least, of the rules laid down in Chapter 6 (and Chapter 7) … it seems to be 
misplaced to be considering and discussing proposals put forward by the Commission to make 
provisions in Chapter 6 … less restrictive’109. 
 
II.4.3.4. After 1984: Rethinking the Strategy for Revision or Dropping the Game? 
 
The 1984 failure to revise Chapter 6 led the Commission to re-think its strategy on bringing 
about changes in the Treaty. In 1986 the Commission drafted a document listing different 
scenarios for bringing about changes in the application of Chapter 6 and their likelihood of 
success. In this context, it was underlined that an interpretation of the original Treaty rather 
than its formal modification was probably most suited to provide a remedy for the gap 
between the de facto operation and the de jure provisions which still go back (unamended) 
to 1957. Commissioner Mosar tried to put the issue on the Commission’s agenda, however, 
two unexpected events, the Chernobyl disaster and the Transnuklear/Mol affair, forced the 
Commission to freeze discussions surrounding a possible revision, formal or informal, of 
Chapter 6110. 
 
Since then, Chapter 6 of the Euratom Treaty was more or less ‘out’ of the Community’s 
‘headlines’, and continued to dwell in its 1957-state. The Commission Aide-Mémoire 
unambiguously recognises that (at the time of writing) the supply of nuclear materials was 
ascertained through the play of the market forces, and the unity of the market is guaranteed 
because of the Member States’ agreement on the ‘London Directives’ in November 1984 in 
the EPC framework. Furthermore, the Supplies Agency continued to operate in the 
minimaliste fashion inherited from the early years of Euratom. Following the diverse failures 
to adjust Chapter 6 and the Agency’s mandate to the ‘real world’, in 1989 even the Court of 
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Auditors raised the question of the suitability of the Agency’s mandate as defined in Chapter 
6 of the Euratom Treaty.  
 
‘For a number of reasons, principally to do with the unexpectedly plentiful supply of uranium on the 
world market and the decisions of the Member States not to comply fully with the Treaty provisions, 
the Agency has not been in a position to fulfil the role foreseen for it. Instead it has played only a 
limited role in ensuring regular, equitable supply of ores and nuclear fuels to users in the 
Community, in the main restricted to giving formal approval to contracts which have already been 
signed by the contracting parties’111. 
 
The Court of Auditor’s conclusions to the 1989 assessment read: ‘In the Court’s view the 
present position of the Agency is unsatisfactory. It recommends that the following steps 
should be taken: (a) agreement to the role and responsibilities of the Agency in the 1990s; 
…’112. Up until 1995, the Court of Auditors has, on an annual basis, reiterated its 
recommendation as to the redefinition of the Agency’s principal tasks. After two years of 
‘silence’, the Court’s 1998 Report again referred to its ‘previous observations in respect of 
the Agency’s role and responsibilities’113. 
 
What developments did the 1990s bring about with regard to the provisions of Chapter 6 in 
general, and the Supplies Agency in particular? Whereas the Member States strongly (and 
the Commission more reluctantly) distanced themselves from re-inserting the call for the 
revision of Chapter 6, the 1990s, nevertheless, have brought about a number of 
developments and landmark events which had profound impacts on the role of the Supplies 
Agency and the application of Chapter 6. These developments and events will be discussed 
in the following section which will emphasise the following three points. First, one of the 
driving forces in legitimising and endorsing the Supplies Agency’s role continues to be the 
European Court of Justice. In two cases, it has filled the Agency’s role with new life. 
Secondly, the ‘new’ markets for fissile materials following the breakdown of Communism 
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have ‘enlarged’ the market for fissile 
materials. As a consequence, the Council has adopted a rule of maximum-dependency of 
nuclear supplies from a country or a region, a rule which has been interpreted favourably by 
the Court of Justice in the two cases referred to. Third, a new modus vivendi had been 
reached between the Commission and France, which had been refusing for several years to 
communicate to the Agency a vast number of its supply contracts. The ‘Memorandum of 
Understanding’ adopted in June 2000 provides for an extra-Treaty accommodation of the 
developments which have taken place throughout the past decades. 
 
II.4.4. The Euratom Supplies Agency in the Process of Redefinition 
 
From the perspective of the Supplies Agency, the 1990s proved to be, if not the ‘Golden 
Age’, at least a decade of renewed activity. For example, the Report published by the EU 
delegation of the French Senate describes the more recent events as having resulted in a 
“recent regain of interest” in the Agency and Chapter 6114. The nature and implications of 
these events will be discussed in the following sections. 
                                                 
111 Court of Auditors: ‘Report of the Court of Auditors on the accounts of the Euratom Supplies Agency in 
respect of the financial year 1989 together with the Agency’s replies’, Para.4.1, p. 4. 
112 ibid. Para.6.1, p. 6. 
113 Court of Auditors: ‘Report on the financial statements of the Euratom Supplies Agency for the financial 
year 1998 together with the Agency’s replies’, Para.5, p. 4. 
114 Délégation du Sénat pour l’Union Européenne (2000: 87). 
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II.4.4.1. Securing Community Supply: From Managing Non-existent Scarcity to Managing 
Diversification of Nuclear Supply Sources 
 
The early 1990s witnessed a massive wave of natural uranium supplies from the former 
Soviet Union (now referred to as NIS (Newly Independent States)) entering the ‘Western’ 
markets at very low prices. Until 1989, the (former) Soviet Union supplied virtually no 
natural uranium to the Community. However, at about that time, the national authorities 
allowed the export of natural uranium which came on the world market in large quantities 
and very low prices, mainly through spot sales by intermediaries115. As a response to these 
changes in the uranium market, it was claimed that the prices at which uranium from the 
former Soviet Union had been offered bore no relationship to the production costs 
considered ‘normal’ for ‘Western’ companies. In this context, it is interesting to note for the 
case presented here that, in 1992, an Ad Hoc Working Group of the Supplies Agency’s 
Advisory Committee argued that ‘Soviet producers had no significant cost advantage which 
could justify their low prices’116. This development led the Supplies Agency and the 
Commission to believe that it could ‘jeopardize the viability of producers, and hence could 
create a risk for the long-term security of supply to Community users’117. The ‘abnormally 
low prices’118 charged by the NIS or intermediaries could soon put natural uranium 
producers in severe danger and thus lead to a small number of suppliers assuming a 
dominant position in the market for uranium. The Agency’s interpretation of Article 2 (d) of 
the Treaty which calls upon the Community to ensure that all Community users receive ‘a 
regular and equitable supply’ in connection with the allegation of prices which are ‘unfair’ 
or ‘dumping’, is that these practices by the NIS are a danger to the security of supply in the 
Community. In line with the restrictions imposed by U.S. anti-dumping legislation aimed at 
limiting the import of natural uranium from the NIS, the Community announced a similar 
policy to be implemented through the exercise of the Agency’s right to refuse those 
contracts that do not correspond to the Community’s policy of diversification of supply 
sources. This policy envisages the imposition of quantitative restrictions (‘reasonable 
limits’)119 on the import of fissile materials from the NIS. These ‘reasonable limits’ 
prescribe that the amount of natural uranium an individual Community utility is entitled to 
acquire is set at 25% of its average net requirements. A figure of 15%-20% applies for 
enrichment. This policy has been supported by the Council. The so-called Corfu-
Declaration, which is a joint Council-Commission declaration adopted in 1994 and 
‘published’ only in the confidential minutes of the Corfu Council meeting, confirms the 
Agency’s policy of imposing restrictions on the import of fissile materials from the NIS. 
 
II.4.4.2. Commission and MEPs in Dispute over the Agency’s Approach towards the NIS 
 
The Commission has subsequently endorsed the Agency’s policy in the Green and White 
Papers on energy policy (1994 and 1995 respectively) as well as in the illustrative Nuclear 
                                                 
115 Blanquart (1995, Para.4) for a more elaborate statement on the price development of the market for natural 
uranium following the ‘opening’ of the Soviet Union. 
116 ibid. para.5. In addition, the U.S. Department of Commerce found that exports from six republics of the 
former Community of Independent States (CIS) were sold at dumping prices. See also Bouquet (1998: 18) 
117 ibid. para.6. 
118 International Nuclear Law Association, Nuclear Inter Jura 1995, Report of Commission 3, Helsinki, 3-7 
September 1995. 
119 Blanquart (1996: 2). 
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Programme of the Community (‘PINC’) dating back to 1997120. Furthermore, Commissioner 
Leon Brittan affirmed the Agency’s supply policy in an appearance before Parliament on 18 
November 1992 answering a question by MEP Mrs Jessica Larive who wanted to know the 
reasons and the legal basis for the Supplies Agency’s policy of quantitative restrictions. 
Commissioner Brittan’s answer reads as follows (selection)121: 
 
‘Massive imports at extremely low prices, coming from the CIS republics risk endangering the 
diversification of the Community supply sources and hence its long-term security of supply and the 
viability of its production industries. That is why the Supplies Agency, in exercising its right to 
conclude contracts, is ensuring the Community does not become over-dependent on a single source 
of supply beyond reasonable limits and that the acquisition of nuclear material from CIS republics 
takes place at prices related to those on the market; that is to say prices which reflect cost of 
production and are compatible with prices of producers in market economy countries’. 
 
Criticsm was voiced by of some MEPs as to the ‘protectionist and restrictive policies of the 
agency’ (Jesscia Larive, then ‘LDR’) or the policy of ‘keeping the price up artificially’ 
(Madron Seligmann, EPP). Furthermore, in a letter to the chairman of the Parliament’s 
Committee on Energy, Research and Trade, Claude Desama, dated 12 March 1993, Larive 
strongly criticised the protectionist activities exercised by the Agency which, according to 
her assessment, lack a legal basis. In another letter to a COGEMA representative dated 11 
March 1993, Larive and Seligmann countered the argument that the prices for uranium 
charged by the CIS did not reflect production costs: ‘We have obtained information on CIS 
production costs which show that they are extremely low, much lower than current spot 
price levels. It would appear that the sellers from the CIS are making available an important 
product at competitive prices … We in Europe should take advantage of this’. The Report 
issued by the French Senate Delegation to the European Union also hints at the fact that the 
policy adopted by the Agency and the Commisison ‘ne fait pas l’unanimité’122. The report 
states that essentially the countries which prefer a more liberal market regime, particularly 
the United Kingdom and Sweden, stand in stark contrast to more dirigiste policies such as 
pursued in France: these states dispute the Agency’s monopoly in terms of its exclusive right 
to conclude contracts still formally exercised by the Agency, and the policy of supply quotas 
for imports of fissile materials which results from the present market conditions123. 
 
However, in the view of the Agency, the ‘policy of diversification of supply sources’ and of 
‘recommending market-related prices for [N]IS supplies’ is legally based on the provisions 
of a ‘common supply policy’ set out in Article 52, Para.1 of the Treaty. In order to ensure 
the diversification of supply sources, the Agency’s ‘exclusive right to conclude contracts’ 
(Article 52, Para.2 (b)) has been revitalised through the practices described above via the 
Agency’s capacity to refuse the conclusion of contracts that do not correspond to the ‘policy 
of restriction’. And recently, the ‘approach’ advocated by the Supplies Agency and the 
Commission has been forcefully endorsed by the European Court of Justice. 
 
                                                 
120 For the ‘Green Paper for a European Union Energy Policy’ see COM(94)659 fin., Para. 195. For the White 
Paper ‘An Energy Policy for the European Union’, see COM(95)682 fin., point 4.3.1.2. For the ‘PINC’, see 
COM(97)401 fin. 
121 Question No 50, H-1087/92, Debates of the European Parliament, 18/11/1992, No 3-424, p. 183. 
122 Délégation du Sénat pour l’Union Européenne (2000: 87). 
123 ibid. 
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II.4.4.3. Winning the Legal Battle: ECJ Endorsement of Agency’s Discretion in KLE and 
ENU. 
In essence, the Court has declared the establishment of the quantitative restriction set up by 
the Agency and the Commission in conjunction with the Council to be in conformity with 
the Euratom Treaty. In the KLE (Kernkraftwerk Lippe-Ems) judgement the right of the 
Commission (Supplies Agency) to refuse the signing of contracts was upheld if contractual 
provisions violate these quantitative restrictions124. Details follow: 
 
A heavily contested decision by the Supplies Agency, concerning the refusal to sign a 
supply contract between KLE, a nuclear power station operator in Lower Saxony, and 
British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL) in 1993 triggered legal activity. The contract signed between 
the two parties was silent as to the place of origin of the uranium to be supplied. After the 
Agency received the contract, it asked KLE and BNFL for information concerning the origin 
of the nuclear material. In December 1993, BNFL informed the Agency that the uranium 
would come from the CIS, probably Russia. The Agency replied, in line with its policy on 
‘diversification of supply sources’, that the contract submitted by KLE might make it too 
dependent on uranium of CIS origin. The Supplies Agency considered the conclusion of the 
contract inappropriate and asked the parties to submit their comments before taking a final 
decision. KLE referred the matter to the Commission pursuant to Art. 53, Para.2 arguing that 
the Agency had failed to act. The Commission, in two subsequent decisions directed to 
KLE, rejected the requests made by KLE on the Agency’s failure to act and the disregard of 
the time limit within which the Agency has to act, in its Decisions 94/95/Euratom of 4 
February 1994 and 94/285/Euratom of 21 February 1994125. KLE instituted proceedings 
before the Court of First Instance against the two Commission Decisions seeking their 
annulment126. 
 
The Court of First Instance in its judgement of 25 February 1997 declared as legal the 
Supplies Agency’s action to refuse the conclusion of a supply contract for natural uranium 
from the NIS. According to Article 61, Para.1 of the Treaty, the ‘Agency shall meet all 
orders unless prevented from so doing by legal material obstacles’. In the KLE case, the 
Court of First Instance identified three legal obstacles to concluding the contract which were 
upheld by the ECJ’s judgement in 1999. 
 
As to the first obstacle, the policy of diversification of supply sources set a maximum level 
of dependence from a single supplier country or region (here: NIS). The Court argued that 
the Agency could exercise discretion in order to bar certain imports of uranium which would 
reduce the diversification of external sources of supply. The Court thus ‘admitted’, in line 
with the Agency’s position elaborated in 1991/1992, that security of supply could be 
jeopardised if NIS imports were permitted in unlimited quantities and were to replace 
traditional supplies. Part of the ECJ’s judgement reads: 
 
‘In order to ensure geographical diversification of external sources of supply, the Agency has a 
discretion – exercising its exclusive right to conclude contracts for the supply of ores and other 
nuclear fuels so as to ensure reliability of supplies in accordance with the principles of equal access 
                                                 
124 Judgement of the Court of First Instance, Joint Cases T-149/94 [1997] and T-181/94 Kernkraftwerk Lippe-
Ems (KLE) v.Commission, [1997] ECR II-161, and Judgement of the Court of Justice, Case C-161/97 P 
Kernkraftwerk Lippe-Ems (KLE) v.Commission’ [1999] ECR I-2057. 
125 See Decision 94/95/Euratom, OJ L48, 19/02/1994, p. 45 and Decision 94/285/Euratom, OJ L122, 
17/05/1994, p. 36. 
126 op cit Footnote 124. 
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to resources, in conformity with the task conferred on it by the Treaty – to bar certain imports of 
uranium which would reduce such diversification’127. 
 
With regard to the second obstacle, the Commission submitted that the supply system 
established by the Euratom Treaty aims at ensuring that nuclear materials are imported at 
market-related prices. The contract between BNFL and KLE was concluded at a price that 
was even lower than the average spot market price and thus did not comply with the rule that 
supplies are to take place at market-related prices128. 
 
The third legal obstacle to concluding the contract was derived from the obligation to 
ensure equal access to fissile material resources and the therefore prevent one user from 
being given a privileged position in relation to competitors. In order to guarantee equal 
access to resources pursuant to Article 52, Para.1 of the Treaty, the Court considered 
justified the application of a permissible threshold of dependence, fixed by reference to the 
state of the market at a maximum percentage of individual users’ consumption. The 
judgement reads: 
 
‘The Agency, within the bounds of its broad discretion, fixed a permissible degree of dependence at 
a maximum of 25%, taking account inter alia of the existing long-term production capacity of the 
CIS and of the fact that that represented some 25% of world production’129. 
 
Following KLE’s appeal against the judgement of the Court of First Instance, the ECJ 
examined only the first obstacle owing to the fact that each of the legal obstacles was 
sufficient to support the Agency’s decision of non-conclusion of the contract between KLE 
and BNFL. The ECJ upheld the reasoning adopted by the Court of First Instance and 
therefore, dismissed KLE’s apppeal130. Hence, the KLE case demonstrated that the 
Agency’s signature under a supply contract is not merely a formality. The policy of supply 
diversification proclaimed by the Commission, agreed upon by the Member States and 
endorsed by the Court has developed into an important if not the all-important instrument of 
the Supplies Agency, following the recent developments on the world market for nuclear 
supplies. With the help of the Court, the Supplies Agency was thus able to re-interpret its 
mandate and to creatively assume competencies the Treaty founders, departing from the idea 
of supply scarcity, had not remotely envisaged.  
 
In the so-called ENU case, the Empresa Nacional de Urânio, a small-scale producer of 
natural uranium in Portugal, had been facing the problem of how to plan its output for the 
next several years. On 15 September 1995, the Court of First Instance issued its judgement 
in the case brought by ENU against the Commission131. The purpose of the proceedings 
launched by ENU was to ensure a ‘Community preference’ for the Portugese uranium 
production, even if offered at higher prices. Furthermore, ENU challenged the legality of the 
‘simplified procedure’ which, as described above, allows direct negotiations between the 
users and the suppliers of their choice, subject to the Agency’s co-signature132. The Court of 
First Instance held that the Treaty does not guarantee special treatment of Community 
                                                 
127 Judgement of the Court, Case C-161/97 Kernkraftwerk Lippe-Ems (KLE) v.Commission’ [1999] ECR I-
2057, Para. 92. 
128 ibid. Para.96-101. 
129 ibid. Para. 103. 
130 See also Euratom Supplies Agency, Annual Report 1999, 
 http://europe.eu.int/comm/Euratom/docum_en.html 
131 Judgement of the Court of First Instance, Joint Cases T-458/93 and T-523/93 ENU vs. Commission [1995] 
ECR II-2459. 
132 Blanquart (1996: 7). 
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producers and that, secondly, the ‘simplified procedure’ is in conformity with the system 
governing supplies as laid down in the Treaty. The Court of First Instance thus dismissed the 
claims brought to the Court by ENU. But what is of more interest to this chapter are the 
general implications of this judgement for the role ascribed to the Supplies Agency. The 
judgement of the ECJ of 11 March 1997133, upholding the judgement and reasoning of the 
Court of First Instance, states that Chapter 6 of the Treaty does not contain any provision 
that obliges the Supplies Agency to guarantee the utilisation of Community production of 
ores. On the contrary, since the procedure for balancing supply against demand applies not 
only to supplies from the Community but also, pursuant to Article 65 in conjunction with 
Article 60 of the Treaty, to applications from users and contracts between users and the 
Agency relating to supplies from outside the Community, no distinction may be made 
according to the origin of the products. Consequently, the Agency ‘is therefore not 
obliged to give preferential treatment to the disposal of Community production, in so far as 
the supply scheme established by the Treaty does not guarantee Community preference for 
producers’134. 
 
Consequently, these legal challenges to the Agency’s mandate and policy may sound 
surprising in the light of the marginal role the Agency used to play in securing Community 
supply, as this was, more or less, an affair that was resolved via market forces. With the 
Commission and Agency pursuing a policy of diversification of supply sources, the Agency 
is the only Community body in the energy domain that happens to be endowed with 
relatively far-reaching discretionary powers that allow, for example, the setting of 
quantitative import restrictions to fissile materials from the NIS. The Commission White 
Paper ‘An Energy Policy for the European Union’ mirrors the Community’s variable 
competencies with regard to managing the Community’s external dependency on energy: 
whereas no Community supply policy exists for managing the supply of oil or gas, 
(although, for example, the dependency on Russian gas creates increasing concern) in the 
nuclear energy sector the Euratom Treaty explicitly calls for a Community supply policy: 
‘… assuring security of supply is one of the fundamental objectives of the Euratom Treaty’. 
Thus, the Supplies Agency, together with the Commission, were given the necessary 
instruments to ‘manage external dependency’135. 
 
In this light the Court, in both the ENU and KLE cases, ruled that where decisions 
concerning nuclear policy and the securing of nuclear supplies are at stake, the Agency has a 
broad discretion when exercising its powers. Reiterating the Treaty, the Court thus stated 
that the Agency plays an essential role in the common supply policy and that it is the task of 
the Agency to guarantee one of the essential aims which the Treaty has assigned to the 
Community, namely the reliability of supply pursuant to Article 2 (d)136. 
                                                 
133 Judgement of the Court, Case C-357/95 P ENU vs. Commission [1997] ECR I-1329. 
134 ibid. Para.23. 
135 Commission of the European Communities: White Paper ‘An Energy Policy for the European Union’, 
COM(95)682 fin., point 4.3.1.2. 
136 For a summary of the KLE and ENU cases and their implications for the Agency’s role see Euratom 
Supplies Agency, Annual Reports, 1997, 1999, http://europe.eu.int/comm/Euratom/docum_en.html 
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II.4.4.4. The ‘Millennium-Solution’? The ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ between the 
Commission and France 
 
With the Agency’s role ‘confirmed’ (according to the view of the Agency itself) or 
‘(re)vitalised’, one of the outstanding issues was the ‘special relationship’ between France 
and the Agency with regard to the French handling of supply contracts. Although EDF 
submits a considerable number of its supply contracts to the Agency (i.e. direct contracts 
with extra-Community suppliers including the those of the NIS), there are different types of 
contracts that continue to pose problems, including contracts on enrichment through 
processing, contracts between ‘linked’ enterprises (‘entreprises liées’) such as between EDF 
and COGEMA/Eurodif, and purchases by COGEMA. With the review of Chapter 6 still 
pending (it has to be recalled that the Commission’s 1984 revised proposal for revision is 
still before the Council awaiting debate …), the Commission and France set up a working 
group aimed at adjusting the provisions of Chapter 6 to the ‘new’ circumstances. However, 
the approach chosen this time was not one of fully-fledged revision, but rather an 
incremental approach seeking to reach agreement on the application of Chapter 6 on an 
extra-Treaty basis through some sort of ‘bilateral’ inter-institutional agreement. As a result 
of the working group’s deliberations, a document entitled ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ 
was elaborated in 1998 by the Supplies Agency as a basis of the discussions between the 
Commission and France. The document is confidential and is not subject to disclosure. 
 
According to a ‘Note’ of 15 January 1999 circulated by France to the other Member States, 
the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ provides for a set of criteria that shall in an exhaustive 
and precise manner, deal with all the contingencies that can be envisaged for the conclusion 
of different types of contracts. Different procedures for signature are provided (such as 
‘signature’, ‘signature partielle’, ‘communication des éléments contractuels’) that are 
applied to different types of contracts all of which are enumerated in the French ‘Note’. The 
‘Memorandum of Understanding’ entered into force after an exchange of letters between 
France (represented by the Sécretaire d’Etat à l’Industrie, Christian Pierret) and the 
Commission (represented by the Commissioner of DG TREN, Loyola de Palacio). With the 
response by the Commissioner to the French government’s letter, the agreement is in force 
as of June 2000. 
 
With the adoption of the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ a means has been found flexibly 
to adjust the provisions set out in Chapter 6 so as to make their application ‘acceptable’ for 
France which had, hitherto, only rudimentarily applied the provisions of the Chapter. Thus, a 
modus vivendi has been found between the Commission/the Supplies Agency and France 
that constitutes an informal reinterpretation of Chapter 6 (since any formal attempt to revise 
Chapter 6 would open a ‘Pandora's box’ releasing the uncontrollable ‘threat’ of a fully-
fledged Treaty revision that would be unacceptable to France). The French Government has 
distributed the ‘Note’ to the other Member States in order to outline the ‘new bilateral 
system’ suggesting its application on an ‘experimental’ basis. 
 
II.4.5. Conclusion 
 
For a number of decades, the Euratom Supplies Agency, with its small group of dedicated 
staff, has lived a quiet life, seeing the initial conditions that led to its creation in the mid-50s 
fade away in the context of abundant supply of fissile materials. Where and when it was 
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possible, the Commission sought to adjust to the changing circumstances of the Supplies 
Agency’s environment. With reference to the Agency’s ‘exclusive right to conclude 
contracts’ spelled out in Article 52 of the Treaty, the ‘simplified procedure’ of 1960 and its 
revision in 1975 suggest that where the institutional conditions permitted adjustment to 
‘reality’, it was exercised in a flexible manner. On the other hand, this did not prevent some 
Member States, France in the first place, from disregarding the obligation to submit supply 
contracts to the Agency. Apart from the challenges the Agency’s ‘exclusive right to 
conclude contracts’ was facing, the Treaty signatories never applied other provisions central 
to Chapter 6. For example, the Agency has certainly not been allowed by any of the Member 
States to exercise one of its most important tasks, its ‘right of option’ of fissile materials. As 
regards the Agency’s role in determining the prices pursuant to Article 67, it has to be stated 
that the Agency never got to exercise this function137.  
 
On a number of occasions, the Commission, pursuant to Article 52, Para.2 has proposed a 
revision of Chapter 6 of the Treaty. After the last attempt in 1984 which failed to produce an 
outcome due to the unanimity requirement in the Council, it took almost a decade to re-
launch the debate surrounding the application of Chapter 6. 
 
In the European Parliament MEPs Madron Seligmann and Jessica Larive occasionally 
brought the issue of the application of Chapter 6 back on the agenda. In questions put before 
the Commission and the Council, Mrs Larive asked the President-in-Office of the Council 
whether it was desirable, in the context of a policy of non-proliferation, to relieve the CIS 
republics of their military stocks of natural and enriched uranium by purchasing this material 
as a fuel for power stations in the Community138. During the same exchange of views, Mr 
Seligmann asked the Council about the general role of the Supplies Agency in the context of 
the restrictions imposed on nuclear materials from the former Soviet Union: 
 
‘… [I]n Chapter 6 the Euratom Supplies Agency had to provide a regular supply of uranium for the 
Community but that was when uranium was in short supply. Today there is no shortage, and the 
agency now seems to have adopted a policy of keeping prices high although it is not authorized to do 
that in any of the clauses. Does the Council consider the agency has really outlived its purpose? 
[…]’. 
 
The reply by the President-in-Office of the Council read: 
 
‘Chapter 6 of the Euratom Treaty does still apply and revision of the chapter is not a matter 
that is under discussion or agreed at present’139. 
 
At the same session, Mrs Larive questioned the Commission (represented by Sir Leon 
Brittan) on the issue of import restrictions vis-à-vis the former Soviet republics (see above). 
In the Commission’s replies the role of the Agency as prime instrument to secure regular 
and equitable Community supply is affirmed and its role in promoting a policy of supply 
diversification justified, even if this implies the imposition of quantitative restrictions to 
nuclear materials stemming from a certain region140. 
 
                                                 
137 ‘Ippolito Report’, Part B, Annex II. Session doc number 1-0228/84. Ref doc noc 1-1164/82, COM/82/0732. 
OJ C330 16 December 1982, p.004 (PE 84.748 final). 
138 Question No 4, H-1088/92, Debates of the European Parliament, 18/11/1992, No 3-424, p. 170. 
139 Question No 4, H-1088/92, Debates of the European Parliament, 18/11/1992, No 3-424, p. 170. 
140 Question No 50, H-1087/92, Debates of the European Parliament, 18/11/1992, No 3-424, p. 183. See also 
question No 95, H-0158/93, Debates of the European Parliament, 10/03/1993, No 3-429, p. 190. 
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Yet, in a letter from 9 November 1993 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on 
Energy, Research and Technology, Claude Desama, Commissioner Matutes referred to 
internal Commission work being done on the issue of Chapter 6 revision. These internal 
discussions did not, apparently, produce tangible results. Furthermore, the ‘non-inclusion’ of 
the Euratom Treaty on the agendas for the Maastricht, Amsterdam and the Nice summits, 
although regularly advocated for by the Parliament’s Committee on Industry, External 
Trade, Research and Energy, suggests that Euratom Treaty revision seems not to be a 
preferred option by a large number of Member States. However, instead of waiting for the 
‘big bangs’ of Treaty revision the approach adopted by France and the Commission in 
drafting and adopting a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ so as to find a modus vivendi on 
the application of Chapter 6 (nota bene: certain aspects of Chapter 6), seems to be more 
likely to produce results that do not require Treaty revision and the opening of ‘Pandora’s 
box’. 
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II.5. Nuclear Safeguards within the Framework of the Euratom 
Treaty 
 
II.5.1. Introduction 
 
Article 77 of the Euratom Treaty reads as follows: 
 
‘In accordance with the provisions of this Chapter, the Commission shall satisfy itself that, 
in the territories of Member States, (a) ores, source materials and special fissile materials 
[i.e. Plutonium -239 + Uranium -235 - author’s note] are not diverted from their intended 
uses as declared by the users,’ 
 
So the first (and, to those unfamiliar with the Euratom Treaty, the most surprising) thing to 
note is that ‘Safeguards’ has got nothing whatsoever to do with nuclear safety. Rather it 
concerns the systems put in place to prevent or detect the diversion of special fissile 
materials (essentially Plutonium-239 and Uranium-235) from their ‘declared use’. In other 
words, it concerns the ‘accountancy’ systems for the control of nuclear materials in the civil 
cycle that could be diverted to military uses - i.e. the covert construction of nuclear 
weapons.  
 
The Euratom Safeguards system is, as stated above, designed to prevent the diversion of 
civil fissile materials to ‘uses not declared by their owners’. This peculiar phrase is 
universally interpreted to mean ‘the production of nuclear weapons’. At least this is 
unambiguously the interpretation that the Euratom Safeguards staff put upon it. (Otherwise 
if owners declared that their intention was to make such materials available to terrorists, this 
would be quite in order, and Euratom Safeguards would have to accept this as a declared 
use, which is plainly ridiculous.) Chapter 7 thus has some of the elements of a prototype 
European Non-Proliferation Treaty, although others argue that its primary role was/is to 
ensure ‘good housekeeping’ by the operators of (civil) nuclear facilities. The original 
purposes of the Safeguards chapter are often assumed to have been (a) to offer a guarantee to 
the USA (as the source of most of Europe’s fissile materials in the 1950s) that fissile 
material of US origin (described, in Euratom terminology, as ‘US -obligated’) would always 
be ‘tracked’ to ensure that it was only used for ‘declared’ (i.e. civil) uses; and (b) to prevent 
Germany from secretly developing a nuclear weapons programme: the requirement for 
declared use would have obliged an explicit decision by Germany to follow this path, (as 
France subsequently did), and Safeguards inspections would detect any covert attempt so to 
do. 
 
Whereas in some areas, the Euratom Treaty simply created the legal framework to ensure 
normative harmonisation, co-ordinated actions and regular supply; in the domain of 
safeguards however, (and in total contrast to the domain of nuclear reactor safety) the 
Member States agreed to submit nuclear materials in their civil nuclear activities to the rules 
and control of an independent, supranational authority141. The Member States have accepted 
that this authority - Euratom Safeguards -should have direct contact with their nuclear 
operators.  
 
                                                 
141 In practice, this task is performed by the EURATOM Safeguards Directorate (based in Luxembourg) which 
is administratively attached (at present) to DG TREN of the Commission of the European Communities. 
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II.5.2. Euratom Safeguards in Practice 
 
To enable the Commission to fulfil its tasks, the Treaty provides specific means in its 
Chapter 7, which can be summarised as follows: 
 an obligation for any operator to submit to Euratom Safeguards the Basic Technical 
Characteristics of its installation and intended activities, 
 an obligation for any operator to have an Accountancy System for all nuclear 
materials, 
 the right for Euratom Safeguards to make inspections at any time in any installation, 
 the right for Euratom to store any excess of special fissile material when necessary, 
 the right for Euratom to impose sanctions, and finally, 
 the obligation for Euratom to issue a specific regulation precising the requirements for 
the operator’s accountancy system. 
 
To this end, and to fulfil other requirements of the Treaty, two regulations were adopted by 
the Council in 1959, and inspections commenced around that time. These regulations 
provided the legal framework for the application of EURATOM safeguards until 1976, 
when they were replaced by Euratom Regulation 3227/76, which is still in force today142. 
 
Euratom Regulation 3227/76 essentially defines the obligations of operators of plants storing 
or handling nuclear materials, the most important being: 
 
   the operator has to provide Euratom with the Basic Technical Characteristics 
(BTC) of the installation concerned, by following a detailed questionnaire. The 
information required includes an account of the arrangements for handling nuclear 
material, a description of the nuclear material, and a description of the system for 
nuclear material accountancy and control. Precision and accuracy of all 
determinations and measurements must be established and submitted to Euratom as 
part of the BTC. Any changes to the basic technical characteristics must be 
communicated to Euratom, 
 the outline of the operator’s programme of activities must be notified on a regular 
basis, 
 the operator must establish and maintain a system of nuclear material accounts 
when he starts to handle such material. Features of this material accounting system 
are that all parts of the installation in which nuclear material may be found have to be 
allocated to one out of a series of Material Balance Areas (MBA) defined by 
Euratom after concertation with the operator. For each MBA, Regulation 3227 says 
that the accounts must record the details of all material which enters and leaves the 
area including quantity, type, composition of material; safeguarding obligations and, 
of course, the type of inventory change. Changes to the inventory other than receipts 
or shipments, for example nuclear transformation by irradiation, must also be 
recorded. Separate accounts must be maintained for plutonium, highly enriched 
uranium, low enriched uranium, natural uranium, depleted uranium and thorium. The 
material must also involve taking a physical inventory from time to time (typically 
once a year) the results of which should be reported to Euratom, 
 the intention to carry out a physical inventory and the programme for doing so must 
be notified, 
 certain transfers, imports and exports of nuclear material must be notified in 
advance, 
                                                 
142  OJ L 363, 31/12/76, p. 1 - 57 
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 in addition to the above obligations, the Regulation provides for a 
derogation/exemption regime in a very limited number of cases, specific provisions 
for ore producers, carriers and intermediaries. Finally, Regulation 3227 provides for 
specific provisions only applicable in Nuclear Weapon States. 
 
On the other hand, one thing is not addressed in Regulation 3227: the inspection criteria or 
activities, which can freely be defined and adapted to particular circumstances by the 
Euratom Safeguards Directorate. 
 
In parallel with the signature of the Euratom Treaty, and the establishment of its Safeguards 
provisions, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957. The 
aim was to disseminate the benefits of nuclear energy whilst ensuring that civil nuclear 
material remained in peaceful nuclear programmes through submission to international 
safeguards control. The system of safeguards adopted initially by the IAEA, mainly outside 
Europe, was limited in scope, having been conceived primarily for application to reactors, 
and did not imply that a State had to submit all its nuclear activities to international 
safeguards. Later, a more complete system of control was developed - at least for the Non 
Nuclear Weapon States - and materialised through the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
nuclear weapons (NPT) and subsequent arrangements. The NPT was opened for signature in 
1968, and has now, inter alia, been ratified by all the Member States of the EU. 
 
The Non-Proliferation Treaty gives a Safeguards role to an Inspectorate created within the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, based in Vienna. Crucially, however, such Inspectors 
do not carry out a significant level of inspection within the five States which officially 
possess nuclear weapons - in particular they do not carry out detailed inspections of 
reprocessing plants in these States, even though these produce most of the fissile materials. 
The IAEA does not do so because such States have dedicated military facilities which are 
immune to inspection, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty recognised that there was no point 
in inspecting civil facilities in these countries, since if the State concerned chose to break the 
Treaty provisions, it could divert fissile material to whoever it liked whenever it liked under 
the cloak of military secrecy. The 1958 NPT recognises the asymmetry between Nuclear 
weapon states and non-weapon states – indeed it seeks to freeze this status quo, for better or 
worse. Thus the IAEA has never seriously inspected the Nuclear weapon states – since they 
could effectively do what they want with their own military material. The argument, 
especially, is that there is no point in inspecting an alcoholic’s cupboards to see if he/she has 
any alcohol in them – you know that they do. Moreover there is no point in seeking to 
control what they do with the alcohol in their ‘civil’ cupboard, if you have no control 
whatsoever of how, what and when goes into their ‘military’ cupboards, or what and when 
comes out of them and where it goes to. 
 
Euratom Safeguards - or rather the Euratom Treaty - does not accept this logic, since it now 
devotes over 70% of its resources to inspecting the two major sources of fissile materials in 
the Community - the reprocessing plants at Sellafield in the UK, and at Cap le Hague in 
France. Euratom Safeguards argues that in so-doing it is simply following the ‘equal pain for 
all’ principle - since the Treaty does not differentiate between the inspection regimes to be 
implemented in the Nuclear Weapon States (UK and France), and the rest.  
 
Both Nuclear Weapon States of course have military production facilities, and stocks of Pu-
239 and U-235, which are wholly outside Euratom’s control, since Art 84 para 3 (Euratom) 
states that: 
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‘The safeguards may not extend to materials intended to meet defence requirements which 
are in the course of being specially processed for this purpose or which after being so 
processed, are, in accordance with an operational plan, placed or stored in a military 
establishment’. 
 
Thus Euratom safeguards inspectors may not carry out inspections during military 
campaigns conducted at ‘mixed’ facilities such as Sellafield’s Magnox fuel reprocessing 
plant, or part of Cap Le Hague – or Capenhurst – or at all at any of the dedicated military 
facilities such as Aldermaston & Burghfield in the UK. It seems very unlikely that 
inspection rights will ever be given by Nuclear weapon states to all their military nuclear 
facilities, so the question which must be asked whether there is any purpose to be served in 
inspecting the civil cycle of such states? (Especially when it consumes 2/3 of your budget 
money which might be much better spent elsewhere.) 
 
A further complication is that the Treaty does not and cannot prevent a Nuclear weapon state 
changing the designation of fissile material. Thus, according to Euratom regulations, a 
Nuclear weapon state can, at short notice, inform Euratom Safeguards that these X kilos of 
Pu-239, which had been declared as civil material, are to be re-designated as military 
material. Thus state condoned ‘diversion’ is perfectly legitimate. Given that BNFL and 
COGEMA are both state owned, it might be questioned whether it is worth devoting so 
much effort to assuring that material declared civil ‘for the moment’ remains as such.  
 
If, however, it is agreed that there is a continuing case for the application of Euratom 
Safeguards in the UK and France, then it remains to be debated whether or not it is 
appropriate (as Euratom Safeguards has chosen to do) to use the criterion of timeliness in its 
inspection regimes in these States. (Timeliness concerns the minimum time-periods in which 
a diversion could take place, a concept whose use in Nuclear Weapon States has sometimes 
been criticised. It is the application of this principle which requires continuous and 
expensive monitoring of Sellafield and Cap-le-Hague, because of their huge through-put of 
nuclear materials. The IAEA, on the other hand, just concerns itself with monitoring input 
and output materials from such plants, leaving the actual re-processing operation as an 
unexplored ‘black box’). 
 
One other issue remains to be addressed. Given the ‘maximalist’ interpretation of the 
requirements of Chapter 7 by the Euratom Safeguards Directorate up to now, a decision was 
taken to build and man two on-site laboratories for testing nuclear materials: one at 
Sellafield, and one at Cap-le Hague. These are two of the most expensive facilities owned by 
the European Commission. They duplicate the existing analytical laboratories operated at 
these sites by BNFL and Cogema respectively. Clearly a point for discussion is why it was 
not sufficient simply to monitor and control the analyses conducted in these operator-run 
(and very highly regarded) laboratories. 
 
 It is arguably possible to interpret the Treaty as requiring Euratom Safeguards to simply 
audit and monitor the safeguards systems put in place by the national authorities, to ensure 
that they meet Euratom Treaty requirements; but in fact a much more ‘maximalist’ 
interpretation has been followed, in which Euratom Safeguards now either duplicates, or 
entirely replaces, national safeguards systems. In order so to do, its staff and resources have 
grown substantially over the last 25 or so years. It should also be noted that Euratom 
Safeguards is a regional safeguards system; but there is also an international (indeed global) 
safeguards system (and inspectorate), operated by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
in Vienna, under the auspices of the 1958 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and which all the 
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EU Member States are party to. Some of these also operate in addition their own national 
safeguards systems. 
 
The most recent ‘annual’ report from Euratom Safeguards, entitled ‘Operation of the 
Euratom Safeguards Office in 1999-2000’, (COM (2001) 436 final) was published on 26 
July 2001. With respect to its future activities, DG TREN has established a group of ‘three 
wise men’ to examine: 
 the task of the Office and its operating targets,  
 working methods and inspection procedures,  
 the relationship between resources and activities.  
 
The group comprises:  
 Henning Christophersen, former Vice-President of the European Commission, and 
former Danish Foreign Minister ;  
 Bruno Pellaud, Chairman of the ‘Swiss Nuclear Association’, former Deputy 
Director General of the AIEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), responsible for 
Nuclear Safeguards; and  
 Michel Eliat, former Director General of ABB Belgique. 
 
The European Energy Foundation’s Newsletter of September 2001143 reported a recent 
speech by the Director of Euratom Safeguards, which he delivered at the 23rd ESARDA 
symposium (European Safeguards R&D Association), in which he is reported as having 
posed the following questions: 
 
First, what will be the impact of the accession of Central and Eastern European candidate 
countries to the Community, in the safeguards area? These countries have their own 
safeguards system. Why should the Commission take over? This problem has already been 
encountered in the frame of the discussions about the implementation of the IAEA 
Additional Protocol. In the Council of Ministers, EU Member States were divided about the 
sharing of responsibilities associated with such implementation. It is not surprising that 
those who were in favour of a transfer to the Commission are the original Member States, 
and those who didn’t agree to it were the newcomers. The problem remains to be solved. 
Who will do what and at which cost? 
 
Second question: how might the new IAEA Integrated Safeguards concepts influence 
Euratom safeguards goals and practices? If it allows the IAEA to reduce inspection efforts in 
countries with high safeguards credentials, why should Euratom not reduce its own efforts 
and equally make savings? Two divergent interpretations still exist here. Either the IAEA 
reduction of efforts will rely entirely on the full implementation of national/regional 
safeguards systems or similar reduction at regional or national levels will take place. 
Safeguards control being intrusive by nature, how will the operators react according to one 
or the other interpretation? 
 
Third question: is it right to spend more than two thirds of the resources available in only 
two out of fifteen EU countries? This is especially important when it is noted that in these 
countries material for civilian and military applications are stored at the same place. Which 
is the level of guarantee achieved in terms of non-proliferation, despite the price we pay? 
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Fourth question: will new technologies help to alleviate the existing budgetary constraints? 
Remote monitoring systems are very promising, but will the technology be reliable and 
politically acceptable? Will the cost remain attractive in view of the rather small and specific 
equipment markets? Will then confidentiality of the data transmitted on line, remain 
properly protected? 
 
Fifth question: why should the safeguards controls, world wide, be concentrated where they 
seem easy and not where they are desirable? An interesting alternative would be a sharing of 
responsibilities with regional safeguards system, in reliable areas of the world. They would 
take the original responsibility and of course report to the IAEA. The UN would, as a 
consequence, be able to concentrate its efforts elsewhere in the world where control is 
desperately needed. 
 
Final question: knowing that any insurance scheme has a price, how much will the taxpayer 
still be prepared to spend on safeguards? In view of the shortcomings of the present systems, 
will the public also accept that the cost of a democratic control ensuring security in the 
nuclear fields is not fully paid by the industrial operators for which the safeguards control is 
becoming a kind of a rubber stamp certifying a sound behaviour144? 
 
It thus seems that the Euratom Safeguards Office is now asking, perhaps for the first time. 
the kind of questions which have concerned Parliamentary observers for some time, and 
which were outlined in this chapter.  
 
II.6. Property Ownership. 
 
This chapter is so short, and so remarkable, that it is worth quoting here in full. It should be 
noted that the term ‘special fissile materials’, which is used throughout the Euratom Treaty, 
refers, essentially, to the fissile isotopes of Thorium, Uranium, and Plutonium. It is also 
important to note that the body which was charged in the Treaty with implementing these 
provisions, is the Euratom Supplies Agency, established by Chapter 6, which is analysed in 
detail elsewhere in this study. 
 
‘CHAPTER 8 
PROPERTY OWNERSHIP 
Article 86  
Special fissile materials shall be the property of the Community.  
 
The Community’s right of ownership shall extend to all special fissile materials which are produced 
or imported by a Member State, a person or an undertaking and are subject to the safeguards 
provided for in Chapter 7.  
 
Article 87 
Member States, persons or undertakings shall have the unlimited right of use and consumption of 
special fissile materials which have properly come into their possession, subject to the obligations 
imposed on them by this Treaty, in particular those relating to safeguards, the right of option 
conferred on the Agency and health and safety.  
 
Article 88 
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The Agency shall keep a special account in the name of the Community, called ‘Special Fissile 
Materials Financial Account' .  
 
Article 89 
1. In the Special Fissile Materials Financial Account:  
 
a. the value of special fissile materials left in the possession of or put at the disposal of a 
Member State, person or undertaking shall be credited to the Community and debited to that 
Member State, person or undertaking;  
 
b. the value of special fissile materials which are produced or imported by a Member State, 
person or undertaking and become the property of the Community shall be debited to the 
Community and credited to that Member State, person or undertaking. A similar entry shall 
be made when a Member State, person or undertaking restores to the Community special 
fissile materials previously left in the possession of or put at the disposal of that State, person 
or undertaking. 
  
2. Variations in value affecting the quantities of special fissile material shall be expressed for 
accounting purposes in such a way as not to give rise to any loss or gain to the Community. Any loss 
or gain shall be borne by or accrue to the holder.  
 
3. Balances arising from the transactions referred to above shall become payable forthwith upon the 
request of the creditor.  
 
4. Where the Agency undertakes transactions for its own account, it shall, for the purposes of this 
Chapter, be deemed to be an undertaking.  
 
Article 90 
Where new circumstances so require, the provisions of this Chapter relating to the Community’s 
right of ownership may, at the request of a Member State or of the Commission, be adjusted by the 
Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European 
Parliament. The Commission shall examine any such request made by a Member State.  
 
Article 91 
The system of ownership applicable to all objects, materials and assets which are not vested in the 
Community under this Chapter shall be determined by the law of each Member State’. 
 
 
 
The distance between these provisions and everyday reality can be gleaned from the 
following Parliamentary Oral Question to the Commission, and the response to it145: 
 
“Question No. 59, by Mr Ford (H-118/88) 
 
Subject: Euratom Treaty, Articles 88 and 89 
 
Have these two articles been implemented, and in particular does the "Special Fissile Materials 
Financial Account" exist? 
 
If the account does exist, where is it available, and if not, why not? 
 
Answer 
Articles 88 and 89 of the Euratom Treaty have never been implemented and there is no "Special 
Fissile Materials Financial Account.” 
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This situation, which has existed since the Euratom Treaty came into force, is the result of decisions 
taken by the Council and Commission having regard to the circumstances prevailing at the time 
when the Euratom Supplies Agency was set up in the period 1958-60. 
 
The absence of the special fissile materials financial account has not caused any practical difficulties 
and no Member State has asked for this account to be drawn up. 
 
The Safeguards Directorate in Luxembourg does, of course, keep a complete account, from the data 
it has, of all the special fissile materials present in the Community at any time’. 
 
There is however at least one anomaly here. Only in Chapter 7 (Safeguards) is there an 
exclusion clause specifically exempting military nuclear materials from inspection and 
control: the rest of the Euratom Treaty is completely silent on the vexed question of whether 
it applies, or not, to military nuclear activities. Thus the ownership provisions of Chapter 8, 
it could be argued, must indeed include all nuclear special fissile materials of military origin 
as well as those in the civil cycle. Unsurprisingly, this is not the interpretation which the 
Commission has generally chosen to follow. 
 
II.7. International Agreements under the Euratom Treaty 
 
II.7.1. Legal Basis 
 
The legal basis for most international agreements which have been negotiated and 
concluded within the framework of the Euratom Treaty is Article 101 of that Treaty, which 
reads as follows: 
 
‘Article 101 
The Community may, within the limits of its powers and jurisdiction, enter into obligations by 
concluding agreements or contracts with a third State, an international organization or a national of 
a third State.  
 
Such agreements or contracts shall be negotiated by the Commission in accordance with the 
directives of the Council: they shall be concluded by the Commission with the approval of the 
Council, which shall act by a qualified majority.  
 
Agreements or contracts whose implementation does not require action by the Council and can be 
effected within the limits of the relevant budget shall, however, be negotiated and concluded solely 
by the Commission; the Commission shall keep the Council informed’. 
 
There is no mention of the European Parliament in this article (or indeed any other 
Community Institution or body apart from the Council and the Commission), whereas of 
course for most (non-trade related) international agreements under the EC Treaty, 
Parliament is required to give its assent (Article 300 EC). Moreover in the case of the EC 
Treaty these agreements are concluded by the Council, whereas in the case of the Euratom 
Treaty they are concluded by the Commission. 
 
A detailed appraisal of all the international agreements under the provisions of the Euratom 
Treaty is well beyond the scope of this study. Instead, a commentary and analysis is offered 
relating to two particular agreements, in which the European Parliament sought to exercise 
some influence - or even to remedy the ‘democratic deficit’.  
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II.7.2. Revision of the Cooperation Agreement between the European Atomic 
Energy Community and the United States of America on cooperation in 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
 
Perhaps the most important of the international cooperation agreements was and is, that 
with the USA. The original agreement, dating from 1958, provided for extensive 
cooperation in the peaceful uses of Atomic Energy - but by the early 1990s was clearly 
showing its age. Moreover, the existing agreement was due to expire at the end of 1995. 
Thus it was that the Council of Ministers, in December 1991, pursuant to Article 101 
Euratom, approved a mandate for the Commission to negotiate a new agreement. (Authors 
note: It is perhaps worth pointing out here that in actual practice it is typically the Commission 
which provides the Council with the draft text of the negotiating mandate, which is then approved 
by the latter. The Commission, in effect, thus often gives itself a negotiating mandate. It, after all, is 
the repository of most of the expertise concerning the substance of Euratom international 
agreements, and it is the Commission which will in any event already have been in informal ‘pre-
negotiation’ contact with the other party/parties). 
 
Although the agreement covered a wide range of subjects, including R&TD, nuclear safety, 
trade and commercial issues, the subsequent substantive difficulties with the re-negotiation 
of the agreement centred on the issue of US consent rights. According to the USA’s 1978 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, the US had to retain ‘prior consent rights’ for transfers and 
re-transfers of US-origin materials. Although the US President had authorised an annual 
waiver for the Community since 1978 in order to honour the existing agreement, the US 
made it clear that no new agreement would ignore the 1978 law, nor could it compromise 
the application of that law in US agreements with other (i.e. non-Euratom) countries. 
 
The Euratom Member States on the other hand, especially those with important nuclear 
industries, refused to grant the US any such rights over activities within the Euratom 
jurisdiction. The Commission claimed, on behalf of the Council, that Euratom had its own 
effective and extensive safeguards system and that any agreement which implied that the 
European Atomic Energy Community was less responsible that the US authorities, or set 
any kind of precedent along those lines, would be unacceptable to the Member States. As 
the deadline for expiry of the existing agreement drew closer, the issue became more and 
more politicised. Finally, however, a carefully worded agreement was reached, and was 
signed on 7 November 1995. The USA did not complete the formal ratification procedure 
until 10 March 1996, and the Agreement came into force on 12 April 1996.  
 
The details of the agreement have been succinctly summarised as follows: 
 
‘Three areas of cooperation are defined in Articles 2 to 4 of the agreement: R&D, industrial and 
commercial, and trade. The nuclear trade Article says that authorisation procedures "shall not be 
used to restrict trade" and, in a side letter, a maximum time of four months is specified for deciding 
on authorisations. This should be an advantage to the Euratom members since the procedures in the 
US were usually rather slow. Article 6 on the detailed regime for safeguards is a key one for the US. 
It defines the application of the Euratom and IAEA safeguards, and procedures to follow if IAEA 
safeguards are not being applied. 
 
Article 8, which is also crucial and is supplemented by a detailed minute (including an annex which 
lists all the facilities in the European Community and in the US to which Article 8 applies), covers 
nuclear fuel cycle activities. According to a Commission summary, it defines the following 
procedures : 
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- any non-sensitive nuclear activities, as well as enrichment up to 20%, irradiation of fissile 
materials and post-irradiation examination involving chemical dissolution or separation of 
irradiated nuclear material, will be freely and unconditionally allowed, 
- re-transfers to third countries will be authorised on a long-term basis according to the procedures 
set out in the Agreement, 
- storage of sensitive fissile material will be possible in any facility that meets the usual physical 
protection levels, 
- reprocessing and alteration in form of content of sensitive fissile materials will take place under 
a generic programmatic consent, in facilities forming part of the list of nuclear facilities 
delineated by each party. This generic consent will be valid in practice for the entire life of the 
Agreement. 
 
The terms of the Agreement are to be implemented in good faith, says Article 10, and with due 
regard to legitimate commercial interests, whether domestic or international. This is fundamental to 
Euratom since, in effect, both parties agree to the principle of non-interference, despite the 
authorisation procedure. Also important for the European Union is Article 13 which deals with 
suspension and termination of the Agreement. Among other clauses it effectively gives the EU the 
right to terminate the Agreement if the US would pass a new non-proliferation law restricting 
further trade’146. 
 
II.7.2.1. The European Parliament’s Position 
 
Both houses of the US Congress were involved in the process of approving the new 
agreement. The European Parliament, however, was not. As we have seen, the Euratom 
Treaty does not provide for any such involvement. But perhaps prompted by increasing 
concern that the two relatively recent Inter Governmental Conferences had signally failed 
to address the ‘problem’ of the Euratom Treaty, whilst proposing radical changes to the EC 
Treaty, the European Parliament began to express its deep dissatisfaction with its lack of 
consultation concerning Euratom international agreements. 
 
On 16 March 1995147 the Parliament adopted a ‘Resolution on the nuclear cooperation 
agreement between Euratom and the US’, which included, inter alia, the following recitals : 
 
‘G. noting that the Treaty on European Union intends to "enhance further the democratic and 
efficient functioning of the institutions so as to enable them better to carry out, within a single 
institutional framework, the tasks entrusted to them"; noting further that, whereas the Treaty 
establishing the European Community includes provisions that strengthen the participation of 
Parliament in most policies, the Euratom Treaty is still characterised by a considerable democratic 
deficit, making it partially obsolete, 
 
H. whereas in this case, as in other cases concerning the Euratom Treaty, Parliament should be 
fully informed, including the definition of the mandate – if necessary on a confidential basis – at 
each stage of the negotiations; whereas its opinion must be taken into account before the end of the 
negotiations and it must be consulted before the signing of a new EU-US agreement according to 
the optional procedure, pending the forthcoming integration of the Euratom Treaty into the EC 
Treaty’. 
 
and all of the following paragraphs  
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‘1. Requests the Council and the Commission, as a follow-up to the initial exchanges of views 
with Parliament and its relevant committee, to inform Parliament thoroughly on the negotiating 
mandate for the new agreement on nuclear cooperation between the US and Euratom, especially 
regarding US conditions on and control over the processing of nuclear material of US origin, as well 
as on the progress of the negotiations, and to take its views duly into account before the conclusion 
of the negotiations ; calls on the Council to consult it before the signature of the new agreement ; 
 
2. Instructs its relevant committee, in the context of Parliament’s involvement and in order to 
prepare Parliament’s positions as formulated above, to remain actively involved in this process 
including : 
 
 - further exchanges of views with the Commission and the Council, to be based on timely 
and full information on aims, developments and prospects of the current negotiations, 
 - research by and consultations with experts, internal and external to Parliament, including 
the consequences if no new agreement on nuclear cooperation with the US comes into 
force on 1 January 1996 ; 
 
3. Demands that the new agreement : 
 
 - enhance rigorous and effective control mechanisms, restricting the production, isolation, 
stockpiling, trade and trafficking of plutonium and weapons-grade uranium and other 
nuclear material in excess of the needs of a cost-effective and environmentally 
responsible energy policy, and guarantee transparency in this respect, 
 - take into account, besides policy considerations in the field of nuclear cooperation itself, 
consequences in the spheres of economic viability and employment, environment and 
health, as well as foreign and security policy, 
 - in the context of the above points, give the highest priority to nuclear non-proliferation;’ 
 
This was perhaps the opening move in Parliament’s increasingly vociferous campaign for 
greater consultation on such international agreements. The next move followed the 
conclusion of this particular agreement. In a letter of 25 April 1996 the Commission 
forwarded to Parliament, for information, the agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation 
between the European Atomic Energy Community and the United States of America. At the 
plenary sitting of 20 May 1996 the President of Parliament announced that he had referred 
this agreement to the Committee on Research, Technological Development and Energy as 
the committee responsible and to the interested committees for their opinions. At its 
meeting of 11 June 1996 the Committee on Research, Technological Development and 
Energy appointed Mrs Nuala Ahern as rapporteur. The Parliament’s (then) energy and 
research Committee (CERT) thus seized this opportunity to develop a more general critique 
of the parliamentary role in this particular process.  
 
The Committee adopted the resolution in the report on 27 February 1997, by 26 votes to 3, 
the report was presented in the April 1997 plenary148, and the resolution was adopted on 24 
April 1997149. If we limit ourselves to the sections of the subsequent report’s Explanatory 
Statement which address inter-institutional issues concerning the Parliament and the 
Euratom Treaty (since this study was not designed to address questions of nuclear energy 
policy), we find the following paragraphs: 
 
‘Parliament had and has to deal with a contradictory situation: the Treaty on European Union has 
extended the powers of the European Parliament in various fields, including energy policy, but 
policy based on the Euratom Treaty remains outside the Treaty on European Union. The Euratom 
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Treaty generally provides for decision-making by the Council on a proposal from the Commission, 
with consultation of the Scientific and Technical Committee and the Economic and Social 
Committee and only scarce requirements of consultation with the Parliament. 
 
This disparity in Parliament’s involvement in energy policy is materially unfounded and hard to 
justify: funds to the amount of 984 million ECU were allocated by co-decision under the EEC IV 
Framework Program (1994 - 1998) for non-nuclear energy research, whereas 1,254 million ECU 
were allocated with simple consultation under the EAEC IV Framework Programme for nuclear 
safety research. The inadequate parliamentary involvement under the Euratom Treaty continues to 
prevail and leads to losses of efficiency (through disputes over the applicable legal basis), and the 
formation of ‘niches’ inaccessible to democratic decision making, monitoring and control. 
 
On relations with third countries, Title X of the Euratom Treaty does not mention any role of the 
European Parliament at all, so any information to or exchange of view with the Parliament takes 
place on a non-obligatory consultative basis’150. 
 
And, with respect to this particular ‘non -obligatory’ procedure, the report noted that: 
 
‘In the beginning of 1995, and on the initiative of Parliament, the Commission did supply oral 
information to and exchanged views with Parliament (partly on a confidential basis), but this 
positive attitude subsided quickly, as negotiations with the USA proceeded during 1995. The 
request in paragraph 1 of the March (1995) resolution for follow-up information and consultation 
before signature was never properly and actively honoured. The Commission Communication to the 
Council, inviting it to approve the agreement just concluded with the US was announced publicly 
through a press release on May 10, 1995 (IP/95/449) and, ultimately, a regular COM document. In 
August 1995 the services of Parliament had to learn from the press about the approval by Council of 
this agreement and duly circulated this external information to Committee members. 
 
Meanwhile, the agreement was not as complete as one would have concluded from these 
announcements: only after exactly half a year of protracted negotiations on some final aspects the 
agreement and its annexes could be duly signed and side letters between the two parties exchanged 
on November 7, 1995. The agreement finally entered into force three months later, after the 
(obligatory) fulfilment of the procedural finalisation between the US administration and Congress. 
All along, the in-depth dialogue between Parliament and the Commission or the Council was not 
resumed, neither before nor after conclusion of the May and November agreements with the US. 
The summary exchange of views between the Commission and the Parliament in autumn 1995 can 
only be characterized as ‘too little and too late’. 
 
The procedural aspects of the (non-)involvement of Parliament in the US-Euratom Agreement 
deserves such detailed elaboration, as history seems to repeat itself. Council and Commission have 
recently refrained from regular involvement of Parliament more than once: the agreement with the 
Russian nuclear ministry to acquire HEU, negotiations on peaceful nuclear co-operation with 
Argentina and Japan (more on the substance of these negotiations to follow) and the Korean Energy 
Development Organization (KEDO). Again, Parliament has to learn about developments from other, 
external sources, before its relevant Committee or individual Members decide to take up the matter 
with them. According to press reports of September-October 1996 Japan may even get ahead of the 
European Union on greater openness and public debate on nuclear energy policy. The positions on 
parliamentary involvement in the March and May 1995 resolutions, quoted above, therefore remain 
valid and relevant, especially since prospects are bleak for an outcome of the IGC negotiations 
which fulfils these demands’151.  
 
The Resolution adopted by the Parliament on 24 April 1997 expressed some of these 
concerns in forceful terms. The recitals include: 
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‘A. dismayed that it had and has to deal with the contradictory situation in which the Treaty on 
European Union has extended the powers of the European Parliament in various fields, including 
some aspects of energy policy, but the democratic approach provided by the Treaty is still not 
applied to policy under the Euratom Treaty, 
 
B. whereas, both with regard to negotiations on the US-Euratom agreement and in subsequent, 
similar cases, Parliament should have been better informed and involved by Commission and 
Council, in accordance with the aims and possibilities of relevant paragraphs in the Treaty on 
European Union and subsequent positions adopted by Parliament on its involvement in all aspects 
of EU energy policies, 
 
C. whereas the European Parliament has not been able to play a constructive part in drafting the 
agreement now being considered, although to do so would have helped the transatlantic relationship 
to grow in a sustained, harmonious and balanced way and would have accorded with the democratic 
rules of the game, 
 
D. pointing out that inadequate parliamentary involvement under the Euratom Treaty continues to 
prevail, a clear example of which is the different involvement of Parliament in the allocation of 
funds for the Fourth Framework Programme for nuclear safety research (1254 million ECU) as 
compared to non-nuclear energy research (984 million ECU), 
 
E. […] 
 
F. reaffirming its commitment, through its involvement in the IGC process, to ensure that its 
positions with regard to integration of the ECSC and Euratom treaties into the Treaty on European 
Union, as expressed in its abovementioned resolutions of 7 April 1992 and 13 March 1996, are 
reflected in the revision of the Treaty on European Union’152.  
 
And in the paragraphs we find: 
 
‘2. Considers unacceptable its weak involvement in current, similar cases of international 
cooperation under the provision of the Euratom Treaty, in the context of the broader debate on the 
EU democratic deficit concerning nuclear policy and other energy policies; 
 
3. Demands that the Commission and the Council introduce greater democracy by putting right the 
current non-involvement of Parliament in the Euratom agreements with USA, Russia, Argentina, 
Japan and the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO), as well as other future Euratom 
agreements with third countries; 
 
4. Asks the Council to recognize Articles 203 of the EAEC Treaty and 235 of the EC Treaty as a 
relevant and valid legal base for formal consultation and involvement of Parliament in all matters 
relating to nuclear energy, and reserves the right to use the provisions of Article 107a of the EAEC 
Treaty as a way of overcoming the democratic deficit in those areas; 
 
[…] 
 
9. Demands that the Commission and Council inform Parliament about and discuss with it, fully and 
in good time, all current and forthcoming international negotiations in the nuclear technologies 
field;’153  
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The last paragraph is of particular significance in the context of the second international 
agreement to be considered in this chapter, which did in fact provide Parliament for the first 
time with a budgetary weapon it could use in its attempt to achieve greater democratic 
control over international agreements concluded under the Euratom Treaty. This was the 
KEDO agreement. 
 
II.7.3. KEDO and its consequences.  
 
The most significant developments in recent years with respect to international agreements 
under the Euratom Treaty, were triggered by the accession of the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom) to the Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organisation 
(KEDO), in 1997154. In order to understand these developments, a brief history of the 
project must first be outlined. 
 
In the early 1980s, with Soviet assistance, the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) (popularly known as ‘North Korea’) built a gas-cooled, graphite moderated, 
5MW(electric) nuclear research reactor at Yongbyon, which came into operation in 1986. A 
reactor such as this is one of the most suitable for the production of weapons-grade 
plutonium, (Pu239), since (a) it contains only natural uranium metal as fuel, which is much 
easier to chemically reprocess (so as to extract the plutonium which builds up in the fuel), 
than would be the uranium oxide fuels used in modern pressurised water reactors; and (b) 
because its on-line refuelling characteristics permit the extraction of fuel elements after a 
relatively short period in the reactor, which optimises production of Pu239. In addition, 
since the DPRK did not possess a uranium enrichment plant, the reactor permitted the use 
of its indigenous uranium deposits, rather than being reliant on imported enriched fuel. In 
the early 1990s the DPRK also had under construction a 50 MW(e) graphite moderated 
reactor at Yongbyon, as well as a 200 MW(e) graphite moderated reactor at Taechon. 
 
Since 1957 a series of international measures has been introduced to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, including the safeguards system of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the "Euratom" Treaty of 1957, with its Chapter 7 on 
nuclear safeguards; and, importantly, the U.N.’s Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) which came into force in 1970. 
 
The NPT permits the five existing nuclear weapon states to retain their nuclear weapons 
(whilst encouraging nuclear disarmament) but obliges the others not to acquire them. To 
guarantee this, each non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS) which is an NPT signatory accepts 
the imposition of an international safeguards regime by inspectors from the IAEA. Thus 
nuclear installations are independently inspected to ensure full knowledge of the quantities 
and whereabouts of all special fissile materials contained therein, in particular plutonium 
239 and uranium 235, the key constituents of nuclear weapons. No such obligation is 
placed on the N-weapon states, although some have now voluntarily opened some of their 
facilities to IAEA inspection. 
 
The NPT provides that the NNWS be given access to plutonium and other fissile material 
and nuclear technology, in return for accepting their status as non N-weapon states, and 
international safeguards inspections and control. The DPRK, under pressure from the 
Soviet Union (prompted by Western concern) signed the NPT on December 12 1985. In 
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1989 the press reported the existence of a suspected plutonium separation plant, referred to 
by the DPRK merely as a ‘radiochemical laboratory’; moreover the DPRK refused to sign a 
safeguards agreement with the IAEA, mandatory under the NPT. Following more Western 
pressure the DPRK signed such an agreement with the IAEA on 30 January 1992, and in 
May 1992 provided the IAEA with its initial declaration of all nuclear material. During the 
ensuing IAEA inspections the agency discovered discrepancies between its findings and the 
information provided by the DPRK, which possibly implied that plutonium had been 
extracted from fuel rods in 1990 and in 1991. IAEA member states also provided 
information about an undeclared nuclear waste site near the plutonium separating plant. In 
January 1993 the DPRK forbade further access for inspection, and consequently the IAEA 
asked for ‘special inspections’, under the provisions of the NPT. In March 1993 the DPRK 
announced its withdrawal from the NPT, but later in June 1993 suspended it. In May 1994 
it announced that it had unloaded the fuel rods of its only working reactor, worsening the 
crisis with the IAEA and the USA in particular. The protracted crisis finally resulted in 
negotiations which led to the adoption of the Agreed Framework of October 1994 between 
the USA and the DPRK. 
 
Under this agreement the DPRK froze its Russian-designed graphite moderated reactors 
and related facilities, remained party to the NPT, and agreed to gradually restore full 
implementation of its safeguard agreement with the IAEA. In return the USA undertook to 
organise an international consortium, i.e. KEDO, for the supply and financing of two 
Western-designed 1000MW light water reactors (LWRs) by the year 2003, and the 
immediate supply of alternative energy supplies which turned out to be 500,000 tonnes of 
heavy fuel oil. KEDO was estimated to cost approximately $5.2 billion. The USA agreed to 
pay for the provision of alternative energy supplies and the encasement of the research 
reactors’ fuel elements, but the bulk of KEDO’s financing is being provided by S.Korea (up 
to 60%) and Japan (up to 20% - or $1 billion), which left an unresolved shortfall. Since S. 
Korea is the main financier, it was agreed that it would provide its own reactor type for the 
project. This is modelled on its Ulchin 3 + 4 reactors which in turn are based on the reactor 
type System-80 of the American company ABB-CE. KEDO was formally established on 9 
March 1995. 
 
The non-proliferation interests in this agreement are crystal clear: the DPRK loses control 
of the nuclear fuel cycle: it will neither produce or reprocess the fuel elements for the new 
reactors. Moreover the previously extracted fuel rods from its old nuclear reactor are now 
being encased by the US and will have to be taken out of the DPRK under the stipulations 
of the Agreed Framework. 
 
II.7.3.1. EU Involvement 
 
In November 1995 Council agreed in principle to the Commission’s proposal that there 
should be EU participation in KEDO. The arguments in favour were both political - 
showing an EU commitment to security in Asia and a sort of quid pro quo for Japan’s 
financial contribution to Bosnia - and economic - European industry could benefit from 
contracts to help build the LWRs. The Council adopted, on 5 March 1996, a Joint Action 
providing for an immediate European Union contribution of 5 MECU to KEDO to be 
charged to the 1996 EU Budget (it was taken from the CFSP budget line B8-013).  
 
The Commission subsequently negotiated an agreement on terms and conditions for 
Euratom accession to KEDO, whereby the Commission would gain a place on KEDO’s 
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Executive Board in return for a financial contribution of 15 MECU p.a. over five years155. 
On 16 June 1997 the Commission submitted a proposal for a Council decision approving 
the conclusion by the Commission of such an agreement (SEC(97) 1118 final). On 24 July 
1997 the Council approved this Commission proposal and on 30 July the Commission (as 
Euratom) signed the Accession Agreement in Brussels. 
 
II.7.3.2. The involvement of the European Parliament 
 
EU accession to KEDO was a major foreign policy issue. It also had significant budgetary 
implications. KEDO membership was and is part of the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. Article J.7 of the TEU states that ‘the Presidency shall consult the 
European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and 
security policy and shall ensure that the views of the European parliament are duly taken 
into consideration…’ This was not done in the case of KEDO. 
 
The Accession Agreement has as a legal base the Euratom Treaty and in particular its 
Article 101, second paragraph. This covers agreements or contracts with a third State, an 
international organisation or a national of a third State and says that ‘such agreements or 
contracts shall be negotiated by the Commission in accordance with the directives of the 
Council: they shall be concluded by the Commission with the approval of the Council, 
which shall act by a qualified majority’. Although consultation of the Parliament is not 
obligatory under the Euratom Treaty, the Council could nevertheless have asked for 
Parliament’s opinion (consultation facultative). There were precedents for such 
consultation, and in this case Parliament felt it would have been particularly desirable, 
given the budgetary as well as foreign policy implications. 
 
In its resolution of 24 April 1997156 on the agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation 
between the European Atomic Energy Community and the United States of America (A4-
0074/97) the Parliament stated that it was ‘dismayed that it had and has to deal with the 
contradictory situation in which the Treaty on European Union has extended the powers of 
the European Union in various fields, including some aspects of energy policy, but the 
democratic approach provided by the Treaty is still not applied to policy under the Euratom 
Treaty’ (recital A). The same resolution demanded ‘that the Commission and Council 
introduce greater democracy by putting right the current non-involvement of Parliament in 
the Euratom agreement…with…KEDO’ (paragraph 3). 
 
In the Preliminary Draft Budget for 1997 the Commission placed funds intended for KEDO 
(15 MECU) in a line (B7-6602) entitled ‘Agreements and other instruments of cooperation 
with third countries’, giving no formal indication of their intention to use these for KEDO. 
The Budgets Committee voted on first reading to reduce the total appropriations to 10 
MECU and place the whole in the reserve. This was partly because of the perceived lack of 
information about KEDO and partly because of the issue of the legal base. The justification 
for this amendment was that a report should be submitted by the Commission on the 
activities undertaken under this line. Council rejected this amendment and in the second 
reading the Budgets Committee accepted the figure of 15 MECU but placed it all in the 
reserve. Parliament inserted a reference in the remarks to KEDO. 
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On 4 June 1997 the Commission requested the transfer of the 15 MECU from the reserve 
for KEDO, which gave the Budgets Committee the usual period of six weeks to take a 
decision. The Budget’s Committee sought the views of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
which, meeting on 15 July, declined to pronounce on the issue of EU accession to KEDO 
but expressed itself strongly in favour of Parliament’s being consulted on the matter. The 
Committee understood that the EU could not accede to KEDO until funds were available 
for disbursement. The Budgets Committee, meeting on 22 July, decided not to approve the 
request for transfer. 
 
In the meantime, the Committee received the Commission proposal (SEC(97) 1118 final) 
and an ‘activities report related to the use of the intended Community financial contribution 
to KEDO’. Parliament was not consulted by the Council. 
 
There followed a rather remarkable exchange of letters, interspersed with various high-level 
meetings, during the course of which the Parliament and the Commission sought to resolve 
their differences over KEDO in particular, and over Parliament’s desire for a formal role in 
monitoring and approving international agreements under the Euratom Treaty in general. 
The letters provide a reasonably good picture of the evolving character of this ‘discussion’, 
and constitute the current ‘acquis’ in terms of Parliament’s present and future role. We 
therefore reproduce their substantive content in the section which follows. 
 
II.7.3.3. The exchange of letters concerning KEDO, and international agreements based 
on the Euratom Treaty 
 
The first letter that concerns us here was sent by Tom Spencer, Chairman of the EP’s 
Foreign Affairs Committee, to Parliament’s President, José-Maria Gil-Robles, on 10/03/98. 
It reads as follows157:  
 
(i) ‘Dear President, 
 
You will be aware that the Foreign Affairs Committee protested last September about Parliament’s 
not being consulted on the Euratom-KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) 
Accession Agreement. As this agreement was concluded under Article 101 of the Euratom Treaty, 
there was no formal obligation for the Commission or Council to consult the Parliament, but the 
Committee had requested that this be done voluntarily, in the light of the extremely important 
foreign policy implications of the Agreement. 
 
When the Agreement was concluded without Parliament having been consulted, the Committee 
decided to request authorisation to draw up a report on the Agreement nevertheless and to seek to 
place the funds destined for KEDO in the 1998 Budget in reserve so that if Parliament adopted a 
negative opinion this could be enforced. Authorisation was duly granted - the Budgets and Research 
Committees are involved through the Hughes Procedure. The 1998 Budget funds have been placed 
in the reserve. 
 
In view of past experience of lack of consultation and in particular what has happened with KEDO, 
the Committee, which discussed KEDO at its meeting of 3 March 1998, decided, on a proposal 
from the rapporteur Mr Tindemans, that an inter-institutional agreement should be sought and that 
until one had been agreed their report on KEDO should not be placed on a plenary agenda. Such an 
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inter-institutional agreement should provide for Parliament to be consulted and duly deliver an 
opinion on all international agreements falling under the Euratom Treaty. 
 
Euratom is supposed to pay its annual dues to KEDO by 30 June this year. If there is an inter-
institutional agreement by May, we should seek to have our report placed on the agenda of the June 
plenary, to enable the Commission to pay up in time. 
 
I should like to request, therefore, that you raise this matter with Council and Commission in the 
inter-institutional trialogue. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Tom SPENCER’ 
 
 
(ii) The EP President replied on 29/04/98158: 
 
‘Dear Mr Spencer, 
 
At the trialogue meeting held on 1 April 1998, I drew the attention of the President of the Council 
and the President of the President of the Commission to the fact that the European Parliament had 
not been consulted prior to the conclusion of the KEDO Agreement. 
 
The Commission, the institution responsible for the consultation of Parliament in respect of that 
Agreement, which is based on the EURATOM Treaty, has failed to provide me with any 
substantive explanation concerning either the procedure selected or the unsystematic nature of its 
approach to such prior consultation. 
 
Nevertheless, President Santer was fully aware of the European Parliament’s deep dissatisfaction 
with this situation and of the serious problems that might arise as regards the granting of the 
budgetary authorisations required for the implementation of the Agreement. 
 
It is no longer possible to turn back the clock in the case of an agreement that has already been 
concluded and in respect of which the third countries party thereto expect the Community to fulfil 
its obligations. However, I do believe that it is important for Parliament to secure from the 
Commission, either in the form of an addendum to the Code of Conduct concerning its relations 
with the European Parliament to which it subscribed, or at the very least by means of an ad hoc 
declaration, an undertaking that it will, in future, consult Parliament in advance on the conclusion of 
agreements based on Article 101 of the EURATOM Treaty. 
 
I would therefore ask you to use your best endeavours to that end and to keep me informed of the 
outcome thereof. 
 
I am writing in the same terms to Mr Samland, Chairman of the Committee on Budgets and to Mr 
Scapagnini, Chairman of the Committee on Research, Technological Development and Energy. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
José Maria GIL-ROBLES’ 
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(iii) The next development was a letter from Commission President Jaques Santer to 
Parliament’s President on 9 June 1998: 
 
‘Monsieur le Président, 
 
Permettez-moi d’appeler votre attention sur l’exécution de l’accord entre EURATOM et 
l’organisation pour le développement énergétique de la péninsule coréenne (KEDO). 
 
Cet accord a été conclu par la Commission au nom de la Communauté européenne de l’énergie 
atomique après approbation du Conseil statuant à la majorité qualifiée, conformément aux 
dispositions de l’article 101 paragraphe 2 du traité CEEA. Il est entré en vigueur le 19 septembre 
1997. Il comporte pour EURATOM des obligations financières qui supposent que la ligne 
pertinente du budget soit normalement provisionnée. Tel n’est pas encore le cas pour l’exercice 
1998. 
 
Vous aviez vous-même pris l’initiative d’évoquer cette question lors du trilogue du 1er avril 1998. 
J’avais alors eu l’occasion de vous faire part de certains doutes quant à l’opportunité d’une 
discussion entre nos trois institutions sur les accords conclus en vertu du traité EURATOM, que les 
récentes conférences intergouvernementales n’ont pas cru devoir modifier. C’est bien volontiers 
cependant que je fais copie de cette correspondance à la Présidence du Conseil, en soulignant tout 
l’intérêt que le Parlement européen attache à cette question. 
 
J’ajoute que rien ne s’oppose, de mon point de vue, à ce que le Parlement européen reçoive en 
temps utile copie des communications que la Commission transmet au Conseil aux fins de 
conclusion des accords d’une importance significative. Sans préjudice de l’avis du Conseil sur ce 
point, la Commission continuera à manifester son constant souci de bonne coopération avec le 
Parlement européen. 
 
En ce qui concerne l’accord EURATOM-KEDO, vous conviendrez avec moi que la Commission a 
fait preuve d’une volonté marquée de transparence à l’égard du Parlement européen, auquel elle a 
transmis de nombreuses informations avant la conclusion de l’accord. En outre, Sir Leon Brittan, 
Vice-président, a participé à deux reprises aux échanges de vues que les commissions 
parlementaires ont organisés sur ce dossier. 
 
Alors qu’il est plus que jamais nécessaire de lutter contre la prolifération nucléaire, je n’ai pas 
besoin de souligner que l’opinion publique européenne, et nos partenaires américains ou asiatiques, 
comprendraient difficilement que la procédure budgétaire mette en péril l’accord conclu avec le 
KEDO. Une telle situation serait du reste contraire aux dispositions du traité relatives à l’exécution 
des obligations découlant des actes des institutions de la Communauté, telles que la Cour de Justice 
les a interprétées à plusieurs reprises. 
 
Vous comprendrez dès lors que je fasse appel à votre concours personnel pour assurer la mise à 
disposition des crédits prévus avant la fin du mois de juin. Telle est en effet la date que nous nous 
sommes engagés à respecter à l’égard de la KEDO. 
 
Je vous prie d’agréer, Monsieur le Président, l’expression de ma haute considération. 
 
Jacques SANTER’ 
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(iv) Following a trilogue meeting on 15 July 1998, during which the question was raised, 
Mr Santer wrote again to Parliament’s President on 16 July 1998: 
 
‘Monsieur le Président, 
 
Lors du trilogue du 15 juillet, nous avons eu l’occasion d’évoquer la proposition de virement 
présentée par la Commission le 15 juin pour libérer la contribution communautaire à l’organisation 
pour le développement énergétique de la péninsule coréenne (KEDO). 
 
Cet échange de vues m’a permis de constater notre souci commun de régler cette affaire sans délai. 
Je m’en réjouis vivement et tiens à confirmer que la Commission, dans le plein respect des 
dispositions du traité, est tout à fait favorable à améliorer l’information du Parlement européen sur 
les accords internationaux qui relèvent de l’article 101 paragraphe 2 du traité EURATOM, lorsqu’ils 
revêtent une importance significative. 
 
A cette fin, la Commission tiendra la commission parlementaire compétente informée du 
déroulement de la négociation de tels accords, dans des conditions propres à assurer la 
confidentialité requise. Le Parlement européen aura l’occasion de faire connaître son point de vue 
en temps utile avant la décision de conclusion. 
 
La Commission procèdera ainsi si vous êtes en mesure de confirmer que notre proposition de 
virement sera approuvée lors de la prochaine réunion de la commission des budgets du Parlement 
européen. 
 
Je transmets copie de cette correspondance à S.E. Monsieur Manfred Scheich, Président du Comité 
des Représentants permanents. 
 
Avec mes remerciements pour votre engagement personnel sur cet important dossier, je vous prie 
d’agréer; Monsieur le Président, l’expression de ma haute considération. 
 
Jacques SANTER’ 
 
 
(v) Mr Gil-Robles replied on 22 July 1998: 
 
‘Monsieur le Président, 
 
J’accuse réception de votre lettre du 16 juillet dernier qui fait suite au trilogue du 15 juillet au cours 
duquel la proposition de virement n° 14/98 présentée par la Commission à l’autorité budgétaire a été 
évoquée. 
 
Le Parlement est en mesure d’accepter cette proposition de virement pour la contribution 
communautaire à l’organisation pour le développement énergétique de la péninsule coréenne 
(KEDO) selon l’interprétation suivante : 
 
- l’information du Parlement européen sur les accords internationaux qui relèvent de l’article 
101 paragraphe 2 du traité EURATOM est de droit, sauf pour des accords d’importance très 
mineure ou de nature exclusivement technique ; 
 
- le Parlement considère que cette information, préalable à la conclusion de l’accord, doit 
permettre à la Commission de tenir compte en temps utile de l’opinion du Parlement. 
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J’exprime le souhait que, dans ces conditions, KEDO puisse recevoir un soutien politique et 
financier de la part de toutes les institutions de l’Union. 
 
Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, l’expression de ma très haute considération. 
 
José Maria GIL-ROBLES’ 
 
 
(vi) Mr Santer replied on 27 July 1998: 
 
‘Monsieur le Président, 
 
J’ai bien reçu votre lettre du 22 juillet dernier, relative à la proposition de virement présentée par la 
Commission le 15 juin pour libérer la contribution communautaire à l’organisation pour le 
développement énergétique de la péninsule coréenne (KEDO). 
 
Compte-tenu de la teneur de nos échanges de vues à ce propos lors du trilogue du 15 juillet, vous 
comprendrez que je ne sois pas en mesure de m’associer à l’interprétation que vous proposez. Je ne 
puis que vous confirmer en tous points les termes de ma lettre du 16 juillet. 
 
Je transmets copie de notre échange de correspondance à S.E. Monsieur Manfred Scheich, Président 
du Comité des Représentants permanents. 
 
Je vous prie d’agréer, Monsieur le Président, l’expression de ma très haute considération. 
 
Jacques SANTER’ 
 
 
So the matter stood in late July 1998. Optimists in the European Parliament referred to this 
exchange of letters as being, effectively, an Inter-Institutional Agreement between the 
Parliament and the Commission, which guaranteed that Parliament would, if not formally 
consulted, at least be kept informed of on-going negotiations on international agreements 
under the Euratom Treaty. Pessimists saw it as an Inter-Institutional Agreement to Disagree 
- or at least to maintain distinct ‘interpretations’ as to what exactly had been agreed. 
 
The next few months provided an excellent opportunity to test out the working in practice 
of the new ‘agreement’. Parliament fairly rapidly came to the conclusion that it was not 
working at all well, when it emerged that in December 1998 the Commission had 
concluded an international agreement with Canada, based on Article 101 Euratom, and that 
Parliament had not been informed about this. Rumblings of discontent in both Parliament’s 
Foreign Affairs Committee and its (then) Committee on Energy, Research and Technology, 
led Commission vice-President Sir Leon Brittan to send the following letter to Leo 
Tindemans, MEP, in his capacity as rapporteur on KEDO for the Foreign Affairs 
Committee: 
 
 
(a) ‘Letter to Mr Leo TINDEMANS 
from Mr Leon BRITTAN 
date : 23.03.1999 
 
Dear Leo, 
 
I understand that you are concerned that the procedures agreed upon in the exchange of letters 
between President Santer and President Gil-Robles of July last year relating to international 
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Euratom agreements are not being honoured by the Commission. In particular, I understand that you 
have serious reservations concerning the manner in which the Commission concluded the Euratom 
agreement with Canada in December of last year. 
 
Let me say from the outset the Commission remains fully committed to the procedural promises 
made by President Santer in his letter of 16 July last year to inform the European Parliament of 
international Euratom agreements concluded on the basis of Article 101, second paragraph, of the 
Euratom Treaty when they are of particular significance and to give the Parliament an opportunity 
to make its views known well in advance of a decision on the conclusion of any such agreement. 
 
Given that the Canada agreement was initialled in April 1998, several months before the exchange 
of letters between the two Presidents took place, I hope you will understand that any subsequent 
procedural omissions on the part of the Commission were entirely due to innocent administrative 
oversight. I accept that it has taken a little while for the Commission to establish the necessary 
internal procedures which flow from the exchange of letters. 
 
Naturally, the Canada agreement does not match the enormous substantive and political importance 
of the KEDO agreement, not least since it does not involve the same substantial financial 
commitment. Thus I very much hope any legitimate reservations you may have on the manner in 
which the Canada agreement was concluded will not impinge on the difficult and highly valuable 
understanding reached by Presidents Santer and Gil-Robles last year. 
 
Indeed, I hope you will agree that the priority now is to make sure the existing understanding works 
effectively rather than reopen the understanding altogether. Given that the Commission is subject to 
a highly circumscribed institutional margin of manoeuvre in this field, I am not persuaded that 
reopening the difficult interinstitutional issues at this stage, before the present understanding has 
been given sufficient opportunity to prove itself in practice, would be fruitful for either the 
Commission or the Parliament. 
 
Of course, I accept that it is primarily the Commission’s responsibility to improve existing 
procedures to meet the commitments made in the exchange of letters. To that end, I have issued 
strict instructions to the relevant Commission services to ensure that the correct procedures will be 
followed in future. 
 
Needless to say, if you would like to discuss this matter further with me I am always available to 
meet with you at the earliest convenient opportunity. 
 
Leon BRITTAN’ 
 
 
(b) To which Mr Tindemans replied as follows: 
 
‘Letter to Mr Leon BRITTAN 
from Mr Leo TINDEMANS 
date : 01.03.1999 
 
Dear Leon, 
 
Thank you for your letter of 23 February 1999 concerning the involvement of the European 
Parliament in international agreements concluded under the Euratom Treaty. 
 
As you know, the Foreign Affairs Committee was most displeased to discover that the Commission 
was not respecting the agreement on such involvement it had reached with Parliament. The 
Committee noted in particular the fact that the Commission had provided no information on the 
Euratom-Canada Agreement, which I understand that you yourself signed on behalf of the 
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Commission, and had therefore also not provided the agreed opportunity for Parliament to express 
its views on this before its conclusion. 
 
The question of the extension of the ITER Agreement was also briefly raised in committee. This is 
an agreement involving the United States, Russia and Japan, and large sums of money, and as such 
clearly of great interest to the Parliament and its Foreign Affairs Committee. The agreement was 
concluded on 26 June by the Commission, but we feel that, given the fact that we were well into the 
process of negotiating our own agreement on parliamentary information/consultation, the 
Commission might have felt it appropriate at least to send a copy to the Parliament some time 
before that date. Moreover, as the EU’s future work on nuclear fusion is in fact ITER, as JET comes 
to an end, and as difficulties have emerged regarding US participation, the agreement with Canada, 
which covers nuclear fusion, does have a clear link and clear importance. 
 
The Foreign Affairs Committee felt that, although the Commission’s failure to inform Parliament of 
the Canada agreement was doubtless an administrative oversight, the only way to ensure that such 
an oversight did not occur again was to make the agreement between our two institutions rather 
more formal and specific. You will see from the copy of the report which I enclose that we call for a 
formal Interinstitutional Agreement, some sort of document to be signed by both parties, which will 
provide for Parliament to be informed of all international agreements to be concluded under any 
article of the Euratom Treaty and to be formally consulted on all such agreements based on Article 
101(2) of that Treaty. 
 
We may have some small margin of manoeuvre here, but I and the other rapporteurs feel that we 
should do our utmost to move significantly towards what is called for in the Foreign Affairs 
Committee’s report sufficiently in advance of the plenary debate for amendments to be tabled to 
take that move into account. 
 
Without committing myself at this point, might I suggest that the ‘exchange of letters arrangement’ 
at least be tightened up and the modalities of its operation be specified to some extent, perhaps as 
follows : 
 
- the Commission will inform Parliament before, during and after negotiation of ALL 
international agreements under Euratom, 
- for all those to be concluded by the Commission under 101(2), Parliament will be given a 
chance to express its views, 
- the Commission will state if it considers an agreement to be of particular significance, 
- Parliament will decide within one month of receiving the text of a 101(2) agreement whether it 
wishes to express its views (i.e. do a report), 
- if it does not wish to do so, Commission may proceed to conclude the agreement, 
- if Parliament does wish to express its views it will be given a further three months to do so, 
- the Commission will take any views expressed by the Parliament fully into account before 
deciding whether to conclude the agreement. 
 
Messrs Brinkhorst and Ford and I should be happy to discuss this with you, and we feel that this 
would best be done as soon as possible. Unfortunately, a several political groups will be meeting 
outside Brussels during the week of 1-5 March, the three of us would be available only at one time 
then - Wednesday, 3 March at 7.15 p.m. If that time were possible for you, given that Mr Brinkhorst 
is hosting a meeting at his home in Brussels just before that time, it would be most convenient if we 
could meet there. He lives at 235 Rue de la Loi, which is just yards from your office. 
 
If this is not convenient for you, perhaps we could meet in Strasbourg on the Monday or Tuesday. 
Your office could make arrangements through our committee secretary, Mr Wood, whose telephone 
number is 284 2483. 
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We look forward, then, to meeting you shortly. 
 
Leo TINDEMANS’ 
 
 
(c) This letter elicited the following reply, addressed to Parliament’s President: 
 
‘Letter to Mr José Maria GIL-ROBLES 
from Sir Leon BRITTAN 
date : 22 March 1999 
 
 
Dear Mr President, 
 
Following extensive discussion between myself and various Members of the European Parliament, I 
am writing to you to confirm the practical arrangements which will now be followed by the 
Commission to ensure that the understanding reached in July last year in the exchange of letters 
between yourself and President Santer (related to the conclusion of agreements of significant 
importance based on Article 101.2 of the EURATOM treaty) is now fully implemented. 
 
First, at the beginning of each year the Commission will provide a list of all the relevant 
EURATOM agreements under Article 101.2 which are under negotiation or for which negotiations 
are to be launched in the coming year. This list will be regularly updated and forwarded to the 
Parliament, under the necessary conditions of confidentiality. 
 
Second, the Commission will provide oral information on request to the relevant EP Committee on 
the conduct of the negotiations, under the necessary conditions of confidentiality. 
 
Third, the Commission will forward the proposals for conclusion of the relevant EURATOM 
agreements to the Parliament at the same time at which they are forwarded to the Council for 
approval. This is a significant procedural innovation since it provides a guarantee to the Parliament 
that it will be informed before the Council has taken a position on the conclusion of those 
agreements. 
 
Thus, the Parliament will have the opportunity to make its views known before a decision is made 
to conclude the agreement, in line with the commitments made in our exchange of letters. I should 
add that the time it takes for the Council to reach a decision on conclusion is generally fairly lengthy 
and thus leaves ample time for the Parliament to express its view if it so wishes. In those cases 
where the Council may wish to take a particularly rapid decision, the Commission will duly inform 
the Parliament of this possibility. 
 
Fourth, by way of this letter I wish to provide you with information on the relevant agreements 
under Article 101.2 EURATOM which are currently either under negotiation or for which a 
decision of conclusion has not yet been taken, according to the information presently available to 
the Commission services. Please note that the agreements referred to represent all agreements 
covered by Article 101.2 EURATOM which are under negotiation or for which negotiations are to 
be launched in the coming year : 
 
- EURATOM Agreement with Ukraine (nuclear fusion & nuclear security): the draft agreement 
was established on October 16th 1998. The relevant documents are now being prepared to be 
officially forwarded to the Council and the Parliament within a matter of weeks. 
 
- EURATOM Agreement with Kazakhstan - nuclear fusion (separate adoption of nuclear 
security agreement already in preparation): draft agreement should be ready within a matter of 
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weeks (the last substantive talks were held in January 1999) following which the relevant 
documents will be forwarded officially to the Council and the Parliament. 
 
- EURATOM Agreement with Russia (nuclear fusion & nuclear security). Negotiations are still 
underway. 
 
- EURATOM Agreement with Japan. Negotiations are due to start in the coming weeks. 
 
It has been brought to my attention that there have been some teething problems in applying the 
understanding reached last year to those agreements for which negotiations were concluded after the 
date of the exchange of letters. In order to ensure there is no further misunderstanding between the 
Commission and the Parliament, I have instructed my services to convey separately to your services 
all relevant texts of agreements which should have been covered by the understanding during the 
latter half of the year and the beginning of this year. 
 
Finally, it would provide significant procedural clarity to the above arrangements if you could 
inform the Commission which Parliamentary Committee is the lead Committee in these matters so 
that the information can be properly communicated via the right channels. 
 
On this basis, I trust that we can now fully implement the understanding reached last year to the 
mutual satisfaction of the European Parliament and of the Commission. 
 
I am copying this letter to H.E. Dietrich von Kyaw, President of the Permanent Representatives 
Committee. 
 
Leon BRITTAN’ 
 
 
This then, is the current practical interpretation of the agreement between the Commission 
and the Parliament concerning international agreements under the Euratom Treaty. One 
slight eccentricity is that although the Commission is believed to be regularly sending its 
summary table of on-going negotiations to Parliament (in the shape of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, and the Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research, and Energy), it 
insists that this document is confidential, and should not be made public. 
 
Having said that, it is also clear that a cultural change has, to a certain extent, been 
achieved, especially in the context of Euratom Loans (see the specific chapter thereon.) The 
Commission has provided an extensive dossier to Parliament on each of the last two major 
Euratom Loan projects, to Bulgaria, and to the Ukraine. 
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III. Strategic possibilities for the European Parliament 
 
III.1. Strategy paper one: Possible Options for Revision or Re-
interpretation of the Euratom Treaty 
III.1.1. The case for a different approach 
 
‘No strategy for institutional reform is likely to have much hope of success unless it is 
based on a realistic assessment of the present states of the Community’159. 
 
This statement by R. Pryce prompts the following observation: if Parliament wants to 
improve the scope of its powers and competencies with respect to issues covered in the 
Euratom Treaty, it has to develop a strategy based on the likelihood of the different aims 
being realised, given the availability of instruments to support such a strategy and the 
procedural constraints that may affect the success of the different strategies (e.g. unanimity 
in the Council for Treaty revision). Consequently, the elaboration of a strategy has to be 
based on a realistic assessment of the likelihood of its success. This assessment has to be 
based on an analysis: 
 
(1) of the interests of the Member States and their likely responses to the strategy 
employed by Parliament, 
 
(2) of the instruments that can be deployed to achieve the respective gaols (e.g. 
budgetary instruments, instruments referring to executive control, instruments that 
affect the procedures of decision-making [dealing with issues separately or in a 
‘package’]), 
 
(3) of Parliament’s ability to muster the necessary majority to sustain the deployment of 
a certain strategy. 
 
(4) Furthermore, it is obvious that Member States’ preferences may be of varying 
intensity with regard to the many issues that are under debate. One strategy 
component therefore has to consist in Parliament seeking allies, i.e. trying to commit 
those Member States with a particular interest in Euratom-revision, so that the item 
is put on the agenda of an IGC160. 
 
Reviewing the parliamentary opinions referred to above, only one of the above-mentioned 
documents includes strategic calculations. In its ‘Opinion for the Committee on Institutional 
                                                 
159 Pryce, R. (1984), in: Hrbek, R., Jamar, J. and Wessels, W. (Eds) ‘The European Parliament on the Eve of 
the Second Direct Election: Balance Sheet and Prospects’, Cahiers de Bruges, N.S. 43, p. 193.  
160 Parliament could try to take advantage of situations in which influential Member States express a strong 
preference with regard to Treaty revision. This recently occurred in the case of the German government (and 
was hinted at by the Green Minister for the Environment and Reactor Safety, Jürgen Trittin) which intends to 
review all ‘nuclear treaties’ of which it is a signatory. The European Parliament could also take into account  
events that may affect public opinion and constitute a ‘window of opportunity’ through which a certain issue 
can suddenly rise to the top of the political agenda. 
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Affairs on the Treaty of Amsterdam’, the (then) Committee on Research, Technological 
Development and Energy made an attempt to devise a strategy destined at Treaty revision: 
 
‘It is time for Parliament to insist on a revision of the Euratom Treaty. It has a very powerful 
weapon at its disposal to reinforce this action: Parliament has the final say on non-compulsory 
expenditure in the budget. It could therefore threaten to systematically delete all 
expenditure based on the problematic articles of the Euratom Treaty, until such time as 
the provisions of the Euratom Treaty are brought into line with those of the EC Treaty as 
amended by the TEU, and as will be further amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam. By 
so doing, Parliament could set a non-negotiable timetable with deadlines which would 
concentrate the Member States’ minds wonderfully’ (emphasis in original)161. 
 
In order to assess the likely success of this strategy, several questions have to be answered: 
what would the likely responses of the Member States in the Council be to the Parliament’s 
‘budgetary threat’ or its actual carrying out of this threat? Would Parliament be able to 
mobilise a majority of its members for long enough to force Member States to engage in a 
rethinking of the provisions subject to conflict? What counter measures are at the disposal of 
the Member States in the Council? Is the aim of achieving Treaty revision realistic with 
regard to the deployment of the budgetary instrument?  
 
Detailed and ambitious proposals concerning the future of nuclear power and related issues 
in the European Union do exist in considerable numbers. But, in the specific context of the 
Euratom Treaty, all these proposals, including a previous study published by Parliament’s 
Directorate General for Research entitled ‘Revision of the European Treaties in the Energy 
Sector’162, suffer from the same shortcoming: declarations do not make a difference unless 
they are supplemented with proposals on how the aims could be realised. 
III.1.2. Outlook 
 
In those areas where the European Parliament can make use of its budgetary, procedural and 
oversight instruments, there is a very real opportunity to overcome the subordinate position 
it is endowed with in the Euratom Treaty, vis-à-vis the Commission and the Council. 
However, the use of these instruments will only be successful if it is supplemented by 
strategic considerations by Parliament. The main elements that might be included and 
questions that might be asked so as to devise a strategy are as follows: 
 
- What is the aim of Parliament’s activity? 
Parliament should specify a hierarchy of aims. This hierarchy could, for example, be as 
follows: full revision of the Euratom Treaty; selective Treaty revision; ‘small-steps’ 
without a formal revision of the Treaty etc.). 
 
- What are the probabilities that can be attached to each of the previously defined 
aims? 
In order to assess the likelihood of achieving the different aims, the following steps have 
to be taken: 
 assessment of the interests of all the actors involved in the (formal or informal) 
revision ‘game’; their likely strategies, and the payoffs they attach to the different 
outcomes, 
                                                 
161 EP Session Document A4-0347/97, p. 28. 
162 European Parliament, DG for Research, ‘Revision of the European Treaties in the Energy Sector’, Energy 
and Research Series W - 15, June 1995. 
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 specification of the procedural constraints: With unanimity being the governing 
principle of Treaty revision and no parliamentary involvement, full or selective 
Treaty revision is strongly status quo oriented compared to the small steps 
approach which may allow Parliament to exploit procedural constraints that are 
less status quo oriented (seeking discretion on the basis of the existing Treaty), 
 assessment of the degree to which a large majority of MEPs and party groups can 
commit themselves to the means employed to achieve particular aims. It is 
obvious that it will be quite difficult for a majority of MEPs and party groups to 
commit themselves to a threat to use a veto on the annual budget, in order to seek 
full revision of the Euratom Treaty. The likely consequences of such an action 
would be difficult to predict. But it may be much easier to commit a parliamentary 
majority to selectively ‘freeze’ budgetary items in order to advance its position 
with regard to a number of well-defined Treaty provisions where discretion can be 
achieved and where the likely consequences of this action can be better calculated, 
 assessment the instruments and the ‘instrument mix’ that can be deployed by 
Parliament. The number of instruments may be restricted for the attainment of 
certain aims (e.g., where no financial implications are involved, the budgetary 
instrument may be of no great utility). Furthermore, the use of some instruments 
can be supplemented with other activities so as to render Parliament’s moves 
more effective (e.g. through seeking consistency in its actions, through 
committing other actors to the same goals, etc.). 
 
The discussion of a limited number of Treaty provisions should not distract from the fact 
that there is much dissatisfaction with other Treaty ‘chapters’. This strategy chapter has 
highlighted the areas where the small steps approach is most likely to produce immediate 
and tangible results for the European Parliament. Given the prospect that there is a minimal 
likelihood of overcoming the ‘unanimity obstacle’ required to revise the Treaty, the view 
presented here may be somewhat ‘sobering’ – there is not much hope of achieving a ‘big hit’ 
in the near future. Opening the ‘Pandora’s box’ that the Euratom Treaty represents would be 
a risk that some Member States would not particularly like to take, given the highly 
diverging interests of different Member States with regard to nuclear energy. Keeping 
‘Pandora’s box’ closed seems to be a much less painful option, even for those who 
acknowledge that a number of Treaty ‘chapters’ have become dysfunctional. Furthermore, 
Treaty revision would be rendered even more cumbersome given the requirement of 
ratification through national parliaments.  
 
This does not mean, however, that the European Parliament should cease to call loudly upon 
the Member States to review those Treaty provisions where the need for revision is most 
obvious. Furthermore, Parliament possesses the instruments to place considerable pressure 
on the Member States to induce some changes (assuming that Parliament can muster a 
majority in support of these courses of action). One important example is an issue that has 
been completely excluded from the Euratom Treaty at the time it was negotiated, nuclear 
reactor safety. In the context of enlargement, the issue of nuclear safety has assumed a top 
priority given the often questionable status of some nuclear power plants in the applicant 
countries. One of the problems facing the Community is to achieve an upgrading of these 
plants to ‘Western safety standards’. Yet, given the lack of a definition thereof, there is 
much confusion and disagreement as to how to ensure a high level of nuclear safety, and 
whether this level should somehow be ‘harmonised’ across the E(AE)C.  
 
Although there is a lot of movement under way, (particularly in a number of DG s inside the 
Commission), to find a universally accepted approach to define these standards or at least to 
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set out a uniform methodology to assess them, Parliament should show a strong interest in 
nuclear safety with regard to the applicant countries and future enlargement. Given 
Parliament’s influence over non-compulsory expenditure, including technical assistance 
expenditures in the PHARE and TACIS programmes, Parliament can exercise pressure on 
the Commission by threatening to put appropriations destined for nuclear safety 
expenditures in the reserve until it has gained confirmation on how this money is spent163. 
Furthermore, Parliament’s power of assent to accession of new Member States means that 
nuclear safety could be a top Parliamentary priority which would ‘help’ the Community 
Member States to ‘concentrate their minds’. 
 
With regard to ‘genuine’ Euratom Treaty provisions, Parliament should be vigilant and seek 
for ‘windows of opportunity’ that may eventually arise and open up possibilities for Treaty 
revision. This strategy paper ends with some examples: 
 
 One tactical device Parliament could employ is to commit Member States to 
strive for Treaty revision. Given the fierce opposition on behalf of the French 
government to revision, together with the fact that France took over the Council 
Presidency in the second half of 2000 and thus presided over the Nice IGC, 
Euratom revision was not an agenda item at Nice. However, this might be 
different in the future if a Member State presiding over a subsequent IGC 
possessed a strong interest in revision. Under such circumstances, Parliament 
could seek a commitment from the Council Presidency and other ‘revision-
positive’ Member States to place the item on the agenda for an IGC. 
 
 In this context, Parliament could continue to communicate the absurdity and 
partly farcical nature of some of the Treaty provisions to a wider audience. One 
ingredient for successful agenda placement is the creation of an interested public 
(awareness raising), which includes a critical mass of interested Member States, 
but also a large majority of parliamentary members. 
 
 Parliament could also focus its major criticisms on the institutional shortcomings 
of the Treaty. This would allow Parliament to act more coherently and make it 
more difficult for the Council to reject Parliament’s claims for ‘more 
democracy’. 
 
 Although Parliament will not have much influence on the number and kind of 
issues discussed at an IGC, the likelihood of Euratom revision will be greatly 
enhanced if issue linkages are made possible during an IGC. Linkages can occur 
when governments have varying preferences across different issues, with 
marginal gains in some areas more important to some than to others. Thus, issue 
linkages are most advantageous where different Member States have highly 
asymmetrical interests on different issues. Owing to the strength of the ‘nuclear’ 
lobby, particularly in France, the creation of compensatory mechanisms would be 
very difficult to achieve. Furthermore, it may be easier for France to issue a 
credible ratification threat and for other Member States to threaten a ‘veto’ in the 
                                                 
163 In 1993, Parliament entered 120 Million ECU in the reserve for the 1994 budget, more than half of the 
appropriations allocated for the TACIS programme. Parliament was not satisfied with the way that the 
expenditure entered in previous years was being spent and wanted more details on how future spending was to 
be organised. Sir Leon Brittan, the Commissioner responsible, came to Parliament early in 1994 providing 
detailed information on spending plans, which led to the money being unblocked (see Corbett, Jacobs, 
Shackleton, The European Parliament, Cartermill International, 1995. p.236). 
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event that Euratom is not revised. Nevertheless, issue linkages have produced 
negotiating results in the past that seemed highly unlikely prior to 
intergovernmental negotiations. 
 
Although revision of the Euratom Treaty seems unlikely in the near future, this chapter has 
tried to demonstrate that it is nevertheless possible: it requires strategic thinking by the 
European Parliament in order to improve its influence over outcomes in the nuclear sector, 
but also to enhance the scope of its competencies to areas characterised by legal limbo such 
as the effects of radiation on the natural environment, and nuclear reactor safety. The 
European Parliament has been a main character in one of the most remarkable success-
stories in the history of international co-operation and democratic governance. It has 
managed to cover the great distance from parliamentary control organ to co-legislator in less 
than five decades. Much of this success derives from its capacity creatively to interpret the 
legal provisions laid down in the Treaties, and its self-acclaimed status as the core element 
of a ‘democratic’ European Union, a claim which is difficult to dispute by the Member 
States. Even the most disputed and archaic Euratom Treaty may not be immune to a dose of 
democracy.  
 
III.1.3. The role of the Atomic Questions Group 
 
We cannot conclude this section without mentioning what is one of the most important fora 
for the implementation of the provisions of the Euratom Treaty and the secondary legislation 
deriving from it. The Council of Ministers delegates the detailed examination of all matters 
falling under the Euratom Treaty to the so-called ‘Atomic Questions Group’ (AQG). This is 
a Council Working Group, usually comprising national civil servants seconded to Brussels, 
many of whom are experts on nuclear issues: many, indeed, have a background in nuclear 
science. Its job, like that of other Council Working Groups, is to do the preparatory work for 
the Council of Ministers. 
 
But so far as we have been able to establish, the Atomic Questions Group would seem to be 
the de facto decision-making body with respect to the Euratom Treaty, since the Council of 
Ministers itself simply does not have the requisite expertise in nuclear matters, or the 
Euratom Treaty, which would be required to challenge any preparatory work carried out by 
the AQG. This is not to say that draft decisions bear no relationship to national interests, 
policies, and politics: the members of the Atomic Questions Group are often the repository 
of much expertise concerning the political positions of the various Member States in nuclear 
matters, and, moreover, expertise on the Euratom Treaty itself. The consequence of all this 
is that Council Decisions or other legislative acts under the Euratom Treaty are normally 
taken as ‘A’ points in the actual Council meetings. 
 
The Commission is of course also present at meetings of the AQG, and is of course also the 
most important repository of knowledge and expertise concerning the Euratom Treaty. But 
the European Parliament does not, however, participate in meetings of such Council 
Working Groups. Parliament therefore needs to pay much closer attention to the on-going 
work of the Atomic Questions Group than it has in the past. It is thus very much in the 
Parliament’s interest to make sure that its voice is heard by both the Commission and the 
AQG, and that Parliamentarians establish contact with the member of the AQG from their 
own countries, and seek to be regularly informed of what the AQG is doing. 
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III.2. Strategy paper two 
 
Summary 
 
The leitmotifs of enlargement and inter-institutional debate are democracy, openness, 
accountability, effectiveness, and efficiency. They do not necessarily mean the same thing to 
people in different countries. Nor do people across the EU necessarily attach equal (or any) 
importance to their realisation. However, enlargement requires institutional change. 
 
This presents the EP with an opportunity to seek to insert itself more effectively into 
constitutional processes. Different levers might be employed under different treaties, articles 
and constitutional processes – such as the next IGC – in order to insert the EP into decision 
making processes from which it is excluded under Euratom in its current form. By achieving 
results under Euratom and in respect of issues relating to Euratom concerns, the EP may 
have an indirect effect on its standing and role under the Nice treaty. 
 
In short, enlargement, the next IGC and the future of Euratom present the EP with the 
opportunity to insist on a parliamentary voice being heard and heeded as a general matter of 
principle and practice. MEPs have the chance to require that policymakers accept their 
political responsibilities in all fields, and to challenge any breach which allows them by 
default to abdicate their responsibility. 
 
III.2.1. Rationale for European Parliament Role 
 
Before examining the strategic options open to the EP, it is important to be clear as to the 
purpose behind EP interest in measures taken under the Euratom Treaty and associated 
measures agreed and implemented under the other treaties. These relate to: 
 
i) the ability of the EP to perform its Treaty given duties and obligations effectively and 
efficiently (thereby conforming its credibility and worthiness as a legislative 
institution), and 
ii) the political aspirations of its members (current and future role conceptions in an 
enlarging EU). 
 
III.2.1.1. EP performance of legislative functions 
 
These broadly divide into: 
(a) legal requirements for EP involvement under Euratom and the other treaties, 
(b) EP interpretation of the possibilities for it to influence measures under these treaties 
(which may not be the same thing at all as (a); though may be informed by either 
experience under (a) or conflicting interpretations by different institutions as to the 
EP’s role. They might also involve an expansive interpretation of possibilities by 
adapting a provision or procedure common under, say the Nice Treaty (such as own 
initiative activities) and ‘applying’ them to Euratom concerns. 
 
How the EP performs its legislative functions depends not just on legal requirements 
governing its role, but on the EP’s own vision, or lack of vision, as to what an appropriate 
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role for it is at a given time, and in a given area. The EP should have a general role 
conception for itself as the elected legislature of an enlarged EU. This needs to be preserved 
and transmitted to new members in the context of enlargement. The norms and values the 
EP purports to uphold and sustain need to be made manifest. The EP must be seen to be 
practising them and seeking to make them recognised as fundamental to good practice in 
respect of policymaking in the EU in general. 
 
EP role conceptions in an enlarging EU 
 
Enlargement itself offers the EP the opportunity to reappraise its role, how it executes it and 
how it exerts, prioritises and focuses its activities in respect of policy issues and geopolitical 
arenas. The legislative agenda may be largely determined by the Commission and 
Presidency. New members’ circumstances may mean that (a) their policy priorities differ 
somewhat from those of existing members; and (b) that existing members’ sense of political 
priorities may change because the circumstances in the new Member States are such as to 
require modification of policy priorities in order to safeguard or meet the broader common 
interests of the EU as a whole, or of those Member States bordering newer ones. For 
instance, it is conceivable that matters germane to Chapter 3 (Euratom) would accordingly 
rise much higher up the agenda and require much closer scrutiny and redefinition. This has 
implications for the way in which parties organise their business and maintain cohesion, 
policy coherence, prioritise issue areas, and seek out winning coalitions. 
 
The over-arching goal must be to show that the EP is relevant, and has something 
worthwhile to contribute in the sensitive areas covered by Euratom. MEPs cannot afford to 
be seen by the public to be less effective, or less influential and vociferous on matters of 
public concern where highly toxic/hazardous substances and emissions are concerned, than 
in respect of the ‘normal’ business of the EU. If they were to be perceived as ineffective or 
irrelevant, the repercussions on perceptions of the value of MEPs and the EP in general in 
EU decision-making could be damaging. 
 
Legislative clout and public image are linked. They may be of especial interest in the run-up 
to the next IGC and the coinciding Euro-elections. MEPs need, therefore, to consider the 
political context within which they seek to alter the EP’s role under Euratom and in respect 
of related policy areas: 
 
Action: MEPs’ legislative clout might be expanded either juridically via treaty change and 
entrenched expansion of their authority (universalisation of co-decision); or de facto via 
intervention as permitted by existing treaties (questions, budget, investigations, public 
hearings, legislative tactics to delay implementation pending modification of specific 
clauses, etc). 
 
Action: improve public image. MEPs need to be seen by the public to be pursuing 
politically (electorally relevant) salient issues of concern to the general public (i.e. showing 
themselves to be responsive to citizens’ interests, and able to mobilise and present them in a 
politically relevant way which may be translated into politically ideological and relevant 
legislative outputs – something the Commission is ill-equipped to do, even if it does use e-
interactive citizens’ fora and ‘ask the Commissioner’ internet pages). 
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MEPs may feel that they are becoming redundant if other citizen interaction with policy 
makers (eg via NGOs, etc) seem to be more effective and have a more visible and immediate 
result than their inputs via the normal legislative channels. 
 
Action: guardian of democracy role. MEPs may also have an interest in showing themselves 
to be the guardian of moral values associated with the idea of an engaged participatory 
democracy, and the ‘voice of the people’. 
 
The last consideration brings the strategic discussion full circle.  
 
Arguably, to safeguard their existing role in the EU’s inter-institutional set up, they need to 
preserve a modicum of public belief in their effectiveness. They cannot afford any implicit 
curtailing of their entrenched powers by the growth of ‘soft law’ or inter-institutional 
practices which limit their ability to influence the content of decisions across the range of 
issues (from funding discreet and related/overlapping research programmes, to policy on the 
transport/import/re-export of hazardous low level waste, and de-commissioning of 
old/dangerous nuclear waste sites and storage facilities whether in the existing EU, or in the 
enlarged EU. 
 
III.2.1.2. Strategic possibilities: Enlargement as an opportunity to prioritize sensitive 
issues (Chapter 3) 
 
Chapter 3 (Euratom) Art 34, for example, offers an area of activity which is subject, 
arguably, to insufficient scrutiny and political oversight. Is it sufficient merely to require 
Member States in whose territories particularly dangerous experiments are to take place to 
take additional health and safety measures subject merely to the requirement that they first 
obtain the Commission’s opinion? Only where the effects of such experiments are liable to 
affect the territories of other member states, is Commission assent required. The EP could 
seek to insert itself into this process by seeking a means of securing access to and discussion 
of relevant information with the Commission prior to the issuing of such assent. 
Accordingly, such assent might be given only after the Commission has discussed the issues 
with the relevant EP committee at the minimum in camera.  
 
Transfrontier pollution and health and safety hazards leading to civil emergencies has been 
the subject of some EU coordination. However, the EP has not yet become part of a 
procedure where there is open and informed debate about such issues of public interest. This 
situation needs to be remedied both by procedural stealth and by formal treaty 
amendment. 
 
Action: Article 36 is another article which might be amended, or which might be examined 
with a view to exploiting its provisions to inject greater openness into a closed, and possibly, 
unsatisfactory procedure. 
 
It provides for the appropriate authorities to periodically communicate to the Commission 
information on the checks on radioactivity to which the public is exposed. Presumably, the 
EP could elicit that information from the Commission, and devise further steps to enhance 
its capacity to scrutinise, monitor, control and influence policy choices pursuant to that 
information.   
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Action: It may, for example, be prudent to seek observer status in any meeting the 
Commission has with the group of experts as provided for under Article 31. 
 
It is surely anomalous that the Economic and Social Committee should have a right to issue 
an opinion on basic standards, whereas the EP is merely the object of Council consultation. 
(Article 31). 
 
Action: At the very least, the EP should be placed on a par with ESC. Moreover, wherever 
Euratom empowers the Council to act by QMV, the EP should seek a right of conciliation 
and preferably co-decision. So far, little consideration has been afforded to Euratom and 
related issues and the way in which inter-institutional interaction may be improved to the 
common good. It is no longer acceptable to assume that Euratom’s concerns are 
fundamentally so technical as to dispense with the need for effective political oversight and 
public scrutiny. Technical desiderata are vital, but in a democracy they cannot be allowed to 
be seen to be implemented without open scrutiny. Moreover, public concern about many of 
the matters covered by Euratom and nuclear energy, means that ideally appropriate 
mechanisms of accountability should be in place to which the public can relate.  
 
Citizens’ charters, public ‘discussions with the Commissioner over the internet’ do not (or 
do not yet) meet the requirements for entrenched, visible, political responsive and 
responsible accountability. This is a role which properly falls to elected representatives of 
the people – hence, the EP. The EP is the only institution that permits genuine 
interactive accountability. Lone voices of individuals emailing ideas to the Commission, or 
whoever, over the internet are unlikely to have the same clout as the articulated expression 
of deliberations across frontiers and parties by MEPs in touch with citizens and, more 
importantly, with each other and with officials from the other institutions. 
 
Action: Article 33 provides for the Commission to make appropriate recommendations for 
harmonising provisions in the member states relating to basic standards. This article should 
be amended to provide for EP consultation at a minimum, with a view to broadening it to 
co-decision in future. 
 
Action: Article 33 - there is no formal provision for effective follow-up - technical or 
political – of the implementation of basic standards. The EP might make recommendations 
accordingly. Similarly, Article 38 permits the Commission in cases of urgency, to issue a 
directive addressed to a Member State to ensure that it takes measures, within a specified 
period, to prevent infringement of basic standards and ensure compliance with regulations. 
 
Action: Article 38 - and all areas where the Commission issues directives - should be 
subject to parliamentary scrutiny and assent; again the emphasis being on amending the 
relevant articles to permit co-decision. Where this is politically too sensitive or unrealistic, 
the EP should move by stealth to gain access to information (either via the Commission or 
the target Member States’ authorities or parliament, and to follow-up – and maybe publicise 
- any measures taken, or not taken). This might have the added advantage of accelerating 
remedial action, possibly pre-empting delaying tactics by the target state which lead the 
Commission to refer the matter to the Court of Justice. 
 
Enlargement alone requires EU-level public scrutiny of the range of issues associated with 
the matters falling under Euratom. As in the past, one of the most useful political weapons 
available to the EP remains the one which is not a legally entrenched right but a tool of 
political operators: the instrument of embarrassment. If necessary, MEPs must be in a 
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position to mobilise themselves effectively in pursuit of issues in order to safeguard the 
public interest, as they see it. Access to relevant, timely and full information is an important 
element in this. Any denial of access by officials, the Commission, or the Council must 
therefore be challenged publicly; and equally publicly followed up. 
 
III.2.2. Strategy 
 
III.2.2.1. Normative 
 
Normative considerations concern the values which the EU member governments and the 
EU treaties seek to uphold. They underpin the constitutional arrangements established in the 
EU in respect of inter-institutional relations. They represent principles and guides to 
institutional behaviour both within the EU institutions and vis-à-vis the EU’s public. They 
have been reiterated at the highest possible political level of the IGCs as values to which the 
EC subscribes. In short, they are not merely rhetorical or cosmetic. They have behavioural 
implications for decision-makers in respect of the actual conduct of policymaking, its 
presentation and implementation. Accordingly, they may be challenged when not honoured. 
Any challenge, of course, requires knowledge, vigilance, awareness and follow-up: 
functions which MEPs may perform in respect of any EU treaty commitments and which 
they may investigate with a view to performing in respect of the Euratom Treaty.  
 
It behoves each EU institution to uphold the transparency, openness, democracy and 
accountability norms. The European Parliament is not the custodian of these norms. It may, 
however, become their de facto guardian. This would be an avenue open to it. It has the 
merit of being non-provocative, non-expansionary, non-threatening vis-à-vis the unique 
competences of the Commission and the Council, and therefore unlikely to provoke 
downright opposition on the part of the Member State governments. 
 
Especially at a point of enlargement and impending further enlargement to nascent 
democracies, it would be very difficult for governments in practice to object to MEPs 
seeking to sustain democratic values, norms and behaviour themselves by virtue of their 
position as the elected representatives of the people; as collectively members of European 
political parties committed to upholding democratic, open, accountable and transparent 
political practices both internally within the parties; internally within the EP – in terms of 
intra-party and inter-party relations; and externally in terms of their relations with both other 
EU institutions (Commission, Council, Committee of the Regions, ESC) and national 
parliaments. 
 
III.2.2.2. Constitutional 
 
The constitutional expression of these values has been developed by (a) successive revisions 
of the treaties establishing the EU; (b) reform of inter-institutional relations whether through 
inter-institutional declarations, trialogue agreements, Codes of Conduct or through formal 
amendment to specific articles of the relevant treaties. An unspoken but guiding principle 
for the European Parliament, notably since the period from the time of the first direct 
elections to after the adoption of its Draft Treaty establishing the European Union in 1984, 
has been that of anything that is not expressly prohibited by the treaties is implicitly 
permitted until the governments decide otherwise. This facilitated the development of the 
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European Parliament’s powers on a gradual, small steps basis. It was complemented by the 
grander vision of a big step forward (most keenly epitomised by explicitly federal 
recommendations for treaty reforms to lead to a bicameral, co-equal legislature based on the 
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament). 
 
It remains the basis for a continuing pragmatic testing of the boundaries and limits to (a) 
what Member Governments will tolerate themselves individually and (b) collectively as the 
European Council and Council of Ministers and (c) the Commission will accede to in terms 
of the role that the European Parliament’s members seek for the European Parliament. Many 
of the legislative powers now exercised by the EP were seen as radical and unacceptable not 
so long ago. There is no good reason why the EP should desist from seeking to exercise an 
appropriate, even radical, role for itself in respect of the Euratom Treaty, and many of the 
issues that fall both under its remit and that of the EU treaty pillars. 
 
III.2.2.3. Practical 
 
The practical implications of attachment to these norms is reflected in the often innovative 
and teleological way in which MEPs have sought to give effect to them in respect of a whole 
range of policy matters regardless of the official legal base under which an item falls. Of 
particular interest are items subject to ‘soft law’ developments, and those which potentially 
might be dealt with under different articles of either different pillars of the EU treaty, or 
under another EC treaty. It has not been unknown for items to be tabled under treaty articles 
which permit the minimum involvement of the European Parliament. 
 
III.2.2.4. Remedy: vigilance 
 
MEPs’ vigilance has meant that the legal base of proposals could be challenged with a view 
to insisting on the European Parliament having a rightful say in the process. Equally, even 
where it has not been possible to change the legal basis for a proposal, MEPs have been 
adept at exploiting inter-institutional understandings, codes of conduct, and developing new 
procedures, to gain either an opportunity to express a view, or to open up a channel as a 
precedent for future EP inputs. 
 
Action: Chapter 4 - EP should issue own initiative opinions. Chapter 4 on investment 
permits the Commission to obtain the ESC’s opinion on programmes to facilitate 
coordinated development of nuclear energy production targets and types of investment to 
realise them. Such information should be made readily available to MEPs who should issue 
their opinion on the Commission’s illustrative programmes, regardless of whether or not an 
opinion is desired by the Commission or not. MEPs should then publicise their opinion and 
the fact that it has been transmitted to the Commission. They should give a copy for 
information to national parliaments and both MPs and MEPs should ask pertinent questions 
in parliament of national ministers to elicit a government response to their opinion. 
 
This would not require a treaty change as such, rather a change in practice which could be 
subsequently incorporated into a treaty amendment. Certainly, the political capital to be 
made out of an own initiative opinion is potentially vast on the technical front, on matters 
relating to transparency in respect of public health, safety and interest. 
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Action: link to the idea of presenting MEPs as voice and representative of the people, 
guardian of fundamental liberties and especially of good government practice (including 
respect for the rule of law, democracy, accountability, transparency and openness). 
 
III.2.3. Opportunities 
 
The IGCs have reformed the EU treaties in ways which impact upon inter-institutional 
relations but which have also considerably expanded the scope of policy competence for 
those institutions. The norms to which the EU is attached in some respects provide an over-
arching rationale and cover for a process which expressly expands the scope of integration 
into highly sensitive and contentious areas (in terms of modifying member governments’ 
former sovereignty or exclusive competence over them). They also provide a cover for the 
fact that for reasons associated with the sensitive nature of expanding the competence of the 
European Parliament’s legislative authority over these areas, there has not been a systematic 
corresponding, logical expansion of the European Parliament’s actual powers. 
 
Action: MEPs might construe the EP as a virtual legislature with full legislative authority 
over all policy areas subject to policymaking by the Commission and the Council in order to 
ensure that the EU’s norms are respected and upheld. They should explore the possibility of 
the EP ‘shadowing’ decision-making where universalised co-decision is not explicitly 
provided in order to ascertain how and if the EP’s views/voice would differ fundamentally 
from the decision taken. 
 
Action: This means that they must seek out every opportunity to make known the EP’s 
voice and views whether expressly provided for in the treaties or not. Especially in the case 
where the treaties do not make sufficient provision for MEPs to give their views, they must 
seek a means of so doing in order to uphold and apply the underlying values and norms of 
the EU treaties to the Euratom treaty. 
 
Since it is highly unlikely that all decision-making even under the EU treaty will be subject 
to universal co-decision, the EP should consider whether it can further exploit pillars II and 
III, and be especially vigilant on matters relating to international organisations, international 
crime, and illegal cross-frontier movement of dangerous substances. It should interpret 
flexibly and expansively matters falling under these pillars to engineer greater access for 
itself, both informal and official, to information. 
 
Action: exploit Chapter 5 on Joint undertakings to seek information on participation by a 
third state, international organisation or a national of a third state in the financing or 
management of a joint undertaking. (Arts 46-48). Pillars II and III do not provide adequate 
means for the European Parliament to exercise its functions but they are sufficiently vague 
to permit a range of questions to be asked of the other institutions. Given the overlap 
between them and pillar I, and the inexact policy boundaries and imprecise policy 
competence – and hence divergent legislative procedure provisions – between the EU Treaty 
(of Amsterdam and of Nice) and the Euratom Treaty, there is scope for (a) parliamentary 
challenge where MEPs feel their voice is not permitted; or is inadequately provided for; and 
(b) investigation as to how in future such lack of clarity may be improved in the name of 
democracy, openness, accountability, efficient and effective government. 
 
It is entirely appropriate and proper that MEPs should question any issue on which they feel 
inadequately informed; inadequately primed; inadequately prepared by not receiving timely 
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information; and inadequately inserted into the legislative process governing the decision on 
the proposal on the table.  
 
Action: combine attempts to set precedents under pillars II and III in respect of securing 
greater acknowledgement of the EP’s existence and ‘voice’ by the other institutions, with 
efforts to use the same tactics in respect of Euratom treaty provisions. To this end, it would 
be appropriate for MEPs to use all channels open to them – including the right to veto a 
proposal having budgetary implications, or international repercussions – to assert their 
legitimate right to have a say, and ultimately, of course, to be an equal partner in the process 
of approving or refusing approval for a proposal or course of action proposed by the 
Commission and/or member governments. 
 
By carefully selecting options likely to open doors, implementing chosen tactics within the 
context of an over-arching strategy, the EP could both seek to achieve particular goals in 
respect of its constitutional authority; in respect of its contribution to enhancing the EU’s 
capacity to sustain its normative values and develop an open, liberal democratic political 
culture, and be seen to be championing both openness and the interests of the citizens in 
respect of environmental and related concerns: transport, health and safety, water, air and 
food hygiene and safety, chemical and industrial processes, relations with third countries, 
safe disposal of toxic waste, defence, responsible import and export policies, agricultural, 
scientific advance from biotechnology to medical research, etc. 
 
There is probably no area of human endeavour which should remain outside the 
scrutiny remit of the European Parliament either implicitly or explicitly.  
 
If the EP were to proceed accordingly, it would have to carefully choose tactics least likely 
to (unnecessarily) arouse a reflex knee-jerk reaction on the part of either anti-Europeans, 
Euro-cynics or those with vested interests (government, private or NGO sector) in secrecy 
and the exclusion of public scrutiny.  
 
If an activity takes places within the territory of the EU that affects the public domain, then 
the EP could justify a legitimate claim in having an interest in ensuring that it has the ability 
to scrutinise it in the name of the public good. EP interventions must be timely, relevant and 
achievable and ideally tied to an over-arching strategy of persuasion. 
III.2.4. Persuasion 
 
The European Parliament cannot afford to be seen to be abdicating responsibility: it is the 
only institution able to aggregate interests, give voice to and act as champion of the people. 
No matter how open and responsive the Commission is, this role is not one that it can 
consistently perform in a way that it clearly linked to choices predicated on political and 
ideological premises, that translate into articulated goals having majority support. 
 
The EP needs a strategy having several components. This means prioritising and combining 
several negotiating tactics to secure a clearly defined end goal. For example: 
 a gradualist small steps approach (securing informal inter-institutional arrangements to 
exchange information, allow MEPs access to letters, briefing, documents etc on an 
informal but systematic basis, for example), 
 combined with a tactic to codify small changes in practice (derived, possibly from the 
former) and entrench them in formal inter-institutional agreements,  
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 medium level negotiations to incorporate these in treaty articles, worded as generally as 
possible, to  
 full-blown treaty revision designed to universalise co-decision. 
 
The first three would be amenable to persuasion and bargaining, possibly coupled with 
carefully targeted use of threats deploying EP existing power to maximum advantage. 
 
The EP might persuade the Commission to share information (including technical 
documents such as procedural papers, guidelines, principles, recommendations to member 
states with regard to revenue or mining (Art 70) regulations, etc) even where this is not 
explicitly required under the Euratom Treaty. For example, it could systematically ask the 
Commission for copies of information and develop with the Commission a practice of 
information sharing. (For example, the Commission did agree to the request for a copy of 
the Council guidelines on Euratom loans). 
 
It might also seek information on the activities and financial commitments of the Supplies 
Agency (under Chapter6). In particular, the EP may have special interest in the work of the 
Agency within the framework of agreements concluded with a third state or international 
organisation. (Art 64; Art 74). 
 
The most obvious threat open to the EP is to withhold assent on spending, especially non-
compulsory expenditure, and to query and withhold assent for spending relating to 
international agreements, enlargement, or research programmes. The anomalous situation in 
respect of co-decision of Framework programmes and the ‘consultation facultative’ 
approach under Euratom ‘framework programmes’ is plainly unhelpful. The EP could use 
the opportunity offered by the development of the 6th Framework Programme to move 
towards closing the gap between the two, possibly by seeking to introduce conciliation 
mechanisms. 
 
In addition, other programmes offer opportunities to investigate (i) the procedural provisions 
for timely and influential EP involvement, deliberation and participation in determining the 
outcome; and (ii) the scope of the programme. For example, under Eloise and programmes 
dealing with coastal zone and water management and the environment, it would seem 
appropriate for the EP’s relevant committee to ensure that account is taken of nuclear 
waste/toxic waste disposal and management, given the location of some nuclear reactors. 
 
MEPs might undertake an own initiative report on evaluating the legal and operational 
‘fitness’ of procedures and rules in applicant states as to nuclear safety provisions using the 
potential offered by inter-parliamentary committees to ‘open up’ a dialogue; and to access 
reports that applicants have to submit to Council on their ability to meet and implement 
performance criteria, containment requirements, civil emergency procedures, safety 
requirements for nuclear power plants, and transportation of fissile material and nuclear 
waste. This could then be used as the basis for EP recommendations addressed to the other 
institutions, and made public to and/or through national parliaments. 
 
If the EP exercises co-decision in respect of such programmes which contain explicit 
references to matter pertinent to Euratom or to related matters, then there is a case for 
stressing the anomaly between that treaty and Euratom. It would be inconceivable that the 
EP’s more extensive role under one treaty on such sensitive public health issues would be 
reduced in order to accommodate political niceties and objections which underpin a 
negligible role for it under Euratom. 
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There is also scope to creatively interpret articles to introduce a rolling process of approval 
by QMV in the Council in which the EP seeks to make any change subject to EP 
consultation and approval on a case by case basis (cf. Art 9.2). Similarly, it could pursue a 
strategy of seeking to upgrade provisions for its consultation, to one where the issue of a 
formal opinion, or preferably assent or co-decision is required (e.g. Article 76). 
 
Chapter 2, section 3 (Art 24ff) is open to creative interpretation. Art 24.1 allows the Council 
to adopt security regulations on a proposal from the Commission. The EP could seek 
clarification of the basis for this (and voting requirement, if any) coupled with an attempt to 
institute a procedure for consultation of the EP by either the Commission or, preferably, the 
Council. It could also raise questions on this item alone, and possibly seek cross-
examination hearings. 
 
In addition, given the wide responsibilities of the Commission under Euratom, including for 
example in respect of inspections, and the lack of report back or follow-up to the European 
Parliament, MEPs might systematically begin to question the Commission about the state of 
play, progress on inspections, results, documents, and access to sites. This could be 
particularly useful to MEPs if a member state proves reluctant to submit to inspection, if 
there is prevarication and lack of openness, and if Court referral is imminent (Art 81). 
 
The EP could also seek to follow up any sanctions, and to develop dialogue with national 
parliaments on relevant issues relating to infringements and enforcement. Together, 
parliamentary cooperation might assist in opening up and rendering this aspect of Euratom 
more transparent. 
 
Under Chapter 8 on property ownership, there are plenty of avenues to explore in 
expansively interpreting the EP’s right to be consulted under Article 90. 
 
Chapter 9 on the nuclear common market is one which might lend itself to formal treaty 
amendment, notably in respect of Article 96 where the EP might seek not merely to be 
consulted but at least to be on a par with the ESC.  
 
Chapter 10 on external relations probably offers the most potential for EP intervention, 
following KEDO and general public interest in and concern about the export, import and 
transport of nuclear materials and waste. The EP might seek to amend Article 106. However, 
in line with a less ambitious approach, again it must exploit all avenues under Euratom and 
the other treaties to increase the volume and utility of information it is able to access in order 
to enhance the effectiveness of its work, to make consulting it, or seeking its advice 
desirable (both in their own right but also in the negative sense of any omission risking 
public confrontation) and of any questions tabled to the Commission, Council or within 
national parliaments on relevant matters. 
 
Overall, it is clear that although the EP is recognised as an institution (as the Assembly) 
under Euratom, its functions are minimal. 
 
III.2.5. Constraints in the EP 
 
None of these tactics is realisable unless there is a good probability of maintaining a winning 
majority behind them in the EP. Great care needs to be taken in assessing ‘opponents’ (from 
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Member Governments to vested interests) and in building and sustaining an environment 
inside the EP and outside receptive to EP wishes in respect of the broad strategy relating to 
remedying the democratic deficit, lack of transparency and accountability in the policy 
sectors covered by Euratom. 
 
A strategy of mixing and deploying these tactics strategically and selectively is essential.  It 
needs to be coupled with a strategy of deliberation with national parliaments both because 
national parliaments might be an instrument to be used in softening up and developing a 
receptive domestic environment, and also because national parliaments have a role in the 
ratification of formal treaty revisions which can only proceed on the basis of unanimity 
among the member governments. 
 
Action: National parliaments might also be encouraged to sensitise domestic governments 
and public opinion to highly contentious public interest issues such as nuclear reactor safety 
(at the time of enlargement negotiations) where the absence of generally agreed safety 
criteria must beg many questions both of the EU and of the member governments.  
 
Action: The EP could easily champion the cause of public health on this occasion and use 
its dissatisfaction with the lack of standards to justify both demands for financial 
appropriations to assist applicants to reach reasonable standards, and to withhold financial 
approval pending EP satisfaction on this score. This could raise fears about an EP threat to 
refuse to endorse enlargement. This might be a powerful inducement to governments to 
accede to some of its ‘lesser’ requests in terms of it having a genuine decisional role in 
respect of Euratom issues. 
 
Action: This could be expanded to include EP calls for due diligence and vigilance 
procedures.  
 
The EP would need to be satisfied that applicants made use of technical assistance, for 
example, in an effective way which satisfied the EP. There would be room for the EP to 
devise procedures which allowed it to verify for itself that satisfactory measures were both 
drafted and implemented.  
 
Action: Linkage to adjacent technical training schemes, such as Phare and Tacis, training of 
trainers, Marie Curie Scholarships, etc could all be explored to vindicate such an approach: 
again, in the name of universalising good practice. This again would open the door both to 
greater inter-institutional collaboration on technical information exchange and also to 
practices which developed a standard operating procedure involving the EP. If this were 
coupled with the EP demonstrating at least to other institutions and to Member Governments 
consistently the usefulness of its inputs, it might be possible for MEPs to persuade Member 
Governments with an interest in treaty reform (especially regarding Euratom and the issue of 
nuclear reactor safety on the eve of enlargement) to include it as an agenda item for the 
upcoming IGC. 
 
In short, being the champion of the people’s cause in this respect is not likely to be enough 
to secure the fundamental change the EP ideally seeks. It needs alliances (possibly with 
suppliers) and political champions. The latter might include transit states for the transport of 
nuclear waste, those bordering new states with ‘dubious reactor safety levels’. They should 
include preferably one or more of the states likely to be in the Council Presidency sequence 
up to and including the ratification of enlargement treaties and the next IGC treaty reform. 
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Using the nuclear issue to open up the case for universalising good parliamentary 
practice. 
 
The high profile and sensitive nature of nuclear issues means that the EP should be able to 
make political capital out of the incomprehensible differences between the treaties over the 
type and extent of role the EP is permitted. 
 
The EP needs to be creative in interpreting all the treaties on all issues related to the 
central concerns of the Euratom Treaty so that it insists on an input, no matter how 
small, and sets up a pattern of EP involvement which it would be embarrassing for 
Member Governments to try and curb or deny when MEPs transform this into a call 
for proper parliamentary scrutiny, co-decision and formal, legitimate legislative input. 
 
III.2.6. Some possible avenues 
 
Energy policy 
In order to meet energy policy objectives and to maintain energy investment at the level 
needed to meet those objectives, the EC used its financial instruments to the full, particularly 
the Euratom borrowing arrangements and subsequent EC instrument for borrowing and 
lending. There is scope for a degree of post hoc control and oversight by the EP which might 
be skilfully developed to open the door to ongoing scrutiny, consultation and dialogue. This 
is necessary to shift the EP from a position of virtual invisibility in this sector (coupled with 
null-legislative role, to one of neutral influence – worth consulting for views, but essentially 
based on continued legislative impotence – to quickly shifting gear to make EP voice and 
consent essential).  
 
One of the simplest and least provocative ways of demonstrating EP concern over lack of 
transparency and accountability might be to draw attention to differences regarding 
decisions in adjacent areas. Euratom versus Nice treaty provisions on research programmes 
such as Framework 6, for instance, might be used to try and lever more of a role under 
Euratom for the EP by insisting on the desirability in principle of subjecting all research 
programmes to the same forms of political oversight and accountability. 
 
The issue is whether this can be achieved within the framework of a revised Euratom Treaty 
alone, or whether through the existing formal committee structures, and informal practical 
agreements and arrangements with the Commission (such as access to exchanges of letters) 
and other institutions at a pre-decisional stage. 
 
There is a case for the EP to have a regular energy colloque with relevant ministers, 
Commission and Euratom officials, etc. This would provide: 
 a forum for face-to-transmission of information, 
 the basis for asking that before such colloques, the EP committee be given full access to 
relevant documentation (and, in the event that only partial, incomplete, late or ad hoc 
access occurs, making political capital out of that and going on to seek openness and 
transparency in the name of the people and democratic responsibility and 
accountability), 
 scrutiny opportunities and the chance to cross-examine (possibly in public hearings) 
officials. Closed meetings would probably be more effective in terms of creating a 
climate of mutual trust, facilitating greater disclosure of pertinent information, and 
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developing a working practice of growing mutual consultation so that this de facto 
scrutiny can later be transformed into de facto treaty entrenched rights, 
 a chance to develop a more coherent overall EP approach to the broad issues raised by 
energy policy, including civil nuclear power prospects and current developments, which 
other committees need to consider in conjunction with the specialist committees of the 
EP, 
 EP links with national parliaments might also be exploited to develop a forum and 
strategy for discussing relevant issues, and turning that into subsequent requests for 
legally recognised right to influence and decide policy, 
 this in turn may help the EP to evolve an approach for ‘normalising’ energy policy 
considerations and developing a requirement for an energy policy risk assessment to be 
conducted in all areas where relevant matters arise (especially environment, transport, 
building, urban/rural, agricultural, health and safety, promotion of research (Chap.1 ) 
external relations (Chap. 10) and so on), 
 this in turn strengthens the case for universal co-decision across all pillars and treaties, 
 it also may be a means of persuading treaty reformers, should the Euratom treaty be 
renewed, to include appropriate provisions for EP oversight. 
 
III.2.7. Open doors: EP post hoc inputs to be exploited 
 
The above normalisation of energy policy broadly conceived carries the risk of duplication 
of effort, contradictory decisions and need for wider consultation and hence slower 
processing of information up to the point of decision delivery. However, this is not sufficient 
a risk to warrant retaining the status quo. Experience, particularly in respect of pillars II and 
III, shows the potency of a gradual approach, even in the face of the opposition of the 
entrenched vested interests of specific member states. (We recall the special position, for 
example, of France and the UK in respect of pillar II). 
 
In addition, the EP may choose to use its very limited powers in respect of pillar III (notably 
for information purposes on matters relating to terrorism and Europol) to lever itself into the 
inter-institutional consultation and decision-making processes concerning Europol, its 
activities, and counter-terrorism (eg nuclear terrorism, use of low level waste, transport of 
fissile materials etc, civil emergencies) to exact recognition by the other institutions and 
Member Governments, that it has something worthwhile to say. 
 
Moreover, this approach would be consistent with honouring the requirements under Article 
2e Euratom concerning appropriate supervision of nuclear materials and guarding against 
their diversion to purposes other than those for which they are intended: whether military or 
whether misappropriated for illegal means, re-export or whatever. 
 
No strategy adopted by the EP will succeed without the support of a majority of members 
within the EP (sufficient in number to sustain support for the strategy overall). It would be 
sensible, therefore, to build into the strategy a tactic for involving national parliaments 
(whose role in respect of EU decision-making is so limited as to beg for options for greater 
involvement). This would have the advantage of widening the scope of discussion, creating 
other forums to raise pertinent issues through parliamentary procedures within the Member 
States, raise the profile of those issues and legitimise them via national intermediaries (so 
that the EP cannot be vilified as being out of touch or merely ‘trouble-making’ or ‘in search 
of a relevant role’), and build a broader based consensus as to the legitimacy and 
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justifiability of parliamentarians per se having a voice which is heard, respected and acted 
upon by member governments. 
 
It may also be a way of softening up wavering governments should any of them eventually 
seek to place Euratom treaty reform as such on the IGC agenda. The constructive approach 
could be bolstered, as the (then) EP Committee on Energy, Research and Technology in its 
Opinion for the Committee on institutional Affairs on the Treaty of Amsterdam, by the EP 
systematically deleting all expenditure based on problematic articles of the Euratom Treaty 
until such time as those articles are brought in line with those of the EC Treaty as amended 
by the TEU, the Amsterdam Treaty (and, subsequently, Nice Treaty). 
 
III.2.8. Enlargement 
 
In the context of enlargement and all pre-enlargement discussions, as well as in respect of 
agreements with third countries, there may be scope for MEPs to augment their capacity to 
scrutinise what is happening; to enhance their investigative actions; and ultimately to query 
(and refuse) discharge of financial arrangements, or endorsement of international 
agreements, or accession arrangements. 
 
EP pre-decisional opportunities to be developed 
 
In addition, the EP may wish to look more closely at energy investment plans and related 
borrowing, related to: 
 Commission energy demand and supply models, 
 bilateral cooperative agreements (EAEC Art 103) with energy suppliers such as 
Australia (on securing uranium supplies) and Canada (on safeguard arrangements in 
respect of ‘sensitive nuclear operations’), 
 international considerations, such as NSA, 
 arrangements for closing reactors in would-be EU member states, 
 arrangements regarding full disclosure of information about reactors on the EU’s 
borders, including the appropriate levels of education, training and skills possessed by 
the local staff, 
 means of ensuring good practice in nuclear energy processing, health and safety, 
transport etc., 
 assessing and requiring comparability of technical standards and safety standards across 
the board. 
 
 
Developing its investigative capabilities into a strategy to acquire real legislative 
decision-making power. 
 developing its investigative capacity by, for example, scrutinising and making 
recommendations on the criteria for performance evaluation guides (this might be an 
avenue for the EP to seek and exert oversight, and at the minimum to have a hearing or 
discussion on these matters. It may wish this to be used as an opportunity to ‘embarrass’ 
governments into being more open with MEPs about matters that directly concern the 
public but which are often clouded in technical smoke), 
 seeking access to applicants’ reports to the Council on their ability to meet and 
implement performance criteria, containment requirements, civil emergency procedures, 
safety requirements for nuclear power plants, and for the transport and disposal of fissile 
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material and nuclear waste. (A tactic towards this might be to hold a colloque on these 
issues with the applicants in closed session, first), 
 assessing (by investigating, if necessary on the basis of an own initiative) the legal and 
operational ‘fitness’ of procedures and rules in applicant states as to their provisions 
regarding nuclear safety; and holding a colloque on the findings complete with 
recommendations on follow-up provisions and their prompt implementation where 
measures are deemed to be inadequate.  
 
The linked advantages to this, include: 
1. It would provide plenty of scope for constantly keeping these issues before the public 
and especially before the enlargement negotiators, Member State and EU officials. 
2. It would enable the EP to set up its own dialogue with applicants on a sensitive issue 
which would enhance its ability independently to receive information not mediated by 
other EU institutions, to discuss these issues with pre-entrants, to make 
recommendations accordingly directed to whichever institutions are appropriate, and to 
seek – where desirable – programmes for improvements in the general public interest of 
those in the EU and seeking full EU membership. 
3. It would enable the EP to have a role in setting the broad parameters and requirements of 
standards in this field. 
4. It would enhance the EP’s general visibility as a parliament addressing relevant public 
interest issues on which governments are evasive. This, too, would enable the EP to 
develop its role as champion and voice of the people, and allow MEPs to demonstrate 
their ‘responsible’ and responsive character to the electorate both in the EU and would-
be members. 
5. It would provide an opportunity for MEPs to suggest the establishment of, or the use of 
existing inter-parliamentary committees with MPs from applicant/pre-entry states to 
engage in open dialogue on these issues. At the minimum, this could ‘open the door’ to a 
mechanism to grant them a right to discuss and try and influence the debate within the 
EU set-up – that is, shifting the legal basis subtly from one setting (Euratom) to another 
(EU) where co-decision is the norm, or is being sought under pillars II (for example, lest 
military contracts relative to the common defence and security policy fall within 
Euratom’s remit) and III (where appropriate). 
6. It might enable it to develop ad hoc arrangements to remove, via informal and possibly 
later formal, inter-institutional arrangements, the democratic deficit in specific areas. 
These are glaringly obvious under pillar III (where illegal trade in nuclear / fissile 
material for example escapes EP scrutiny). They are less obvious, but a potent source of 
developing an EP role, in respect of research policy across the board, and international 
agreements. The latter may be tied to the civilian use of nuclear material and related 
issues, but might also quite properly encroach on the European defence and security 
realm (where under pillar II EP power might be gradually expanded, and where 
cooperation among the appropriate EP committees might prove productive). 
7. It might be appropriate for the EP to look closely at the tactical opportunities for 
ensuring that Euratom meets its obligations under Art 2 (e) on the diversion of nuclear 
materials. This is an area where the EP may wish to develop closer links (unofficially or 
officially) with Europol with a view to developing (if this accords with security 
requirements which may operationally demand secrecy or closed interaction) the EP’s 
role under pillar III - slippage from Euratom to EU may well be desirable. 
 
In short, the political repercussions are such for the EP as an institution that it would have an 
educative and communication role that went beyond the more limited technical remit 
suggested by the activity in this seemingly very narrow and technical sphere: 
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 seeking observer status on any Council working party on relevant matters, such as the 
setting of standards, methods, procedures and funding of personnel, technical expertise, 
training of trainers, oversight of the trainers. 
 
The time required to set up and implement legislation (eg a directive) on something as 
sensitive as nuclear safety standards, or nuclear reactor safety harmonisation means that the 
EP strategy needs to be elaborated within a long perspective of up to ten years. Clearly, it 
needs to complement this with short and medium term goals regarding access to 
information, challenging the largely unaccountable roles of the Commission and Council, 
the lack of accountability of the Atomic Questions Group and tendency for Council to 
‘rubber stamp’ recommendations taken as ‘A’ points in Coreper. 
 
Here is an opportunity to go beyond a passive role to transforming this into an active role for 
the EP on the occasion of either, or both, pre-enlargement agreements, and the next IGC : 
seeking a legitimate, treaty revision to entrench an EP role – preferably based on a co-
decision right. Failing that, a right to have observer status coupled with a right to be 
consulted, issue an opinion which has to be heard and commented upon before any decision 
is taken; and to be allowed to follow-up, or failing that, to take an own initiative action to 
follow-up’ by way of ongoing scrutiny, might help to insert the EP more effectively into a 
highly sensitive, and probably excessively closed set of procedures and decision-making 
practices under Euratom. 
 
Whilst acknowledging that wholesale revision of Euratom is highly unlikely, not least 
because of the vested interests of member states committed to nuclear energy programmes 
(and the sizeable proportion of MEPs from across the EU opposed to nuclear energy), the 
EP cannot afford to be seen by the public to be silent about issues of nuclear safety either 
within the enlarged EU or further afield.  
 
This in turn raises problematic issues internal to the Commission in respect of responsibility 
for Art 101 and for Euratom External Relations. The EP might, at a minimum, seek 
clarification and repeatedly follow up proceedings. It already has a de facto position post-
Kedo in being consulted on agreements with third countries but needs to refine and 
accelerate its own internal procedures to be sure of having an impact. In short, it needs to act 
as a full legislative partner regardless of the formal limitations on its role. 
 
The overall advantage from improving the EP’s role under Euratom would seem to lie in the 
implications of that for all other legislative procedures in the EU which fall short of co-
decision. 
